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This dissertation presents an overview of interpreting during the Korean War by 
examining shifts in the positionality of interpreters during the preparatory, engagement, 
and conclusionary stages of the conflict. Here, the preparatory stage refers to the U.S. 
military occupation of south Korea (1945-1948), the engagement stage refers to period of 
active military engagement between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its 
allies against the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command (1950-1953), 
while the conclusionary stage refers to the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-1953). 
Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory and Moira Inghilleri’s (2005a) influential 
argument that interpreting takes place in a “zone of uncertainty,” this dissertation 
explores how new interpreting habitus emerged as the communicational purposes and 
power dynamics within the military field were oriented, disoriented, and reoriented with 
the progression of the conflict. The variation in who was allowed to act as an interpreter, 
the tasks interpreters were assigned, and the norms that dictated how interpreters should 
act and react during interpreted events indicates a need to reconsider traditional notions 
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1.1. Overview of Chapters 
The Korean War (1950-53) is remembered as an important event in international 
history because it was the first “United Nations War” (Edwards 2013, 1) and was dubbed 
as such because when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North 
Korea) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) on June 25, 1950, and in 
response the recently formed United Nations deployed the United Nations Command 
(UNC), a coalition of troops assembled from sixteen UN member states, to counter the 
North Korean attack. North Korea, in turn, would later be aided by troops dispatched by 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The multilingual makeup of the UNC required 
that the organization rely on the services of numerous interpreters who helped bridge the 
language gaps between coalition partners, facilitate communications with the local 
populace, and aid in the gathering of intelligence about the enemy. It is due to the 
presence of troops from various linguistic, cultural, and national backgrounds, and the 
significant role interpreters and translators played throughout the war that this internecine 
war has been recognized as “a particularly fertile ground for research on language” 
(Müller 1984, 83). 
The body of research on interlingual communication during the Korean War, 
however, remains relatively small, though some insightful research on interpreting and 
interpreters during the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-53) has been conducted and 
presented by scholars of Translation and Interpreting Studies (TIS). María Manuela 
Fernández Sánchez has published two papers, “Understanding the Role of Interpreting in 
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the Peacemaking Process at the Korean Armistice Negotiations (Panmunjom 1953)” 
(2010) and “A Bilingual Officer Remembers Korea: A Closer Look at Untrained 
Interpreters in the Korean War” (2012). On this topic both examine the technical and 
emotional difficulties interpreters faced while working at the armistice talks. Her findings 
indicate that interpreters at the armistice negotiations experienced role conflict, 
perceptions that their work was underappreciated, high performance expectations and 
perceived skill inadequacies, all of which have been identified as causes for “burnout” 
(Schwenke et al. 2014; Shlesinger 2007). 
In “Interpreting Conflicts and Conflicts in Interpreting: A Micro-historical 
Account of the Interpreting Activity in the Korean Armistice Negotiations,” Binhua 
Wang and Minhui Xu (2016) engage in a nuanced study of “post-hoc accounts” of 
interpreters who served at the Korean Armistice Negotiations. Wang and Xu examine the 
complex networks of relations that took form during the wartime negotiations and 
analyze the various conflicts that took place during interpreted events. These conflicts 
included disagreements over language use between the two sides, disputes between the 
interpreters and their military superiors arising from misconceptions about interpreting 
activity, and differences of opinion between different interpreters. The study reveals that 
the ethical code these interpreters adopted dictated that rather than acting as neutral 
mediators, which is often expected from professional interpreters in a civil setting, they 
act as loyal members of the military.  
Though these publications have provided much needed insight into the role 
interpreters played during the Korean Armistice Negotiations, a conspicuous shortcoming 
in the existing research on the Korean War is that it does not account for the activities of 
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interpreters at different stages and locales of the war. Previous research by Hillary Footitt 
and Michael Kelly (2018) and Jesus Baigorri-Jalon (2011) has demonstrated that 
interpreters play different roles during the preparatory process, the war operations, and 
the post-conflict period. During the preparatory process, interpreters are recruited to work 
in diplomacy and intelligence, but once direct warfare breaks out, interpreters are 
required to mediate communications among military personnel who speak different 
languages, facilitate interactions with local civilians, aid in the control of occupied 
territories, partake in to production of propaganda material, participate in the 
interrogation of prisoners of war and support the evacuation of non-combatants. At the 
end of hostilities, interpreters are required to work in peace negotiations, demobilization, 
and the management of resistance or liberation movements. While previous studies that 
examine interpreting during the Korean Armistice Talks have furthered our 
understanding of diplomatic interpreting within the military as a conflict neared its end, 
much remains to be said about the role of linguistic mediation while preparations for war 
are underway and contributions interpreters make “on the ground” while hostilities are 
unfolding.  
In an effort to address these gaps in research about interpreting during the 
Korean War, the current study engages in a comparative study of all three stages of the 
conflict, namely, 
(1) the preparatory phase – the U.S./U.S.S.R. military occupation of Korea 
(1945-48),  
(2) the engagement phase – the violent confrontation between the militaries of 
North and South Korea and their respective allies (1950-53), and, 
(3) the conclusionary phase – the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-53). 
 
By expanding the scope of research to include the events that led to the war, the period of 
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direct military engagement, and the circumstances that prompted its discontinuation, this 
study will provide a more comprehensive picture of wartime interpreting during the 
Korean conflict. The objective of this investigation is to reveal how the identity of 
interpreters and what it meant to interpret was oriented, disoriented, and reoriented by the 
shifting structures of hierarchy and power within the military field during the three stages 
of the Korean conflict. The basis of this approach is grounded in the assumption that 
interpreting is a socially-situated activity and, as such, who is allowed to function as an 
interpreter in any given context and what is perceived as legitimate interlingual mediation 
is liable to shift as the communicative objectives of social agents and organization, as 
well as the conditions under which interpreting takes place change.  
The empirical data presented in this dissertation draws from a diverse corpus that 
includes military documents, archival material, personal memoirs, biographies, 
interviews, historical studies and short stories. The documents collected from the online 
Korean History Database and the United States National Archives at College Park, which 
includes meeting notes, letters, and newspaper articles, are a crucial source of 
information on the positionality of interpreter within the various power structures that 
arose during different periods of the Korean conflict. The inclusion of these documents in 
my research is significant as they are previously unpublished and are therefore under 
scholarly examination for the first time.  
In addition to the archival documents, I also draw on a variety of biographical 
material (memoirs, autobiographies, and interviews). The use of these sources is often 
marginalized in social scientific research (Watson 1976, 95) as questions have been 
raised about the reliability of autobiographical accounts and the vulnerability of such 
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material to manipulation by other parties such as ethnographers, interpreters, and 
interviewers. Despite these potential shortcomings, many studies conducted within the 
social sciences make use of biographical materials, albeit with careful consideration of 
their application, because, as Perk (1998, 69) points out, the life stories told by 
individuals provide “a much closer view of personal involvement in the history, which 
may compensate for the chronological distance” in most history publications. 
Furthermore, what information individuals choose to include and omit, as well as the 
subjective manner in which this data is narrativized is a strong indicator of the narrator’s 
ethical beliefs, which can be as valuable as objective facts. Thus, I have opted to include 
excerpts from the writings of military interpreters who worked with the U.S. military 
during the Korean War and the Korean Armistice Negotiations.  
Lastly, I consult fictional representations of interpreters and translators, or 
transfiction, written during this period by Korean writers and U.S. military personnel who 
lived in Korea during the U.S. military occupation and/or the Korean War. As stated 
earlier, historical records which mention interpreters or interpreting during the Korean 
War are limited. Due to the absence of relevant transcripts or recordings, it is difficult to 
engage in traditional discourse analysis and reveal how individual interpreters worked 
within the social structures in which they were positioned. The fictional works seen in 
this study provide vivid portrayals of communicative exchanges mediated by interpreters 
caught in the midst of the Korean conflict. Such depictions of translators and interpreters 
in literary works are valuable sources of knowledge about the interpreting profession in 
history. An added benefit of engaging with transfictional works is the fact that fiction can 
speak to the emotional aspects of translation in a way that nonfiction often does not, and, 
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as such, is a particularly useful resource for “exploring the impact of feelings like desire, 
empathy, shame, anger and fear” on interlingual communication (Spitzl 2014, 363-368). 
Such details are particularly relevant to the present study insofar as it examines how 
interlingual mediation takes place under the pressures of conflict, during which tensions 
are high and violence is likely to erupt at any moment. While this study is grounded in a 
macro-sociological approach, it recognizes the fact that excerpts taken from fiction offer 
details about interpreting in the context of violent warfare which would otherwise be 
inaccessible, and thus views them as useful resources for providing description and 
analysis of interpreting practices during the Korean conflict.  
The contents of this dissertation are organized as follows: chapter one reviews 
the existing literature within TIS that engages with translators and interpreters during 
violent conflict situations. It introduces the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of 
field, capital, habitus, and zones of uncertainty as the theoretical basis of this study. 
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework is particularly effective when applied to the study of 
interpreters because interpreting often takes place in social contexts in which differing 
communicational objectives and unequal social status among agents and institutions 
engaged in interpreted events is the norm. The Bourdieusian framework introduced in 
this chapter serves as the foundation for the central argument of this study: that the 
identity of the interpreter and the norms of interpreting are prone to change as the 
communicational purposes and the power dynamics between social agents engaged is 
oriented, disoriented, and reoriented by changes that emerge within a social field.  
 Chapter two examines how interlingual communicative encounters were 
mediated during the U.S. military occupation of southern Korea. I first elaborate on the 
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circumstances that led to the division and occupation of Korea by the U.S.S.R. and the 
U.S. and reveal how faulty planning by the United States military, Korea’s history of 
subjugation under Japanese colonial rule, the frustration felt by the Korean public 
towards foreign intervention by the two superpowers, and the ideological hostilities 
brought on by the onset of the Cold War created tensions between American officials 
within the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), the Korean 
public, and Korean civilian interpreters working for the Military Government. Memoirs, 
military records, fictional works, and newspaper articles are consulted to reveal why the 
Military Government earned the moniker “the interpreter’s government” and what caused 
widespread negativity to be felt towards the so-called “malicious interpreters” working 
for the U.S. military.   
Chapter three begins with a brief historical review of the Korean War. It explains 
why the military brass of the United States opted to rely on interpreters provided by the 
South Korean military rather than train its own linguists. The tensions that arose between 
UN Liaison Group officers (interpreters), U.S. Korean Military Assistant Group (KMAG) 
officers, and Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) unit commanders during interpreted 
events are the main focus of this portion of the dissertation. I argue that although both 
KMAG officers and ROKA commanders sought to gain control over the interpreting 
habitus, the balance of power between the two sides and the mutual animosity felt 
between UN Liaison Group officers and their military superiors prevented either of these 
interlocutors from fully asserting their dominance during interpreted events held during 
the war.  
Chapter four focuses on the form and function interpreting took during the 
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Korean Armistice Negotiations. I consider a range of factors, such as the affiliation of 
United Nations Command (UNC) interpreters, their military rank, the diplomatic 
conference setting, and the presence of enemy interpreters who monitored the 
interpreter’s work. These factors collectively served to uncompromisingly constrain the 
interpreter during the armistice talks, forcing them to function as “faithful echoes” of 
their military superiors when interpreting. I argue that while institutions of power, such as 
the U.S. military at the Korean Armistice Negotiations, may possess the power to compel 
interpreters to function as so-called linguistic conduits, illusionary assumptions of what 
constitutes objective approaches to interpreting can hamper rather than encourage 
coherent interlingual/cultural communication and discourage the interpreter’s moral and 
professional unaccountability.   
Chapter five ties the study together by comparing how the communicational 
goals and power dynamics between interlocutors engaged in interpreted events during 
each stage of the Korean conflict led to the formation of unique interpreting habitus 
specific to the context in which interpreting was taking place. It considers how changes to 
the interpreter’s position within the military field influenced their ability to ensure that 
the communication objectives of social agents engaged in interpreted events are met. I 
argue that while interpreters can take on different roles based on the contexts in which 
they engage, interventionist tactics are often the result of pragmatic necessity rather than 
ulterior personal or political motives. On the other hand, mechanisms instituted to 
guarantee the neutrality of the interpreter and the fidelity of their words to the original 
statement are often imposed to ensure the maintenance of structures of power, encourage 
moral unaccountability, and ultimately obfuscate communication in order to satisfy the 
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strategic aims of the institutions of power. 
 
1.2. Literature Review: Interpreters in Violent Conflict 
While early scholars of translation of interpreting in the 1960s were interested in 
issues of so-called “equivalence,” the interests of the field shifted in the mid-1980s 
towards the exploration of issues of power, ideology, resistance, ethics, and activism 
which revealed translators and interpreters to be active participants in the transfer of 
written texts and oral exchanges rather than unbiased conduits (Even-Zohar 1978, 
Hermans 1985, Lefevere 1992, Niranjana 1992, Spivak 1993, Toury 1995, Venuti 1995, 
Mikkelson 1998; Wadensjö 1998; Angelelli 2004a, 2004b; Shlesinger and Pöchhacker 
2010). These studies challenged previous notions that interlingual/cultural 
communication should or even can take place in a neutral vacuum and argued that in fact 
that translation and interpreting actually occurs within confrontational social spaces in 
which different parties vie for power by controlling the form and flow of linguistic 
exchange.  
Due to the confrontational nature of translation and interpreting, metaphors of 
violence were often used as part of the language employed during discussions among 
scholars in the field, yet studies conducted in the field rarely engaged with the topic of 
interlingual communication within the context of violent conflict. Myriam Salma-Carr 
was one of the first to point out the longstanding paradox in TIS to view translation in 
terms of violent metaphors yet represent the individual language mediator as situated in a 
position of “in-between” where risks to their wellbeing are “manageable” (Salama-Carr 
2007, 1). She urged researchers to engage with actual situations of political, cultural, and 
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ideological confrontation in which the translator/interpreter is firmly embedded in rather 
than merely serving as a metaphor for the tensions and conflicts that inevitably arise 
during intercultural communication. A large body of studies have since examined how 
language mediators function under conditions of fierce hostility.  
 Given that wars are typically fought between countries and peoples who spak and 
write in different languages, there is an inherent requirement for interlingual 
communication within the context of warfare. While the ability to communicate with 
one’s allies and adversaries is crucial to the waging of war, the role of translators and 
interpreters is often overlooked by the media, policymakers, and scholars outside of 
Translation and Interpreting Studies (TIS). As Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly note, 
Until the turn of the twenty-first century, foreign languages, translation and 
interpreting were almost totally absent from discussions about war and conflict, 
receiving little attention from academics (such as military historians, translation 
scholars, and international relations specialists), from the military themselves, or 
from the general public. The tacit assumption seemed to be that most wars are 
fought with allies, and against enemies, who obligingly speak our own language.  
(Footitt and Kelly 2018, 166) 
 
Rosendo and Persaud (2016, 2) surmised that possible reasons for the lack of 
historical records and studies pertaining to interpreters may be due to the primacy of the 
written word over the spoken word, which implies that the work of translators is more 
likely to have been examined than that of interpreters due to the often perceived lower 
social status of these spoken language brokers, and the fact that when historians leave 
records of historical events, they must choose what details to include and which to leave 
out, meaning that the participation of individuals of secondary roles, such as interpreters, 
tend to go unrecorded. Afterall, the annals of war do not provide details about every 
human activity but tend to chronicle the “great deeds of great men, statesmen, generals” 
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(Burke 1992, 3-4). Even on those rare occasions when the presence of the interpreter is 
acknowledged, records often lack detailed descriptions or commentary on the most-often 
unnamed interpreter’s work. The marginalization of interpreting and interpreters is also 
evident in visual portrayals of wartime interpreters, as Fernández Sánchez notes that 
interpreters are very rarely the focus of the wartime photographs in which they are 
featured, and “this position reflects both the function of interpreters as mediators and the 
marginality of their role” (Fernández Sánchez 2014, 173).  
More scholarly interest in interpreting in the history of conflict has begun to 
emerge over the past several decades within TIS, as evinced by the works of authors such 
as Gaiba (1998), Roland (1999), Delisle and Woodsworth (2012), Baigorri (2014). This 
rise in research on interpreting in violent conflict is the result of trends that have emerged 
since the “cultural turn” in TIS. Particularly relevant to the present study is research 
conducted on the involvement of interpreters in modern conflicts, such as the role of 
interpreters working with French, British, and U.S. troops during World War I 
(Heimburger 2012) and in the campaigns in Europe and the Pacific during World War II 
(McNaughton 2007, Takeda 2009, Tryuk 2012, Footitt and Kelly 2012, 2018; Footitt and 
Tobia 2013). Other publications report on recent African conflicts in the Darfuri (Hari 
2008), the Former Yugoslav Republics (Stahuljak 2000, 2009; Dragovic-Drouet 2007; 
Baker C. 2010a, 2010b; Kelly and Baker 2012), and Iraq and Afghanistan (Baker, M. 
2006, 2010; Inghilleri 2008, 2009, 2010; Tipton 2011; Rafael 2007, 2012). There are also 
revealing first-hand accounts of military linguists’ experiences in the U.S. detention 
facility in Guantánamo Bay (Saar and Novak 2005).  
There have also been a number of collected works published on the topic of 
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translation and violent conflict. The studies collected in Translating and Interpreting 
Conflict, edited by Salama-Carr (2007) engage with topics including the role of “fixers” 
working for Western Media during the U.S. invasion of Iraq (Palmer 2007), translation 
and interpreting practices during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Dragovic-Drouet 
2007), translators and interpreters during the Opium War (Wong 2007), and several 
more. A special issue of the academic journal The Translator (Inghilleri and Harding 
2010) entitled “Translation and Violent Conflict” discusses a range of relevant topics, 
such as the decision to and consequences of interpreting during the war in Iraq (Inghilleri 
2010), narratives of translators and interpreters in war zones and the construction of 
narratives of conflict by translators and interpreters (Baker 2010), the translation of 
Bosnian and Serbian poetry during the violent breakup of Yugoslavia (Jones 2007), the 
management of interpreters recruited to work in British war crimes trials following World 
War II (Tobia 2007), and the depiction of translators as traitors in historical records, film, 
fiction, and news reports (Beebee 2007). The special issue of Linguistica Antverpiensia 
(Rosendo and Persaud 2016) on “Interpreting in Conflict Situations and in Conflict Zones 
throughout History” is also a valuable source for research on the history of interpreting. It 
contains a collection of studies on the history of interpreters in various historical contexts 
such as interpreters working for the Dutch East India Company during the Sino-Dutch 
War (1661-1662) (Chang 2016), French interpreters during World War I (Cowley 2016), 
interpreting in Nazi concentration camps during World War II (Tryuk 2016), as well as 
the role of mediators in more recent conflicts in Afghanistan (Tălpaș 2016) and Kosova 
and Macedonia (Todorova 2016).  
Taken as a whole, this growing body of literature on military interpreting 
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provides a clear picture of the critical role that interpreters play in influencing both the 
progression and representation of a war, irrespective of the historical period or geo-
political nature of the conflict. The study of interlingual communication and warfare will 
likely continue to entice scholars of TIS because this context has proven to be a fruitful 
ground for the testing of theories developed within the field. Though the extreme 
conditions of war might appear to have little to do with the circumstances interpreters 
typically encounter in a civilian setting, in fact, it is under the duress of violent warfare, 
where implicit hierarchical structures of power are explicated, that the discursive 
structures formed in interpreted interactions become clearly visible and the tensions over 
legitimate forms of communication are most starkly revealed.  
 
1.3. Sociological Approaches to Interpreting in Violent Conflict 
A variety of methodological approaches have emerged from existing research on 
military interpreting, though most studies are cross-disciplinary in character. “Historical 
perspectives” draw on case studies, oral histories, and archive material to understand the 
sociopolitical and historical context of particular conflicts that involved interpreting and 
interpreters. One such work is Ruth Roland’s Interpreters as Diplomats: Diplomatic 
History of the Role of Interpreters in World Politics (1990), which is an historical 
account of the numerous roles interpreters assume in diplomatic and political history that 
relies on anecdotes, interpreters’ diaries, and governmental administrative records. 
Roland notes that from ancient times to the Cold War era, interpreters have played a 
crucial role in military conquests and political negotiations in which they may accrue 
significant power due to their political or military affiliations,  and where they are liable 
 
14 
to “grossly abuse their power” rather than voluntarily abide by any professional codes 
when faced with conflicting ideologies and risk to their own lives (Roland 1999, 171). 
But while Roland’s work sheds light on the work of interpreters that had previously been 
ignored, because it was written for the general reader by a political scientist, the book 
does not pay much attention to topics often discussed in TIS, such as interpreter training 
or modes of interpreting. 
 In The Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation: The Nuremberg Trial, Gaiba 
(1998) investigates the interpreters and the interpreting arrangements at the Nuremberg 
Trial. The strength of this study lies in the breadth and depth of information the author 
collected on interpreting at this historic venue, which prior to the publication of this book 
had not been extensively discussed. Based on an examination of a wide range of 
materials including transcripts, archival documents, microfilm and interviews with 
several interpreters, Gaiba describes the preparation stage, the interpreting system, the 
impact of interpreting on the proceedings, and the personal backgrounds of some of the 
interpreters.  
“Textual approaches,” or narrative approaches, on the other hand, consider how 
interpreters exercise their agency against the politically-inflected narratives that are 
constructed by institutions of power to garner domestic and international support for a 
war. In Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account, Mona Baker (2006) employs 
narrative theory to examine the role played by translators and interpreters in mediating 
conflict in various arenas of conflict, including Guantanamo, Iraq, and Kosova. Baker 
argues that translation, and by extension interpreting, is not an innocent act but “part of 
the institution of war” (Baker 2006, 1-2) as translators and interpreters participate in the 
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active circulation, promotion and resistance against narratives that are circulated through 
a society and between societies via translation and interpreting. Baker emphasizes that 
though interpreted utterances may serve as weapons for waging war, they may also be 
used as acts of subversion: 
undermining existing patterns of domination cannot be achieved by concrete 
forms of activism alone – demonstrations, sit-ins, civil disobedience – but must 
involve a direct challenge to the stories that sustain them. As language mediators, 
translators and interpreters are uniquely placed to initiate this type of discursive 
intervention at a global level. 
(Baker 2006, 6) 
 
The insight that interpreting can be used as a tool to combat the narratives of powerful 
institutions was further examined by Julie Boéri (2008) who applies narrative theory to 
examine the emergence of interpreting communities that adopt an activist approach to 
interpreting.  
Finally, research adopting a more “sociological approach” examines the 
networks of power and structures of hierarchy and power that dictate the actions of social 
institutions and agents in the context of a particular conflict. The sociological perspective 
is readily applicable to the studying of interpreting as interpreting is a socially regulated 
activity that takes place between social agents, rather than being a purely linguistic 
exchange. The earliest published research to draw attention to interpreting as a socially 
situated activity was penned by sociologist R. Bruce W. Anderson (1976). Anderson 
modelled interpreting as a three-party interaction, with the bilingual interpreter assuming 
the pivotal mediating role between the monolingual producer and the monolingual 
consumer. He argued that the power of the interpreter arises from their position in the 
middle which has “the advantages of power inherent to all positions which control scarce 
resources” (Anderson 1976, 218-219). This advantage, when combined with the relative 
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ambiguity of the interpreter’s role, allows the interpreter considerable latitude in defining 
their own behavior vis-à-vis the client(s). Unfortunately, his work was not taken up by 
interpreting scholars until over a decade later.  
The work of Miriam Shlesinger (1989), who applied of Gideon Toury’s theory of 
translation norms to interpreting, paved the way for research that viewed interpreting as a 
social act, and not merely a linguistic activity. The notion of norms, developed by Toury 
(1995) mainly in the context of literary translation, is one of the most influential concepts 
in TIS. Toury was amongst the first scholars to underscore the fact that translation takes 
place amid complex cultural, political, and historical contexts, and, like all other social 
behavior, is regulated by norms. With regards to translation activity, Toury viewed norms 
as “the translation of general values or ideas shared by a community—as to what is right 
and wrong, adequate and inadequate—into performance instructions appropriate for and 
applicable to particular situations” (Toury 1995, 54-55). His view of translation as a 
norm-governed activity inspired many TIS scholars to focus on the target text and culture 
rather than on the correspondence between the source and target texts, to describe 
translation activities rather than prescribing them, and to pay attention to the cultural and 
sociological aspects of translational phenomena rather than limit analysis to the linguistic 
features of a translated text.  
Later, the work of Cecilia Wadensjö (1998), drawing from the work of Erving 
Goffman (1981), highlighted the triadic nature of interpreter-mediated events, which 
encouraged scholars in the field to apply discourse analytic and sociological models to 
the empirical study of interpreting. Two currents of research have emerged from this 
body of work: the micro-sociological approach, or social interactionist approach, which 
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widely uses discourse analysis as its theoretical framework, and the macro-sociological 
approach, which draws on social theories, most notably the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu’s field theory, to account for interpreters’ agency in interpreted social 
interactions.  
The macro-social approach to the study of interpreting was pioneered by Moira 
Inghilleri, who presented (2003) a theoretical model to examine translation norms in 
interpreting by incorporating Toury’s notion of norms with Bourdieu’s concepts of 
habitus and field, and Bernstein’s pedagogic discourse.  She uses asylum hearings as 
examples to argue that norms are realized in and through interactions between the 
interpreter and various other participants of the interpreted event. Inghilleri’s work came 
in response to an earlier attempt by Daniel Simeoni to apply Bourdieu’s theories to TIS in 
his article “The Pivotal Status of the Translator’s Habitus” (1998) in which Simeoni 
rather depressingly theorized that over the centuries the “translatorial habitus” had 
contributed to the internalization of submissive behavior on the part of the translator 
which has led to the low social prestige of the profession. Simeoni argued that the 
translator’s “voluntary servitude” significantly contributed to the secondariness of their 
activity (Simeoni 1998, 6). The question of the translator’s alleged subservience is 
directly addressed by Inghilleri (2005b) who offered an alternative reading of Bourdieu’s 
theorization of the habitus of translators and interpreters, suggesting that they can be 
“both implicated in and able to transform the forms of practice in which they engage.” 
She examines acts of interpreting in relation to the social practices and relevant fields in 
which they are embedded, rather than seeing interpreting as taking place in its own static 
professtional field. Bourdieu’s field theory has proven to be a useful framework for the 
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study of interpreting as a social act and interpreters as social agents, serving as an 
alternative to theories developed within Descriptive Translation Studies, which often fail 
to considered the agency of individual linguistic mediators by focusing excessively on the 
systems in which they function.  
 
1.4. Habitus, Field, Capital, and the Zone of Uncertainty 
Over the past two decades, a significant number of scholars have applied 
Bourdieu’s sociological approaches to TIS (Simeoni 1998; Gouanvic 2005; Inghilleri 
2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Wolf 2002, 2007a, 2007b, 2015; Torikai 2009, 2014; Grbić 
2014; Guo 2017), and his concepts of “habitus,” “field,” and “capital” are widely 
discussed in various contexts, from asylum interpreting to the professionalization of 
translation and interpreting. Inghilleri (2005a, 126) notes that Bourdieu’s sociological 
approach “provides a set of powerful tools” for conceptualizing interpreters’ practices, 
especially their “reproductive or transformative” roles in particular historical and socio-
cultural contexts. Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts are interrelated and can be employed to 
analyze the practices of social agents and the dialectical relationship that emerges 
between agents within social institution. According to Bourdieu, social space is a 
“multidimensional space” comprised of multiple fields in which agents’ positions are 
defined according to the types of capital they possess or accrue (Bourdieu 1991, 229). 
Bourdieu understands “fields” to be confrontational spaces in which individuals and 
institutions struggle for the production, attainment, and dissemination of capital. Here, 
“capital” refers to any assets (cultural, economic, social, etc.) which social agents 
collectively or individually view as valuable and are associated with both material and 
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symbolic wealth. It is important to note that Bourdieu posits a social world (what he 
sometimes refers to as the field of power) comprised of multiple fields, each capable of 
being further divided into subfields. Each subfield, though it follows the overall logic of 
the larger field with which it is associated, has its own internal logic, rules and 
regularities. Though fields are hierarchized, with the most dominant agents and 
institutions holding considerable power, there is nonetheless space for agency and change 
within and between them. An agent’s “habitus” is formed based on an agent’s position 
within a field and can be understood as an acquired schemata, dispositions, or, “a sense of 
the game, ordinarily described as a ‘spirit’ or ‘sense’ (philosophical, literary, artistic, 
etc.)” (Bourdieu 2000, 11). 
 Drawing on Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, this study first reconstructs the 
social space in which the Korean conflict was fought in order to contextualize and 
analyze interpreters’ practices throughout its duration. Bourdieu offers three steps which 
can be used to investigate a given field and the social agents who occupy it: 
1. analyze the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power; 
2. map out the objective structures of relations between the positions occupied by 
the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate forms of specific 
authority of which this field is a site; 
3. analyze the habitus of agents, the different systems of dispositions they have 
acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social and economic condition, 
and which find in a definite trajectory within the field…a more or less 
favorable opportunity to become actualized.  
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992a, 104-5) 
 
 Inghilleri outlines this conceptual approach in relation to interpreted events in the 
asylum system as follows,  
In interpreted events, where multiple fields and habitus intersect, social agents 
 representing well-established professions (e.g., judges, solicitors, civil servants) 
will reproduce with some certainty what they feel to be the ‘objective’ structures 
of their respective fields. Such agents will possess culturally significant forms of 
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capital linked to their respective fields, in this case the legal and political fields, 
which confer prestige, status and authority upon them. These fields are part of the 
larger universe of symbolic institutions that reproduce existing power relations 
through the production and distribution of a dominant culture that tacitly 
confirms what counts as legitimate linguistic and cultural knowledge in the 
context of the legal system. But what of interpreters if, as suggested above, the 
interpreting profession occupies a far less certain social position? Their 
relationship to any or all of the inter-locking fields that converge on the 
interpreting context may reflect this positioning, making it more likely that others 
will define and control the social/interactive space through the imposition of their 
respective habitus.  
(Inghilleri 2005a, 5) 
 
 Nevertheless, she indicates the potential for what she refers to as an “interpreting 
habitus” to emerge in which interpreters can and do exert equal or greater control over 
interpreting activity, including in situations where this involves the disruption of pre-
established power relations.  
I would argue that a specific interpreting habitus can emerge from interpreting 
activity that simultaneously disrupts power relations and structures interpreted 
events in such a way as to allow all participants to operate with a shared 
understanding regarding interpreting activity. However, the specific ways that a 
particular interpreting context is structured by and structures the interpreting 
habitus – which or whose normative practices prevail – will depend on the 
interplay in social/interactional space between social agents, field(s) and their 
accompanying habitus. The interpreting habitus is thus, like habitus more 




 In this dissertation, the emergence of an interpreting habitus within the military 
field and across three different phases in which interpreting took place during the Korean 
conflict is identified and analyzed: the U.S. military occupation, the Korean War, and the 
Korean Armistice Negotiations. The three stages are distinctive due to the particular 
identities of the interpreters, the specify communicative purposes of each event, and the 
specific social and geopolitical conditions under which the interpreting occurred. The 
distinction between the events is primarily temporal, though there is an overlap between 
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the Korean War and the Armistice Talks, as the negotiations took place while the war 
was still being waged. To some extent, therefore, the categorization is also geographical, 
as the armistice negotiations were restricted to two sites, Kaesong and Panmunjom, while 
the entirety of the Korean peninsula was made a battlefield.1   
The idea of a “fictive kinship” as regards to the interpreters’ relationships to 
members of the military will also be examined and will include local civilian interpreters 
working for the U.S. occupational government, South Korean military interpreters 
working with U.S. military officers, and the relationship between U.S. military 
interpreters and their military superiors at the Korean Armistice negotiations. In doing so, 
it will reveal how the physical, political, cultural, and ideological proximity of these 
interpreters to the institutions they served determined how closely they aligned 
themselves with the role morality and ordinary morality of the U.S. military institution. 
 
1 In Surviving in Violent Conflicts: Chinese Interpreters in the Second Sino-Japanese 
War 1931-1945, Ting Guo (2017) also looks at interpreters working across three different 
contexts: the Kuomintang (KMT), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Japanese 
military during the Second Sino-Japanese War, focusing on the asymmetry in the role 
they played in each group. The KMT, she notes, only required the services of Japanese-
Chinese interpreters or translators for diplomatic negotiations and intelligence gathering 
during the war, for which it had an adequate supply as a significant number of Chinese 
had studied in Japan. The Chinese Communist forces had the least need for interpreters. 
Their main partner was the Soviet Union and their interpreting needs could be met by 
Chinese cadres who had studied in Russia. The Communist Party used only party 
members as interpreters and felt confident of their loyalty. In contrast with the Chinese, 
the Japanese invading forces needed an extraordinarily large number of competent 
interpreters. There were, of course, a number of Japanese who had studied Chinese; there 
were also the members of the colonized Taiwanese population, who generally had to use 
Japanese language in school and thus became bilingual. In addition, an estimated 50,000 
Chinese, many of them in the occupied areas, held college degrees from Japanese 
universities. Despite this large pool, the number was insufficient, and the Japanese had to 
recruit locally. Those who cooperated with the Japanese were often deemed traitors and 
collaborators. Some were targeted during the conflict and many labeled traitors 
afterward, showing how interpreters so often find themselves on the frontlines of combat 
and in the crosshairs after defeat.  
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The concepts of “role morality” as defined by professional codes of conduct, and 
“ordinary morality” as driven by personal feelings of responsibility for one’s actions 
within a specific cultural context are amongst the issues discussed in Interpreting Justice: 
Ethics, Politics, and Language (Inghilleri 2012) in which the expectations and realities of 
interpreting in different types of conflict situations are discussed at length. Whether in the 
mass arrest of undocumented workers in a meat-packing plant in Postville, Iowa, asylum 
adjudication procedures in the U.K., or within the U.S. forces during the Iraq invasion 
and subsequent occupation, in each setting the impossibility of interpreters achieving a 
neutral stance prescribed by codes of conduct is in evidence. The book concludes that 
professional codes of interpreter conduct which focus purely on “role morality” do not 
sufficiently take into account the varied contexts in which interpreted communication 
takes place and tend to disregard the matter of the interpreters’ responsibility to morally 
respond to injustices they observe while performing their work. Inghilleri’s examination 
of local and contract interpreters in Iraq is particularly relevant to this dissertation as it 
reveals the ethical choices made by local interpreters both to serve and while serving with 
the U.S. military and the interpreting habitus that emerged as a result of the social, 
economic, and political conditions under which they worked. She argues that interpreters 
in violent conflict zones cease to be mere linguistic conduits and instead often adopt a 
“fictive kinship” with the military that further shields them from the ethical demands of 
their role.  As such, interpreters, like combatants, can become “embodied conduits” of 
the political and military institutions they agree to serve, and adopt the same “role 
morality” as the soldiers with whom they serve (Inghilleri 2012, 112).  
 The current study adopts the view that interpreting takes place in “zones of 
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uncertainty”, a term Bourdieu uses to refer to weak positions located in the gaps between 
fields, where different fields converge, and interlocutors, each with a different “feel for 
the game,” interact with other agents and assert with varying levels of certainty the 
validity of their social practices, or habitus (Inghilleri 2005a, 4).  
Bourdieu views zones of uncertainty as contradictory and potentially liberatory 
spaces within a social structure in which contradictions emerge from a 
convergence of conflicting world views that momentarily upset the relevant 
habitus. He suggests that zones of uncertainty are located in the gaps or spaces 
between fields – hence their lack of clear social definition. 
 
Following Bourdieu, I argue for a view of interpreting as a potentially social and 
disruptive space where contradictions may emerge due to the convergence of distinct 
fields, and the social/institutional/discursive practices associated with them. The 
possibility of gaps or spaces emerging between fields will always be contingent upon the 
particular context in which an interpreting event takes place and the wider network of 
power that exists outside of or emerges within it. The level of uncertainty can become 
higher when the value of the symbolic capital of a dominant institution of power goes 
unrecognized, enabling others to challenge the normative view of what constitutes a 
legitimate practice. In some cases, a more empowered interpreter may be able to use their 
own linguistic or cultural capital to challenge existing normative practices and demand 
that new ones be employed. On the other hand, when the level of uncertainty is low, the 
dominant institution is more likely to assert its control over the interpreting habitus.  
 This dissertation will examine how, within competing military fields, the 
interpreting habitus transformed across three stages of the Korean conflict due to a 
number of factors including, the different status of the military and civilian interpreters, 
the value of the symbolic capital they and other relevant social agents possessed, and the 
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social hierarchies that emerged as the local and geopolitical conditions evolved. It will 
show how, when the authority of different institutions of power was challenged or when 
the value of some interpreters’ linguistic capital became highly valued, the interpreting 
habitus underwent additional significant transformations. Under these circumstances, the 
prior assumption of the institutions and the social agents involved were brought into a 
new relationship during which, in certain stages of the war, the habitus of some or all 
participants was disrupted, challenging their previously taken for granted specialized 
knowledge and networks of power.  
 




THE U.S. MILITARY OCCUPATION OF KOREA (1945-48):  
A GOVERNMENT OF, FOR, AND BY THE INTERPRETER 
The current chapter will reveal how the power dynamics between social agents 
engaged in interpreted events shaped the form that interlingual communication would 
take within the field of military occupation in southern Korea (1945-48). Employing 
Bourdieu’s theoretical approach as a framework for examination, this chapter will first 
examine the position of the military field of occupation vis-à-vis larger fields of power, 
namely the diplomatic field in Northeast Asia leading up to and during the occupation. In 
his works, Bourdieu defines fields as “historically constituted areas of activity with their 
specific institutions and own laws of functioning” (Bourdieu 1990, 87). As such, a study 
of the military field in Korea during the U.S. occupation must expand beyond the period 
under direct examination and include the circumstances that preceded it, most notably the 
Japanese colonization of Korea (1910-45) and the U.S.-Japanese conflict during World 
War II (1941-45). The chapter will then introduce the United States Army Military 
Government in Korea (USAMGIK) and the communicational challenges it faced during 
the occupation. Various factors forced the Military Government to rely heavily on the 
services of locally recruited Korean civilian interpreters, as a result of which it was 
mocked as a “government of, for, and by the interpreter” and an “interpreter’s 
government.”  
 
2.1. WWII and its Aftermath in Northeast Asia 
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The Korean peninsula, divided along the 38th parallel into communist North and 
capitalist South, stands as one of the final vestiges of the Cold War. The roots of the 
division can be traced back to 1910, when Korea, which existed as a unified state for 
more than a millennium, was colonized by Imperial Japan. World War II broke out in the 
Asia-Pacific Theater when the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service attacked various U.S. 
Navy bases, most notably Pearl Harbor, to prevent the U.S. Pacific Fleet from intervening 
in its military actions in Southeast Asia, where it sought to seize control over the 
European colonies in the region. The surprise attack, which was condemned for being 
carried out without a declaration of war, provided the Japanese army with an advantage 
during the early stages of the war; it left the U.S. military in the Pacific severely depleted, 
allowing the Japanese to expand into much of Southeast Asia (Willmott 1983: 14). The 
United States Navy, however, was able to quickly rebuild its forces and after two decisive 
victories in 1942, at the Battle of Guadalcanal and the Battle of Midway Island, the tides 
of war turned in favor of the United States. Following these two defeats, Japan was 
unable to further extend its sphere of power, which might have provided it access to more 
resources with which to mount an offensive. The resurgent United States implemented a 
strategy of “island hopping” or “leapfrogging” and steadily captured Japanese territory in 
the Pacific (Roehrs and Renzi 2004, 122). A series of bases were built on these captured 
islands, allowing for direct and massive bombing raids over the Japanese mainland, at 
which point Japan’s defeat was inevitable. 
In late 1943, with victory seemingly a matter of time, U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek met in Cairo to discuss the shape Asia’s political landscape would take 
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following Japan’s surrender. The results of these talks were issued on November 27, 
1943 in the Cairo Declaration, which states that the Allies would continue deploying 
military force until Japan’s unconditional surrender and that they had agreed that after the 
war, Japan would be stripped of all the overseas territories it had gained after 1895 
(Latourette 1957, 627). The United States, the United Kingdoms, and China also 
proclaimed: 
The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of 
Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and 
independent.2 
 
The vague phrasing regarding the time frame envisioned by the leaders of the Allies 
before Korea would be granted full independence left much up to speculation and would 
later be the source of widespread discontent amongst the Korean people. It was later 
revealed that, in fact, Roosevelt believed Korea would require a period of tutelage of up 
to forty years before it could be granted sovereignty while Stalin, on the other hand, 
advocated that such intervention be limited to a period of five years (Barry 2012, 38). 
With Japanese forces on the defensive, the Allies once more called for the 
unconditional surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces on July 26, 1945, in the Potsdam 
Declaration, proclaiming that the only alternative would be “prompt and utter 
destruction.”3 The Declaration, signed by U.S. President Harry Truman, British Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, affirmed that once 
the Japanese were defeated the terms of the Cairo Declaration would be carried out and 
 
2 For the text of the Cairo Declaration, see McNelly, Sources in Modern East Asian 
History and Politics, 154. 
3 For the text of the Potsdam Declaration, see McNelly, Sources in Modern East Asian 
History and Politics, 166-168. 
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Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and 
Shikoku, which constitute the Japanese mainland. The Japanese leadership responded to 
the Declaration with their own pronouncements to fight to the bitter end. On August 6, 
1945, the United States detonated an atomic bomb over the city of Hiroshima and on 
August 8, 1945 the Soviet Union, which had thus far avoided conflict with the Japanese 
in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, declared war on Japan and 
invaded the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, in northeastern China. Later that day, 
the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki. While there 
was considerable pushback from the military, on August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito 
gave a recorded radio address to the Japanese Empire announcing the surrender to the 
Allies, thus ending the war.  
On August 17, 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur issued General Order Number One for the 
surrender of Japan.4 The order instructed the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to 
direct its military and naval commanders in the field to surrender their forces and 
weapons to specifically designated representatives of the Allied Powers (the United 
States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and Republic of China) who had divided Japanese 
territory into four zones. The U.S. would occupy Japan, as it had conducted the attacks on 
Japan’s main islands, as well as Korea south of the 38th Parallel. The Soviets would take 
the surrender of Japanese forces in Manchuria, Korea north of the 38th Parallel, and 
Karafuto (southern Sakhalin). The British military would conduct operations in Southeast 
 
4 For a detailed discussion of the drafting of General Order No.1 see Gallichio, The Cold 
War Begins in Asia, 75-92 
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Asia south of the 16th Parallel and troops in China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa, and 
Indochina north of the 16th Parallel would surrender to the representatives of the Republic 
of China. 
The Soviet Union entered northern Korea on August 14, 1945 and arrived in 
Pyongyang, the largest city north of the 38th, on August 24, 1945. It established the 
Soviet Civil Administration (SCA) as the occupying government on October 3, 1945, and 
the United States military, preoccupied with circumstances in Japan, only arrived at 
Incheon harbor on September 8, 1945, and established the United States Army Military 
Government in Korea (USAMGIK) in Seoul, the capital of the country.  
 
2.2. The Dismantling of the People’s Republic of Korea  
Historians agree that the decision to occupy and divide Korea stemmed from the 
inability of American bureaucrats to comprehend the possibility that a potent sense of 
nationalism or will for unification and independence could exist in Korea (Cumings 
1981, Lee 1982, Gallicchio 1988), despite the fact that Korea had stood as a single 
unified state since the 10th century, sharing a common ethnicity, language, and culture, 
with well-recognized national boundaries. It was therefore unsurprising that the people 
resisted the idea of trusteeship and felt humiliated by the prospect of yet another period of 
great-power “tutelage,” having just endured thirty-five years under Japanese colonial 
control. If any country should have been divided following World War II it was Japan, 
which like Germany, was an aggressor. Instead, as a result of the ideological rivalry 
brewing between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it was countries like Korea, China, and 
Vietnam that suffered this fate. As a former German ambassador to Korea would 
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comment, “While we Germans were divided after the war because of our sin, the Koreans 
were divided because of their innocence” (Breen 2004, 117). 
The U.S. occupation felt further unjustified owing to the fact that in August 1945, 
when it became clear Japan would lose the war, an indigenous governing body, the 
People’s Republic of Korea (PRK), had been established in consultation with Japanese 
colonial authorities before the U.S. or U.S.S.R. arrived in Korea. According to William 
Stueck and Boram Yi (2010, 180-181), “fearing that Koreans would respond by attacking 
the more than 378,000 Japanese civilians and 163,000 Japanese military […] Abe 
approached Yo Un-hyung” who organized the Committee for the Preparation of Korean 
Independence (CPKI) with the assent of General Abe Nobuyuki, the last Japanese 
Governor-General of Korea, in preparation for Korean independence.56 Immediately after 
 
5 For all references to and mention of paces and people in Korean, I have kept the spelling 
of Korean names according to the Romanized versions appearing in the archived 
documents for ease of possible later reference to the archives. Most historical documents 
produced during the Korean War did not consistently follow any format at the time, so 
spelling can be highly idiosyncratic and variety. For my own writing, I have used the Revise 
Romanization of Korean developed by the Republic of Korea National Academy of the 
Korean Language, with the noted exceptions of well-known figures like Syngman Rhee, 
who are often associated and referenced with particular rendering of their names.  
6 Under Yo’s leadership, People’s Committees sprouted up throughout the country to 
coordinate Korea’s translation to independence. The CPKI called for the cooperation of 
all political groups and factions in its efforts in enacting a land program which would 
enable tenants to purchase their farms on easy terms, guarantee the ousting of Korean 
collaborators and Japanese from positions of authority, extend the suffrage, enable the 
formation of cooperatives, increase wages, stabilize the economy, and minimize 
governmental intervention in the private domain. Though there were over forty parties 
representing all shades of opinion included in the original coalition, all parties were 
united in their views on key topics such as the expulsion of the Japanese, seizure of their 
property, immediate independence, and self-government. To implement these programs, it 
was agreed by the leaders in Seoul that each province would establish its own 
government in accordance with the basic principles of the program. Such a procedure, it 
was believed, would allow all regions to solve local problems without the need to refer 
back to Seoul and effect a governmental stability impossible to achieve through 
immediate centralization. Provincial leaders were informed of the plan before the 
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the announcement of Japan’s surrender, resistance leaders of the CPKI called upon the 
Japanese Governor-General and proposed that in order to preserve law and order, prevent 
political and economic chaos, and construct a Korean government in harmony with the 
wishes of the people, all authority be turned over to their coalition, which would prepare 
for complete Korean independence by establishing the People’s Republic of Korea 
(PRK). Abe willingly assented, with the understanding that the existing Japanese colonial 
governmental structure would not be dissolved, and that Japanese soldiers and civilians 
would not be molested in the aftermath of the war. The governor’s conditions were 
supported by the CPKI and the organization assumed de facto control over the Korean 
peninsula (Millett 2005, 43). Soon after, the Committee held a representative national 
assembly in Seoul and on September 6, 1945, the delegates formed a national 
government with jurisdiction over all of Korea.  
It was in the name of this government that Yo Un-hyung sent a delegation that 
included his brother Yo Un-hong, his secretary Cho Han-yong, and their interpreter Baek 
Sang-gyu, to greet the commander of the U.S. military occupational forces, Lieutenant 
General John R. Hodge, upon his arrival at Incheon on September 7, 1945. Hodge, who 
had orders from Washington to deal directly with the Japanese Governor-General in 
effecting the transfer of authority, was completely unprepared for such a move. He 
denied the Korean delegates an audience, opting to discuss these matters with the 
Japanese colonial authorities in the absence of Korean representation (Henderson 1968, 
205-206).  
 
surrender and were, therefore, able to act instantly upon news of the Allied victory. 
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The U.S. military claimed to have come to Korea to help its people form a 
democratic government that represented the aspirations of all. Yet at the same time, 
Washington took the view that Koreans lacked the training necessary for administrative 
duties, making it necessary for Military Government to assume governmental 
responsibility in southern Korea. The fact that there was already a functioning 
governmental body, recognized by the Japanese Governor-General, with People’s 
Committees successfully operating throughout the country, complicated the issue as it 
contradicted the very premise of occupation.  
The U.S. military’s approach to the matter was to act as if it were forming a 
military government in enemy territory, as was the case in Japan, in which case standard 
procedures would dictate that it adopted the following attitude towards local political 
bodies: 
Neither local political personalities nor organized political groups, however, 
sound in sentiment, should have any part in determining the policies of military 
government. Civil affairs officers should avoid any commitments to, or 
negotiating with, any local political elements except by direction from higher 
authority.7  
 
This was not the case in Korea, however, as the Americans themselves had claimed that 
Korea was an independent and friendly state, and thus the standards mentioned above 
should not have been readily applied to the circumstances in southern Korea.  
Truman attempted to clarify the U.S.’s stance in the following public statement 
made on September 18, 1950, in which he intimated that the efforts of the PRK to 
establish immediate independence were to be disregarded: 
The assumption by the Koreans themselves of the responsibilities and functions of 
a free and independent nation […] will of necessity require time and patience. The 
 
7 FM 27-5, p 0, 1.7. 
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goal is in view, but its speedy attainment will require the joint efforts of the 
Korean people and the Allies.8  
 
The U.S. military used Truman’s words as the basis for ignoring the authority of the 
PRK, declaring that “United States policy prohibits official recognition or utilization for 
political purposes of any so-called Korean provisional government or other political 
organization by United States Forces.”9 By refusing to recognize the sovereignty of the 
PRK and choosing rather to treat it as just another political party—one that it actually 
viewed as a latent challenge to its occupational authority—the U.S. blatantly refused to 
respect or acknowledge the will of the Korean people and their right of self-
determination.10 
 Enraged by the Military Government’s treatment, Koreans flocked to the streets 
in protests against the Military Government while the Republic’s leaders argued that the 
PRK represented a unified government of all Koreans, regardless of the dividing line, and 
that it was likewise recognized north of the artificial border as well.11 The U.S. military 
ignored the Republic’s demands for recognition and on October 10, 1945, Major General 
A. V. Arnold, the newly instated U.S. Military Governor of Korea stated in a press 
conference that the Military Government was the only government in southern Korea, 
and demanded that the Korean people put an end to the pronouncements of what he 
 
8 Department of State Bulletin, XIV, p 108. 
9 SCAP, Summation, No. 1, p 177 
10 The U.S. military government also refused to recognize the members of the 
Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, led by Kim Gu, who was obliged to 
enter the country as a private citizen. 
11 Yo Un-hyung stated that it was “only after the lapse of more than a month since 
coming to Korea” that General Hodge and Arnold “condescended to receive” him. Letter 
from Yo Un-hyung to Kim Yeong-jung, July 18, 1947.  
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termed “irresponsible political groups.” This statement crystallized a large part of Korean 
thinking into an anti-American mold: the liberators had become the oppressors.  
If the sole reason U.S. troops were sent to the Korean peninsula was to “aid the 
Korean people to achieve their independence” and to establish a democratic government 
by their “free choice,” and if the authorities in Washington did “believe in the right of the 
Korean people to determine for themselves the kind of economy and political 
organization they require,” why did the PRK receive such treatment?12 Why did 
Washington insist on administering an election when a popular government already 
existed?  
The decision to occupy Korea, disregarding the pre-existing indigenous governing 
body, and establish the Military Government is intricately linked to the onset of the Cold 
War and the emergence of a new power dynamic in Northeast Asia following World War 
II. The United States wished Korea to operate according to the American framework of 
beliefs, not the Soviet’s communist model. The PRK, as it existed upon the arrival of the 
24th Corps, was not dominated by American ideology, though it was not strictly speaking 
communist in nature either. Instead, the Republic was the embodiment of Korean 
aspirations for a democratic socialist government, a form of government that over eighty 
percent of Koreans favored according to a study conducted by the USAMGIK during its 
first year of occupation. Any recognition of the PRK’s sovereignty and independence, 
which appeared to be more closely aligned to Russian ideals that American ideology, 
 
12 Department of State press release, August 30, 1946. The President’s Message to 
Congress on the State of the Union. Department of State Bulletin, XIV, 139.  
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however, would have signified a diplomatic defeat and weakening of the United States’ 
influence in the region.   
 
2.3. The Establishment of the United States Army Military Government in Korea 
The United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was 
established on September 8, 1945 and maintained administrative authority over southern 
Korea until August 15, 1948. The Military Government was terribly unprepared for the 
challenges it would face, as it lacked knowledge of the language, history, culture, and 
political situation in Korea. Most importantly, Hodge, the commander of the 24th Corps 
of the U.S. Tenth Army, and his subordinates, failed to distinguish between Koreans and 
Japanese as four days before arriving in Seoul, Hodge told his officers that Korea “was an 
enemy of the United States” (Cumings 1981, 126). The general was also widely quoted as 
calling Koreans, “the same breed of cat” as the Japanese. This meant that from a 
command point of view “no separation had been made between the Japanese and Korean 
occupations [and] there was a tendency to place both Japan and Korea in the same 
category” (Meade 1951, 76). The historian Michael Breen supports this argument as he 
claims, “There was a tendency to see [Koreans] as low-class Japanese” (Breen 1998, 
118).  
Hodge’s disregard for the sociopolitical circumstances in Korea led to a number 
of faulty policy decisions. In addition to dismantling the PRK, on September 9, 1945, at a 
surrender ceremony, Hodge announced that the Japanese colonial government, including 
its Governor-General and its technical and administrative staff, would remain intact. This 
move was, naturally, met with a major public outcry, in response to which Hodge 
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reluctantly replaced the Japanese Governor-General with Major General Arnold and 
remove all the Japanese bureau chiefs, though he in turn, enlisted the former Japanese 
bureaucrats as his advisors. Hodge later defended his use of Japanese personnel with 
claims that the U.S. would have experienced “great difficulty operating with any 
sweeping removal of Japanese unless we are willing to accept chaos” because “all 
utilities, communications, etc., are Japanese-operated and government controlled” and the 
U.S. Military Government was “entirely inadequate to cope with this situation” (Dobbs 
1981, 37-38).  
The decision to retain members of the Japanese colonial government as advisors 
caused a second outpouring of discontent from the Korean people, forcing Hodge to 
establish the Korean Advisory Council within the Military Government in October 1945. 
Nine out of the eleven Council seats were given to members of the Korean Democratic 
Party, a right-wing political group that was formed at the encouragement of the U.S. 
which was primarily made up of large landowners, wealthy businesspeople, and former 
officials in the Japanese colonial government. The chairman, Kim Seong-su, was a large 
landowner who had been a member of Japan’s Central Council. Clearly unrepresentative 
of the Korean public, the Advisory Council was, according to one observer, “universally 
hated and distrusted throughout Korea” (Cumings 1981, 148). This was another source of 
bitterness among the Korean people as much of the Korean elite had previously worked 
directly or indirectly with the Japanese for material reward and defense of their own 
interests. By employing such personnel, the U.S. Military Government justified the 
actions of the Japanese colonial government and the Korean elite who had colluded with 
them. Ordinary Koreans wishing to see their country independent, unified, and tackling 
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its social and economic problems felt betrayed at the deep conservatism that 
distinguished the occupation. As USAMGIK official E. Grant Meade later wrote, “the 
establishment of the Council ended the period of general Korean unity and opened an era 
of extreme confusion” (Meade 1951, 159). 
In effect, the dominant operating philosophy of the American Military 
Government mirrored the oppressive approach of Japanese colonialism as it blatantly 
disregarded the aspirations of the Korean people for self-government, ignored its 
historical past, and enforced an occupation to enlarge its sphere of influence. The U.S. 
Military Government, by choosing to bolster the status quo in Korea by resisting 
thorough reform of colonial legacies, generated monumental opposition against its 
presence, thereby inheriting an enmity amongst the majority of the Korean people that 
had previously been directed at the Japanese colonialists (Cumings 2005, 192). This 
dissatisfaction was manifested in the form of mass demonstrations and uprisings that 
persisted throughout the occupation. Judging that it was the People’s Committees 
operating throughout the country that were the cause of such resistance, the U.S. military 
dedicated the first year of its occupation towards forcefully dismantling these 
organizations. This push by the U.S. was met with a massive rebellion that spread over 
four provinces in the fall of 1946. Although the U.S. military was able to quickly 
suppress these revolts, radical activists nonetheless developed a significant guerrilla 
movement in 1948 and 1949.  
 
2.4. The Establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the 




In addition to the dissatisfaction felt by Koreans due to the policy decisions made 
by the U.S. Military Government, the Korean people were also enraged by the arbitrary 
division of their country, one that grew increasingly rigid as U.S.-Soviet relations 
deteriorated. The end of World War II terminated the alliance between the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R., which eliminated the buffers that existed between the two ideological camps 
and led to the rise of an ideologically fueled rivalry that would last throughout the Cold 
War. The Korean peninsula, thus, became a microcosm of the emerging Cold War order 
as it morphed into a battle ground between two contending powers. Hugh Borton, 
Division Chief, Japanese Affairs, Department of State, summed up the situation 
succinctly: 
Originally that was a military division […] It was made to assist us and our Allies, 
the Russians, in fighting the Japanese in Korea. But they surrendered before we 
got there and the military division stuck and became a political one.13  
 
In other words, as world relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
deteriorated, each government became more insistent on a solution of the Korean 
problem which would prevent the other from bringing the whole territory within its 
sphere of dominant influence. Thus, during the three-year occupation, the division 
between the two zones deepened and the difference in policy between the occupying 
powers led to a polarization of politics (Robinson 2007, 108-109).  
The Soviet-U.S. Joint Commission, which was established to aid in the 
construction of a unified Korean government, met twice, once in 1946 and 1947, so that 
the two sides could work towards a unified administration, but they failed to make 
 
13 Broadcast over NBC. 7:00pm EST December 28, 1946 
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progress due to increasing Cold War antagonism (Buzo 2002, 59-60). After the failure of 
the Joint Commission meetings in 1947, it became apparent that the formation of a 
unified Korean government would be impossible under the current conditions. The 
United States handed over the matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
which on November 14, 1947. The General Assembly passed Resolution 112 (II), which 
created the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), whose 
mandate was to supervise free and open elections, assist in the withdrawal of the 
occupying forces, and guide the new political entity to full independence. The UN 
decided elections were to take place no later than March 31, 1948, and that UNTCOK 
would have the right to verify any aspect of the election process that it wished. American 
and Russian armed forces would have to be withdrawn from Korea as soon as possible 
and within three months of the formation of the Korean government (Luard 1982, 232).  
The Soviets argued that the Resolution 112 (II) would break the 1945 Moscow 
Accords and violate Articles 32 and 107 of the UN Charter. Article 32 requires that both 
sides of the dispute be consulted, but Korean representatives from northern and southern 
Korea were never invited to address the UN and Article 107 denied jurisdiction to the UN 
over post-war settlement issues (Hart-Landsberg 1998: 85). The U.S.S.R. was unable to 
stop the passing of the resolution because their veto rights were limited to issues brought 
up in the Security Council and did not extend to decisions made by the General 
Assembly. Instead, northern Korea and the Soviet Union publicly opposed the creation of 
UNTCOK and refused to participate in any election administrated by the Commission or 
support any of its activities. When the members of the Commission arrived in Korea in 
January 1948 to begin an assessment of the situation, it became clear that UNTCOK 
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would not be able to fulfill the conditions set by the UN resolution as they were denied 
entrance into northern territory. A report was made to the Interim Committee of the UN 
General Assembly, which operated when the General Assembly was not sitting, and a 
decision was made on February 26, 1948, that UNTCOK should adhere to the original 
intention in so far as this could be accomplished: elections would be supervised in the 
south but nothing could be done about the north (Luard 1982, 234).   
During the following month, elections were held for Korea’s National Assembly, 
in which the northern Koreans refused to participate. Soon after, Syngman Rhee was 
chosen by the National Assembly to be the first President of the Republic of Korea. The 
United States then transferred authority to this new government, and on January 1, 1949 
accorded it full recognition. The Soviet Union responded to the establishment of the ROK 
by holding elections in the north for a Supreme People’s Assembly. With Kim Il-sung at 
its helm as the Prime Minister, this Assembly drew up the North Korean constitution and 
founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which proclaimed 
authority over all of Korea. In early 1949, the Russians withdrew their troops from North 
Korea and in June 29, 1949 the United States withdrew its own forces from South Korea.  
To the Korean people, who had hoped for independence, the occupational forces, 
who arrived as benefactors who had liberated them from Japanese colonization, ended up 
opposing the nation’s independence and unification despite popular protest. The two 
foreign powers left behind two diametrically opposed governments, each claiming 
sovereignty over the whole of Korea, setting the stage for the largest international conflict 




2.5. Nisei Interpreters in Korea 
The U.S. military was exceedingly underprepared for the administrative duties of 
an occupational force when it seized control over the southern half of the Korean 
peninsula. Traditionally, the United States had shown limited interest in the country. As 
historian James Matray (1985, 5) explains, “Korean affairs had been the exclusive 
concern of closer and more powerful neighbors—Russia, China, and Japan” while “the 
United States had seen no national interests worth defending on the Korean peninsula.” 
America’s attitude towards peninsular affairs remained largely unaffected during World 
War II and Korea was scarcely considered in postwar planning, even after the Cairo 
Declaration in November 1943 and the verbal agreement on international trusteeship at 
Yalta in February 1945. It hardly comes as a surprise that “the Korean policy of the 
United States in 1945 was very poorly coordinated” (Kim 1975, 53) and “a view widely 
held among historians is that the United States forces coming into the Korean peninsula 
had practically no preparations to deal with the problems awaiting them” (Lee 1982, 32).  
Amongst the various difficulties the U.S. Military Government faced during the 
occupation, the most salient were the 
difficulties imposed by barriers of language – the mechanical linguistic problem, 
the difficulty of achieving a meeting of minds, and the frequent impossibility of 
being certain whether there has been a meeting of minds or not. On all levels the 
occupation forces were constantly confronted with problems of language. 
(HUSAFIK 1948) 
 
Despite the important role interlingual communication would play throughout the 
occupation, the U.S. military failed to make the appropriate preparations needed to meet 
the various challenges interpreting and translation would pose before arriving in Korea. 
In fact, when Hodge and the 24th Corps first landed in Incheon Harbor on September 8, 
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1945, they were without so-much as a single Korean language specialist. The Armed 
Forces Pacific (AFPAC), the command group above the 24th Corps, made a belated 
search for Korean interpreters in August 1945 but “it was able to find only six paroled 
Korean prisoners of war, who were accordingly attached to the 24th Corps” (HUSAFIK 
1948). 
It was only in October of 1945, several months after Hodge landed in Korea, that 
the U.S. military sought to train Korean linguists at the U.S. Military Intelligence Service 
Language School, where the Japanese translators and interpreters were trained during 
World War II. This was a classic instance of too-little-too-late, as the Korean-language 
class was made up of only “eight students under a Korean American officer, Lt. Calvin 
Kim” (McNaughton 2007, 417). Needless to say, this number could hardly meet the 
immense demand for Korean-English mediators under the Military Government.  
On the other hand, the U.S. occupational forces were accompanied by a total of 
approximately thirty Nisei (second generation Japanese immigrants to the U.S.) 
interpreters and translators who were assigned to the headquarters, the Military 
Government, and military divisions in local provinces. These Japanese interpreters and 
translators were critical to the success of Hodge’s initial mission, which was to “take the 
Japanese surrender, disarm the Japanese armed forces, enforce the terms of the surrender, 
and remove Japanese imperialism from Korea” (Hodge 1948). The Nisei mediated 
between U.S. and Japanese military units as the Americans disarmed and relocated the 
approximately six-hundred-thousand Japanese troops stationed in Korea, who were 
gradually removed to Jeju island off the southern coast of the Korean peninsula before 
being repatriated to Japan (McNaughton 2007, 411).  
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After taking Japan’s surrender, Hodge’s second mission in Korea was to 
“maintain order, establish an effective government along democratic lines to replace the 
Japanese government in Korea, and rebuild a sound economy as a basis for Korean 
independence” and “train Koreans in handling their own affairs and prepare Korea to 
govern itself as a free and independent nation” (Hodge 1948). This mission required that 
Korean-English interpreters mediate communication to facilitate cooperation between the 
U.S. occupational forces and the Korean populace. As the U.S. had landed in Korea 
“without trained Korean language personnel in their ranks” (Fishel and Hausrath, 1958, 
8) the Military Government decided to continue using Nisei interpreters as their 
substitutes. While Nisei interpreters initially stood-in for Korean interpreters, their ability 
to function as efficient mediators in Korea was severely limited, for the following 
reasons.  
First, while the success of this approach hinged on the premise that a large portion 
of the general Korean public could converse in Japanese, the actual number of Japanese 
speakers in Korea was not as high as the U.S. military assumed. The number of Koreans 
who reliably understood Japanese did not reach 20 percent of the population until 1943, 
when 22.15 percent or 5.7 million Koreans were able to understand Japanese (22.15 
percent) (Kim-Rivera 2002, 266-267). It should also be noted that it is unclear what 
categories were used to define “understanding” Japanese, which is distinguishable from 
having a “command” of the language, which is the requisite for effective communication 
via interpreter. Regardless, this number could hardly justify the usage of Japanese 
interpreters as the primary channel of interlingual communication between the U.S. 
military and the Korean people.  
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Second, the Korean people displayed resistance towards communicating with U.S. 
military personnel through Japanese interpreters. The future president of the ROK, Rhee 
Syngman stated “We shall not teach the Japanese language in our schools. We are 
Koreans. If the Japanese wish to speak with us in the future let them learn Korean!” 
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 173). The presence of the Nisei suggested to the Korean 
people, who had endured thirty-five years under Japanese colonial control, that the 
United States acknowledged Imperial Japan as a legitimate counterpart whose language it 
was willing to learn in order to communicate on equal terms. The absence of Korean 
interpreters indicated to the Korean people that the U.S. military did not see the need to 
communicate with or feel the necessity to cooperate with them. As U.S. Colonel William 
P. Jones Jr. (1959, 1-2) writes:  
expecting others to make the effort to learn his language, an arrogance that 
suggests we are no different from the former colonial rulers. For foreigners to 
make the effort to learn the local working language is to demonstrate – often 
dramatically – a sense of respect for the people who speak that language. To 
avoid the effort can sometimes be interpreted as a show of disrespect.14  
 
Under such conditions, Koreans felt themselves once again at the mercy of a foreign 
power while they themselves were barred from participating in the recontextualization or 
the reconstitution of social order. Of course, these Nisei interpreters were not of Japanese 
nationality, and were therefore not directly related with Korea’s colonial past, but the 
Korean people remained distrustful towards Nisei, “because of the Korean conviction that 
a Japanese remained a Japanese even if born in the United States and wearing an 
American uniform” (Meade 1951, 82-83). Such racial antipathy, however, was not one-
 
14 US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Language Training for 
Foreign Aid Personnel. 86th Cong., 1st sess. Washington DC: GPO, 1959 
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sided as “many Nisei exhibited the traditional Japanese disdain for Koreans and the 
Korean language” (McNaughton 2007, 143). This mutual distaste created hostility in an 
environment in which tensions were already palpable, thus serving as a hindrance to 
communication and cooperation.  
An additional problem that arose when employing Nisei interpreters in Korea is 
depicted in the following remarks made about a Nisei interpreter at the surrender of Jeju 
Do.  
Green’s [the senior American officer] remarks were translated into Japanese by an 
interpreter, a Nisei who looked very embarrassed and stumbled badly over the job 
[…] He got most of the information we wanted, most of it correctly in all 
probability, but it was hard and slow going. Everything had to be translated, often 
through two intermediaries. Questions and answers were frequently 
misunderstood: at times a matter had to be dropped out of sheer fatigue. And the 
Japanese, who were permitted to ask questions towards the last, appear to have 
been equally obscure on certain of the answers that painfully sifted through them. 
(HUSAFIK 1948) 
 
Based on this statement, some Nisei interpreters stationed in Korea appear to have lacked 
the linguistic and communicational skills needed to function as competent mediators. It is 
possible that the more competent Nisei interpreters were stationed in Japan, which was 
also under U.S. military occupation at the time, while the less adept linguists were 
deployed to Korea. The questionable linguistic capabilities of the Nisei interpreters 
dispatched to Korea, coupled with the low number of Koreans capable of or willing to 
conversing in Japanese, undermined the practicality of employing the Nisei interpreters in 
Korea.  
 
2.6. Local Korean Civilian Interpreters 
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As a result, the USAMGIK was forced to “depend almost exclusively upon 
natives for the vital work of interpreting” (HUSAFIK 1948). The need for Korean-
English interpreters grew more pressing as the occupation dragged on and an increasing 
number of Koreans were employed by the Military Government. By December 1945, 
almost seventy-five thousand Koreans were working for the USAMGIK, and in 
December of 1946, the governance structure of the USAMGIK was reorganized so that 
each bureau would be co-headed by an American and a Korean. This meant that any 
policy decisions would require consultation between the two sides and the consent of 
both. Despite having to work side-by-side with their American counterparts, 
less than ten percent of the higher officials in Military Government have any 
understanding whatever of English. Less than one-half of the number who do 
understand English are able to speak it effectively. It is absolutely necessary for 
Americans to be able to talk and to get over ideas to Korean officials. This can be 
done only through interpreters […] I think we might add that practically no 
American can speak Korean. 
(National Archives and Records Administration, November 15, 1946, 11) 
 
In the absence of Korean civilian interpreters, communication and coordination between 
U.S. and Korean personnel would have been virtually impossible, making interpreters 
vital to the operations of the occupational government. 
Interpreters were recruited by the USAMGIK throughout the occupation. The task 
of selecting local civilian interpreters was at first managed by Yasuma Oda, a former 
official of the Japanese Government General, because no American military personnel 
possessed the linguistic skills necessary to properly administer the selection process. The 
first round of recruiting Korean interpreters, carried out shortly following the arrival of 
the 24th Corps, was judged as being “fairly successful” as “a considerable number turned 
up” to work (HUSAFIK 1948). The military assessed that “[a]lthough not fluent in 
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English, they were for the most part satisfactory” (ibid.) and a large portion of this 
original group eventually ended up working for the Military Government. Soon 
afterwards, due to a rising need for Korean interpreters among the U.S. military units 
stationed in Korea, a secondary call for interpreters was sent out but this second search 
“yielded only a loan harvest, but some Koreans were hired as interpreters, translators, and 
civil censors” (ibid.). The fact that the second group was judged to be inferior to the first 
demonstrates there was a limited number of Koreans able to speak and understand 
English in the country at the time. 
 The low number of capable English speakers in Korea was due to the fact that 
“the forty years of Japanese rule, especially that last decade when Japan was at war, was 
a major interruption in English education in Korea” (Kim-Rivera 2002, 279). In 1939, the 
Japanese imperial government declared English an enemy language, banned the import of 
Western books, fired all British and Americans in official positions, forced missionaries 
to leave its territories, drastically reduced the instructional hours of English, and removed 
the subject from the higher-education entrance exams. Under the highly discouraging 
atmosphere the Japanese government created against the English language, “both the 
quality and the quantity of English language education suffered a great deal” (Kim-
Rivera 2002, 272). The bulk of the interpreters who worked for the Military Government 
were individuals from wealthy families who had studied in the United States and “only 
one in five had learned English in Korea” (Dong 2005, 112). 
The limited number of Koreans capable of communicating in English meant that 
the supply of interpreters within the linguistic market the Military Government had 
constructed upon its arrival could not meet the demands for this resource. In the 
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following excerpt, Jeon Suk-hui, who worked as an interpreter during the occupation, 
comments on the difficulty the U.S. Military Government faced when recruiting 
interpreters, and the lengths to which its staff was willing to go to find capable personnel 
(Jeon 2005, 107): 
   When the U.S. soldiers arrived they discovered that all the Americans and 
Koreans could do was stare at each other’s faces and say “hello” and “okay” 
because no one spoke good enough English to communicate […]  
They thought someone who had been to university would speak at least a little 
bit of English. That is when the name “Jeon Suk-hui,” a graduated from Ewha 
Womans University, caught their eye. 
Three or four American officers from the Military Government came to our 
hospital and asked me to become an interpreter. They were not soldiers, they were 
officers. I showed them my baby and told them that it would be difficult for me to 
work for them. Of course, I spoke in English. They visited several times 
afterwards to persuade me to change my mind.  
 
Peter Hyun, who worked as an interpreter for the Military Government, wrote the 
following about the interview process he underwent when he applied for a interpreting 
position at the USAMGIK in the early winter of 1945, when he was seventeen years old: 
The only job I could come up with in Seoul right after liberation was working as 
an interpreter for the U.S. occupational forces. The best and favorite subject 
during middle school in Hamheung was English. To be frank, I never studied 
conversational English. Of course, my English skills were not very good […] but 
so what? I decided to give it a try! I was as courageous as I was young and 
foolish. I visited the Human Resources office of the 8th Army. I must have looked 
very young because the bulky Army Major sitting behind the desk asked me how 
old I was. I added three years to my actual age […] I couldn’t believe it. I got the 
job so quickly and easily! There weren’t even any detailed questions about by 
work experience or qualification. 
(Hyun 1996, 29-30; my translation) 
 
Hyun’s experience reveals that the supply of interpreters within the linguistic market 
which the Military Government had constructed upon its arrival could not meet the 
demands for this resource. In a market in which the already high demand for interpreters 
continued to rise whilst the supply remained stagnant, the Military Government had to 
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resort to recruiting interpreters without properly assessing whether or not they possessed 
the requisite linguistic abilities to fulfill their function as linguistic mediators. Thus, Jeon 
also indicates that English language abilities amongst the interpreters varied considerably 
as “at the time there were many interpreters who were complete hokey” (Jeon 2005, 108). 
 
2.7. Interpreters as Intercultural Agents 
During the U.S. occupation of southern Korea, however, the presence of 
USAMGIK interpreters was readily felt by all interlocutors participating in an interpreted 
event, as evinced in the following statement made by a former Military Government 
official:   
It can readily be understood how an interpreter could in time come to know his 
principal’s job almost as well as the principal and, if granted enterprise, act on his 
own in answering questions and reaching decisions while interpreting, or even 
independently while his principal was absent. It was a common enough 
experience to hear one’s interpreter and a Korean conversing at a greater length 
than demanded by the translation at hand. This led in some cases to suspicion of 
interpreters, but always there remained the answer that the rendition of an 
American thought into Korean terms was more than a mere exchange of words. 
(HUSAFIK 1948) 
 
This excerpt indicates that interpreters were not restricted to functioning as “conduits” 
but actively intervened in interlingual communicative exchanges, at times overstepping 
the limits of what is often considered the normative role of the linguistic mediator, as 
they were entrusted with extralinguistic functions to supplement for the lack of 
knowledge USAMGIK personnel possessed regarding Korean language, politics and 
culture. 
Though this historical record does not provide detailed accounts of how 
interpreters intervened in interpreted events, the short story “Rice” by Henry Steiner 
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(1951) provides a detailed depiction of a Korean interpreter working with an American 
military officer during the Korean occupation. Though this is a fictional work, given the 
fact that Steiner lived in southern Korea from 1946 to 1947 while working as an 
engineering field supervisor for the Military Government, much of what is described in 
this story would have been inspired by observations made while the author was stationed 
in Korea.  
The story follows Song, a Korean interpreter, who accompanies Captain Frazer 
and Sergeant Biancoli as they pay a visit to Han, an elderly rice farmer. Their goal is to 
persuade Han to sell his rice harvest to the USAMGIK at a reduced price, as part of the 
Rice Collection Program, but if necessary, the American military men are willing to 
forcefully confiscate his stores.  
   “Tell him if he doesn’t sell, we’ll confiscate the rice.” 
   Mr. Song said placatingly in Korean, “The people in the cities are starving. 
They cannot pay the high price on the open market. That is why the government 
sets this low price and makes out a quota.” 
   “The government of thieves! Let those in the cities come back to the land if 
they wish to eat.” Mr. Han’s eyes, the color of yellow river-water, became bright 
and wet with emotion. “Let them depend on the rain as I do and starve when it 
does not come. Let the river sweep away all they have. For years, I have worked 
the land for the Japanese and saw them take my rice away. Now I have the land 
and the rice. The government wants to take it away again. It is the same as the 
Japanese.” 
   “What does he say?” Frazer asked. 
   “One moment please, Captain Frazer.” And then in Korean to the old man, 
“But this is not for the Japanese. This is for your own people. The Americans are 
helping us.” 
   “Yes, I know. They will sell the rice to the robbers for five times what they 
give me. Then the robbers will sell it to the people for ten times. What do these 
foreigners know!” The speech came shooting out of the old man’s mouth. 
   “You are right,” Mr. Song said, “some of the rice may go to thieves, there to 
be sold again, but is it no comfort to know that you are behaving justly, that you 
are helping others who would starve without you? At least you will gain merit in 
the eyes of God no matter what sins others may commit.” 
   The old man ignored him again.   
   Mr. Song turned to Frazer and said, “He says no.” 
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   “You mean you talked that much and all he said was no? You interpreters are 
all alike.” 
(Steiner 1951, 7-8) 
 
In this excerpt, rather than mimicking the American captain’s menacing tone, or relaying 
his threatening message, the interpreter instead attempts to first pacify the elderly man by 
explaining the circumstances that have necessitated the Rice Collection Program. Even 
when Captain Frazer asks that the farmer’s response be communicated to him, rather than 
informing him of the farmer’s thoughts on the matter, the interpreter opts to continue 
persuading Han. He negotiates on behalf of the Americans, imploring the elderly farmer 
to recognize the fact that the U.S. Military Government is requiring that he sell his rice 
for reasons different from those of the Japanese colonists who stole Han’s previous 
harvests. Only when Song determines that he can do no more to convince Han to 
reconsider his stance does the interpreter relent and offer the American officer the short 
interpretation, “He says no.” Here the interpreter decides to omit much of what was said, 
choosing rather to relay the central message without voicing the criticism expressed by 
Han, in an attempt to diffuse the rising tension within the interpreting event. While Frazer 
does voice his displeasure with Song’s approach, his comment that “You interpreters are 
all alike” reveals that it was considered normative behavior for the interpreter to speak on 
behalf of both interlocutors, to select what should be embellished or omitted from a 
dialogue, and to facilitate discussion so that the communicative goals of the exchange 
might be achieved. 
The interventionist role USAMGIK interpreters assumed during interpreted 
events was met by criticism and condemnation by both the Military Government and the 
Korean public, who were preconditioned to believe that interpreters ought to transfer 
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rather than construct meaning. The active role interpreters adopted during interpreted 
events led some Korean politicians to fall under the impression that it was the interpreters 
who were actually in charge of overseeing the administrative duties of the Military 
Government rather than its American officials, and thus they were the ones to blame for 
its many policy failures. This idea became so widespread that one Korean political 
organization went so far as to claim that the idea of trusteeship itself originated not from 
U.S. policymakers but came, 
[f]rom the interpreters of the U.S. Army and Military Government who are of the 
opinion that in Korea we have no leader who is capable of leading us and 
therefore our independence should be delayed…It is not unreasonable, therefore, 
that U.S. authorities should think of a trust system for Korea. 
(HUSAFIK 1948) 
 
This is, of course, far from the truth as the idea of trusteeship over Korea was first 
discussed between Roosevelt and Stalin while World War II was still underway, and 
detailed plans for the length and form of the trusteeship were decided on during the 
Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December of 1945. Regardless of the truth, 
however, this incident demonstrates how influential interpreters were seen to be in the 
eyes of the public.  
 
2.8. Public Perceptions of the Malicious Interpreter in Fiction and the Media 
Two translation-related events during the early months of the U.S. occupation had 
a notable influence on the recasting of Korean views of the U.S. presence into a negative 
mold. The first widespread controversy had to do with the translation of the Cairo 
Declaration. In November 1943, the leaders of the U.S., the U.K., and the Republic of 
China committed themselves to the liberation of Korea following Japan’s defeat by 
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specifying in the declaration that Korea would be granted independence “in due course.” 
The translation of the Cairo Declaration that circulated in Korea, which had been 
prepared by official Japanese sources, translated the ambiguous phrase “in due course” 
into the equivalent of “in a few days” (Stueck and Yi 2010, 186). According to Hodge, in 
his report to MacArthur,  
One of greatest difficulties here in maintenance of order is the idea planted firmly 
in the minds of all Koreans that Korea is now…a free and independent nation…In 
talking to educated Koreans I discovered that translations of the Cairo Statement 
to Koreans have been “in a few days” or “very soon” rather than “in due course” 
in reference to the time of Korean independence. That is said to apply specifically 
to Proclamation Number One. Request that any future translations be carefully 
checked.15 
 
Hodge later made a public announcement that Korea in fact would not be granted 
immediate independence and instead, that Koreans would have to earn their liberation by 
“demonstrate[ing] to the democratic nations of the world and to me as their representative 
your capacities and abilities as a people and your readiness to accept an honored place in 
the family of nations” (HUSAFIK 1948).  
The situation was further exacerbated in December 1945 when the decision to 
establish a trusteeship over Korea was announced. To the Koreans, who had anticipated 
immediate independence, the decision to implement a five-year trusteeship was 
humiliating, and cooled their initially warm welcome to United States troops as 
liberators. Anti-trusteeship demonstrations were staged across the country. It was later 
assessed that to some extent the reaction was due to the fact that the word “trusteeship,” 
when translated into Korean, was the same word that had been used by the Japanese 
 
15 Radio CG USAFIK to CINAFPAC Adv, 131031/I Sept 45. 
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authorities to refer to their colonial control over the country. General Hodge made the 
following statement in an attempt to pacify the public: 
I fully understand what the word “Trusteeship” means to Koreans. In the meaning 
that you apply to that word, it is even more abhorrent to me as a responsible 
representative of my nation than it can be to you. The diplomats of the great 
Powers do not use the word in the same meaning as do Koreans, because they did 
not exercise forty years of Japanese domination. If they did understand your 
thoughts of the term “Trusteeship” they would use another term to express the 
assistance and advice they are willing to give Korea. I can assure you that I need 
no demonstration of any kind to make me do all in my power to remove all 
references to “Trusteeship” from future discussions of Korea.  
(HUSAFIK 1948) 
 
The general’s belated response did little to mend the damage already done to public 
relations with the Korean people; instead it appeared that the Americans were replacing 
rather than removing the former colonial overlords.  
A natural extension of the view that equated the U.S. Military Government with 
the Japanese Colonial Government was the idea that the groups aiding the Americans, 
especially the local interpreters, were the successors to the chinilpa (pro-Japanese 
collaborators). As stated earlier, the Japanese government radically reduced the study of 
English in schools once the war in the Pacific began. The majority of interpreters that 
worked with the Military Government had thus studied overseas and only wealthy 
families could afford to send their children abroad. Following liberation, the majority of 
these wealthy landowners began to support the far right party, the Korean Democratic 
Party, which had deep vested interest in the status quo and felt the threat of communism 
most keenly. A significant number of “collaborationists” from the Japanese occupational 
period were also drawn into this group. A staunch anti-communist, Hodge lent his 
support to the far right. The majority of the approximately 400 interpreters who worked 
for the Military Government, including Hodge’s personal interpreter Lee Myo-muk, were 
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members of or closely associated with the Korean Democratic Party. In the eyes of the 
Korean people, the Japanese collaborators, the wealthy landowners, and the Military 
Government interpreters were cooperating to maintain the social hierarchy established 
during the colonial era.  
The perceived relationship between the U.S. Military Government, former 
Japanese collaborators, and interpreters, which was the subject of widespread 
condemnation, is aptly represented in the following description of a poster seen by U.S. 
Colonel Glenn Newman of the U.S. Military Government:  
An American soldier, blindfolded, is shaking hands with a Korean who holds a 
Japanese flag and a bundle of 100 yen notes. Between the two is an interpreter 
labeled as “Bribed by Traitors and Pro-Japs. 
(HUSAFIK 1948) 
 
The American soldier in this poster is drawn wearing a blindfold to suggest that the 
United States was oblivious to the circumstances in Korea. The Korean holding a 
Japanese flag and a bundle of Japanese money is a representation of former Japanese 
collaborators who were now seeking to forge ties with the United States and the 
interpreter, positioned at the center, is bridging the two parties, thus ensuring that the 
existing social hierarchy will prevail under the new regime.  
The perception that interpreters were running the Military Government led to that 
institution earning the moniker the “interpreter’s government,” which was a “government 
of, for, and by interpreters” (Taylor 1948, 372). These interpreters were referred to as 
“malicious interpreters” by the Korean media. This idea was examined in many 
transfictional works produced in Korea during the occupational period. Among these 
works, Chae Man-sik’s “Mister Pang” stands out as an exploration of the social role 
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played by interpreters following the end of the war and the arrival of the United States.16 
The story presents two characters, Paek Chisa and Pang Sambok, and demonstrates how 
the ability to speak English reversed the fortunes of two Koreans in 1945. The allegiance 
of the two characters is underlined by the English and Japanese honorifics the two use 
when referring to each other: Paek Chisa is referred to as Paek-san while Pang Sambok is 
called Mister Pang. The lower-class Pang Sambok, a cobbler, managed to put his limited 
English skills to use as an interpreter for an American officer, resulting in a dramatic rise 
in wealth and status. The following excerpt describes the house Pang purchases just three 
days after becoming an interpreter.  
Mister Pang […] moved to his present house—said to be the company house of a 
bank director before Liberation—from the Hyonjo-dong rented room three days 
after becoming an interpreter for the lieutenant. Upstairs and down, it was 
decorated half in the Western style, half in the Japanese—altogether a palatial 
mansion.  
(Chae 2017, 177) 
 
The fact that the U.S. military interpreter, Pang, moved into the house of a former 
Japanese collaborator, the bank director, indicates that the interpreter has replaced the 
colluder as the face of the Korean upper-class. Rather than redecorating the house in the 
“Western style,” which would indicate a clear break from the past, however, the mansion 
is decorated half in the Western and half in the Japanese style. This passage hints at the 
 
16 Chae Man-sik, a Korean novelist, playwright, literary critic, essayist, reporter, and 
editor who produced 290 novels, short stories, plays, critiques, and essays during his 
career. In his work, Chae uses satire to discuss social issues such as class conflict, 
colonialism, national identity, and the intellectuals living under Japanese colonial and 
U.S. military occupation. During the U.S. occupation, Chae shifted his attention from 
colonialism to the difficulties of nation-building in Korea under U.S. occupation, amid 
the turbulence and confusion of ideological struggle and national division. 
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fact that though the Japanese colonial era might have ended, Japanese collaborators 
continued to maintain a strong hold on the wealth and power in Korea. 
Soon after Pang moves into his new home, he is visited by the upper-class 
patriarch Paek Chisa, who prospered under the Japanese because his son held a position 
within the colonial police force. With liberation, however, his family was stripped of its 
wealth and targeted for retribution. Paek paid Pang a visit in hopes of persuading Pang to 
help him regain his fortune by using his connections within the Military Government to 
track down and capture the people who stole his riches. As payment, Paek promises to 
award Pang half of his estate, to which the interpreter quickly agrees. Although the 
interpreter has replaced the colluder as the beneficiary of foreign occupation, the fact that 
Pang agrees to help Paek regain his fortune indicates that ultimately the interpreter is 
working to maintain the social status quo that was established under Japanese rule.  
Malicious interpreters also sparked the interest of the public when the topic of 
interpreting was reported on by major newspapers in southern Korea during the years 
between 1945 and 1950.17 The large number of articles devoted to this topic is a clear 
indicator of the level of interest the public felt towards the empowered interpreters 
working for the Military Government. These articles provide a rough overview of how 
interpreters were framed by the media during the occupation.  
(1) Malicious Military Police interpreter sentenced to 10 years in prison 
(2) Emphasize principle of judiciary independence – eliminate machinations of 
interpreter and impure party members, lawyer’s association proposes to Military-
Governor  
(3) Unjust outside interference and malicious interpreter domination renounced, 
determined to protect the judiciary, group of prosecutors submit petition 
 




(4) U.S. Korea Joint Conference close examination crimes and consider 
punishment for malicious interpreters and corrupt officials 
(5) Criticism for misbehavior of U.S. official, Korean interpreters are a necessary 
evil 
(6) Fake interpreter steals 130 thousand won 
(7) Fake interpreter delinquent to be locked up for undermining Bar-Dance Hall 
(8) Interpreter steals military uniform to be sent behind bars 
(9) Abuse of U.S. military interpreter, several hundred thousand Won swindled, 
approximately ten malicious interpreters arrested 
(10) Delinquent interpreter prosecuted 
(11) Misdeeds of malicious interpreter, steals 140 thousand Won 
(12) Malicious interpreter exposed while trying to pocket supplies – candidate for 
Mayor’s secretary” 
(13) Thorough purge of malicious interpreter, seeking information on police 
torture” 
(14) Malicious interpreter uses handgun in robbery 
 
A cursory examination of the titles shows that the majority of these articles report on the 
crimes committed by “malicious interpreters.” This would suggest that U.S. Military 
Government interpreters were subjected to public scrutiny. Considering that these 
interpreters were viewed as the new generation of foreign colluders, it is hardly surprising 
that media outlets focused on the malicious activities of this social group. A closer look at 
the contents of articles (1) through (3) provides a clearer picture of how interpreters and 
the act of interpreting in an occupational space were viewed by the Korean public. 
Article (1), “Malicious Military Police interpreter sentenced to 10 years in 
prison,” is one of two articles which reports on the arrest of a Korean-Japanese interpreter 
who worked for the Japanese colonial government. This interpreter was charged with 
“participating in the electrical and water torture of 60 anti-Japanese activists while 
working for the Japanese Military Police.” The tone of the article grows particularly stern 
when it mentions that this interpreter aided the Military Police set their office on fire 
before fleeing Hoeryeong, most likely to dispose of any records of their inhumane 
interrogation methods, after Japan had announced its surrender to the Allies, which 
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proved that the interpreter was not working for the Japanese out of necessity but rather 
that he was “a national traitor” who was in fact loyal to the Japanese.  
Article (2), “Unjust outside interference and malicious interpreter domination 
renounced, determined to protect the judiciary, group of prosecutors submit petition,” 
likewise discusses the misconduct of interpreters under the colonial government, though 
in more general terms: 
When Japanese tyranny began the people suffered bitterly for the numerous cases 
of innocent civilians being imprisoned for unfounded accusations made by 
malicious interpreters while criminals were acquitted because they had bribed the 
interpreter.   
 
This article indicates that interpreters under the Japanese authorities wielded considerable 
influence as it claims they could use their position to convince the police and court 
whether a person was guilty or innocence of a crime. It also suggests that these 
interpreters were prone to receiving bribes and that they were feared and hated by the 
public. This article, most importantly, shows that the criticism directed towards 
interpreters during the U.S. military occupation extends back to the Japanese colonial era.  
The contents of Article (3), “Unjust outside interference and malicious interpreter 
domination renounced, determined to protect the judiciary, group of prosecutors submit 
petition,” show that interpreters were charged with interfering in court hearings during 
the military occupation. In an interview, former prosecutor, Seonu Jeong-won, states that 
“many people suffered because interpreters distorted what was being said” at the Military 
Government Court. Seonu claims he saw a court interpreter “send an innocent man to 
prison by making him guilty by saying ‘no’ when he should have said ‘yes’” (2005, 117). 
Seonu claims he later had the interpreter arrested, but while incarcerated the interpreter 
informed the authorities that the prosecutor who had had him arrested was actually a 
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communist. After hearing this, the prosecutor scolded the interpreters, saying “Hey you, 
it was terrible living under Japanese oppression, now that there are new masters have you 
decided to sponge off the Americans and harass Korean people?” Here again, the actions 
of interpreters working for the U.S. military government are seen as mirroring Japanese 
collaborators.  
The contents of articles (1), (2), (3) show that interpreters working for the United 
States Army Military Government in Korea were viewed by the public as colluders 
working with a foreign institution who were willing to use their linguistic resources for 
their own personal gain. It was due to these factors that historians such as Jin Duk-gyu 
(1980, 46) tend to be extremely critical of Military Government interpreters: 
These interpreters were individuals that lacked clear historical awareness or a 
sense of national identity. Most of them were obsessed with their own individual 
comfort and personal advancement. They began to play the role of a new social 
stratum within the hierarchy of power by using the backing of unchallenged 
power of the U.S. military they ruled over the Korean people. They were involved 
in all matters relating to rights and interests, committed countless corrupt crimes, 
increasing the level of socio-political confusion. 
 
The reason interpreters engaged in corrupt activity appears to be linked to the dynamics 
of the linguistic market in southern Korea under U.S. occupation, which was 
characterized by an excess in demand. Excessive demand is created in a market when the 
price of a product or service is set below the equilibrium price. In this case, the 
consumers compete to purchase this product or service, and the high demand pushes up 
the price, making more suppliers willing to produce the product or provide the service as 
the price begins to rise to its equilibrium. The conditions under which the linguistic 
market operated during the occupation, however, were not typical market circumstances 
because the U.S. military maintained a monopsony—i.e., a situation in which there is 
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only one consumer of a good or service—over the demand for interpreters and 
translators. The following excerpt, taken from historical records of the U.S. military, 
suggests that the Military Government, which possessed wage-setting power as the 
largest employer of interpreters, set the price for linguistic services at an artificially low 
price, a fact that the institution was cognizant of:  
[interpreters] were paid twenty yen a day; in spite of the low pay many educated 
English-speaking Koreans volunteered their services in order to improve their 
knowledge of English. 
(HUSAFIK 1948) 
 
The Military Government, however, was disinclined towards increasing the wages of 
interpreters and translators under its employment, based on the fact that they were already 
being paid more than Japanese interpreters during the Japanese colonial government.  
Q. Are interpreters well paid? 
A. Comparatively speaking, interpreters are paid higher than chief clerks and 
considerably higher than their position called for under the former government of 
Korea – under the Japanese. Their exact pay at present ranges from Civil Service 
grade 7 at the top to 10 at the bottom. The total monthly pay for the top grade at 
present, including the cost of living differential, is 1870 W. The total monthly pay 
for the lowest paid interpreter at present is 1670 W.  
(National Archives and Records Administration, November 15, 1946, 12) 
 
By undercutting interpreters, the Military Government opened the door to potential 
corruption. The political leader Won Se-hoon asserted that underpaying interpreters led to 
corruption and that there was a need to increase interpreter wages, as they have “been 
paid salaries which give them little more than tobacco money.”18  
 
18 Research by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) shows that countries with higher civil 
service wages have lower levels of corruption because higher salaries raise the stakes of 
engaging in corruption. Similarly, the “fair wage model” contends that officials engage in 
corruption only when they see themselves as not receiving a “fair” income, a perception 
that could be eliminated through higher salaries. This view corresponds with experts on 
corruption, such as Peter N.S. Lee, who notes that “it is not a question of paying 
sufficient salary to a man incorruptible but rather of not paying salary on which a man is 
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The artificially low pay offered interpreters meant that the countervailing force 
against engaging in corrupt activity, in other words the threat of loss of employment, was 
weakened while the incentive to seek alternative channels of income was strengthened. 
Under such circumstances, interpreters, who joined the Military Government for 
pragmatic rather than ideological reasons, did not feel the need to meet the expectations 
of the Military Government.  
 
2.9. Interpreter Agency within a Zone of Uncertainty 
According to Bourdieu, the power that a social agent holds is derived from their 
position within a social field and the capital they possess. How then were interpreters 
able to gain access to capital and power that allowed them to challenge the authority of 
the Military Government during interpreted exchanges when the USAMGIK dominated 
the military and political field in occupational Korea? The empowerment of USAMGIK 
interpreters was made possible by the fact that interpreted events take place within a 
“zone of uncertainty” (Inghilleri 2005, 72). A “zone of uncertainty” is a social space in 
which agents from different fields converge, and the convergence of conflicting world 
views momentarily upsets the habitus of everyone involved. Social agents, seeking to 
reestablish social order amid the confusion, compete to assert with varying levels of 
certainty the legitimacy of their own social practices. Thus, interpreting activity becomes 
the locus of competition between social agents whose hierarchical relations and 
accompanying habitus are recontextualized. Typically, social agents and institutions in 
possession of larger amounts of capital, and therefore power, will dictate the terms under 
 
encouraged to be corrupt in order to meet his reasonable commitments.”  
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which the norms of interpreting are established. It is due to this fact that the interpreting 
habitus often remains oriented towards the maintenance of control possessed by dominant 
institutions and social agents over interlingual communication and interaction.  
Nonetheless, it is always possible for a more dominant networks of power to be 
rendered unable to forcefully assert its authority during interpreted events if its position 
of power is challenged by the presence of an interpreter or other interlocutors who may 
diminish the value of the symbolic capital they possess. Such developments allow the 
interpreter to accrue symbolic and cultural capital that enables them to compete with 
social agents from more established professions and fields in the struggle over power and 
control of the social/interactional space in which interpreting activity takes place. When 
the authority of the dominant institution is challenged, an interpreting habitus that rejects 
the dominant institution’s views regarding normative behavior may emerge. In this case, 
the role of the interpreter and what constitutes legitimate interpretive practice can be 
brought into question or redefined. 
In the case of the USAMGIK, although the Military Government was the 
dominant administrative and military institution in the field of occupation, interpreters 
were able to challenge the organization’s view of what constitutes legitimate behavior, 
able to produce new forms of interpreting practices, and able even to dominate 
interpreted interactions because of the significance of the linguistic and cultural capital 
they possessed. The value of the interpreter’s capital was exponentially increased due to 
two factors. First, the demand for the linguistic capital these interpreters possessed was 
driven upwards as the USAMGIK transitioned to a bilingual organization. While the 
viability of daily administrative operations hinged on the assumption that the American 
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and Korean staff could cooperate and coordinate, none of the American staff and only a 
very limited number of the Korean staff could communicate with their counterparts. 
Second, the supply of interpreters in the linguistic market created by the USAMGIK 
could not rise to meet expanding demand because the study of English had been 
discouraged by the Japanese colonial government during the decade preceding the U.S’s 
arrival.  
According to the historians Fishel and Hausrath, the “interpreter’s government” 
had the following effects:  
1) It put civil affairs at the mercy of their Korean interpreters;  
2) it made the Korean interpreter, unprepared by training and experience, the key 
man in civil affairs field operations;  
3) it posed a serious security problem because of the difficulty of adequately 
screening interpreters under Korean conditions; and, 
4) it exalted the influence of Koreans who spoke English and therefore were able 
to obtain direct access to civil affairs personnel.  
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 8-9) 
 
Countermeasures against the empowerment of interpreters were discussed during the 
Joint America-Korea Conference, during which the head of the Korean delegation, Kim 
Kiu-sic suggested that Military Government interpreters might be kept in check if the 
U.S. military could carry out the three following measures:  
1) Language qualifications to be tested by both Koreans and Americans before 
employment 
2) Duties and activities should be outlined and he should be told how far his 
responsibilities go. The trouble is that these interpreters are used sometimes 
as informers, advisors, liaison officers, etc. 
3) Classification: 
a. Interpreters or translators attached to the higher officials of M.B. 
b. Those attached to bureau chiefs and governors of provinces 
c. Those attached to sub-officials such as section chiefs. 




Indeed, had the Military Government been able to enact these three measures, namely 
improving the recruitment process, clearly defining the interpreter’s duties, and 
establishing a system for personnel management, it would have been better able to dictate 
the terms under which interpreters operated. However, Kim overlooked the fact that it 
was precisely the organization’s inability to select, train, and manage its linguistic staff 
rather than a disinclination to do so that created the conditions for USAMGIK 
interpreters to monopolize the channels of interlingual/intercultural communication in the 
first place.  
After discussions were completed, the members of the Joint Conference sent a 
letter to General Hodge which contained the following suggestions for tackling the 
problems associated with interpreting:  
Interpreters are essential in any governmental organization such as Military 
Government where the language barrier is so great. However, dishonest and venal 
interpreters have unique opportunities not only for personal gain but for the 
furtherance of the political power of the particular group with which they may 
happen to be associated. The utilization of interpreters should be carefully limited 
to tasks where the officials concerned cannot perform their missions satisfactorily 
because of language difficulties. Such officials should carefully check the work of 
interpreters in important matters. 
(National Archives and Records Administration, February 4, 1947) 
 
This statement does little in the way of providing the Military Government with practical 
guidance for managing its interpreters. The recommendation that officials limit the use of 
interpreters to tasks for which their services are indispensable was hardly a viable option 
as there were no American military personnel able to speak Korean, and less than five 
percent of Korean officials in the USAMGIK were capable of conversing in English. 
Such a move would have required that American staff restrict dialogue to the handful of 
Koreans who could conversate in their language, and the Military Government was 
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already under fire by the Korean public for its preferential treatment of English speakers. 
Under such circumstances, the suggestion that U.S. staff somehow monitor the work of 
the organization’s interpreters rings hollow as well. Thus, rather than providing effective 
countermeasures, the contents of this letter reveal that the Military Government’s 
inability to access the linguistic capital required for interlingual communication barred it 
from asserting dominance over the interpreting habitus.  
The circumstances seen above should not, however, simply be understood as a 
case in which interpreters forcefully wrestled control away from the Military 
Government. An interpreting habitus emerges through interactions between social agents 
rather than being constructed by one group. In other words, the interpreting habitus that 
arose within the USAMGIK was a natural result of the lack of linguistic and cultural 
capital USAMGIK officials possessed during interactions that required fluency in the 
language and culture of their counterparts. It was due to this fact that “Many Military 
Government officials came to rely heavily on interpreters for the conduct of business far 
beyond that of mere translation” (Historical Office of the U.S. Command in Korea, 
1948). In sum, the interpreting habitus was reoriented towards the interpreter because 
their specialized position with respect to linguistic and cultural knowledge was 
acknowledged by interlocutors in the field, which provided them with the symbolic 





THE KOREAN WAR (1950-19 53): A PARROT PERCHED ON A RIFLE 
Given that the United Nations Command was comprised of troops from sixteen 
United Nations member states, the success of its military operations was highly reliant on 
the work of interpreters and translators. Despite the critical role they played during the 
Korean War, however, little is known about these linguistic mediators. This chapter first 
reveals how Korean-English interpreters, known as UN Liaison Group officers, were 
recruited, trained, and utilized during the Korean War (1950-53). Particular attention is 
paid to the triadic relationship between UN Liaison Group officers, U.S. Korean Military 
Assistance Group officers, and ROK Army officers.  
 
3.1. Diplomatic and Military Fields in Northeast Asia 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the international arena was 
dominated by multinational wars which cut across national borders and spanned multiple 
continents. The aftermath of the disastrous Second World War saw the beginning of an 
era defined by the decline of former colonial powers, the simultaneous rise of the Soviet 
Union and the United States, and the creation of supranational organizations such as the 
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace. On the Korean peninsula, the 
end of the Second World War signaled the collapse of the Japanese Empire and the end 
of colonial rule. The power void left by the Japanese was promptly filled by the militaries 
of the Soviet Union and the United States, who divided the country along the 38th 
Parallel and established military governments in the two zones. Though the United 
Nations attempted to unify the two Koreas by administering joint elections, this effort 
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failed because UN agents were prevented from setting foot in the communist zone north 
of the border. Separate elections were held in 1948, and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South 
Korea) were launched that same year. The Soviet and American militaries soon after 
departed, leaving behind two diametrically opposed governments, each claiming 
sovereignty over the whole of Korea, setting the stage for the Korean War.  
As soon as the two governments were founded, they began preparations for 
military confrontation. In the South, this mandate was spearheaded by Syngman Rhee, 
the first president of the Republic of Korea, who maintained that a peaceful coexistence 
between the two Koreas was impossible and reunification needed to be secured by any 
means possible. What prevented Rhee from launching an all-out war with the North 
Koreans was the fact that the United States refused to support his plan for the 
reunification of the Korean peninsula by force. At the time, the U.S. was preoccupied 
with countering Soviet geopolitical expansion in Europe. As part of this effort, Truman 
announced the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to contain the communist threat in Greece and 
Turkey, which became the foundation of America’s policy of Soviet containment 
throughout the Cold War. This move was followed by the Marshall Plan in 1948, an 
initiative to aid Western European economies rebuild after the end of World War II, and 
the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, a military 
alliance established to provide collective security against the Soviet Union.  
The premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Il-sung, was 
equally adamant about the need to unify the country by force and constantly sought Stalin 
and Mao’s support for a war against the Republic of Korea. In the years following the 
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establishment of the two Korean governments, however, neither of North Korea’s two 
major allies had sufficient motive to unleash a war on the Korean peninsula. Unifying the 
Korean peninsula was not a high priority for Stalin, who faced a greater challenge in 
Europe as Western European states began to rebuild themselves, with the aforementioned 
support of the United States. When Kim Il-sung first breached the matter, asking for 
“permission to begin military operations against the south” (Shtykov 1949), the Soviet 
Politburo responded with, “It is impossible to view this operation other than the 
beginning of a war between North and South Korea, for which North Korea is not 
prepared either militarily or politically” (Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo 
1949). While refusing his proposal, Stalin nonetheless “found Kim’s reunification ideas 
interesting enough to discuss them with Mao” (Goncharov, Lewis and Xue 1993, 139). 
At the moment, the Chinese likewise had little to gain from a war on the Korean 
peninsula. The Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and 
the Communist Party of China, led by Mao Zedong, had been raging on since 1927, 
although the two had briefly combined forces against the Japanese. It was only in 1949 
that, after more than two decades of fighting, Mao’s communist forces finally defeated 
Chiang’s army and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite the fact 
that Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters had fled across the Taiwan Strait, the newly 
established PRK was faced with a myriad of domestic issues, including eliminating the 
last vestiges of opposition on the mainland, erecting a stable political system, and 
revitalizing the economy. Preoccupied with matters closer to home, Mao had no reason to 
incite a clash on the Korean peninsula. 
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It was only in 1950 that shifts to the balance of power on the international stage 
convinced Stalin to accept Kim’s calls for a war for the reunification of Korea. The most 
important factor was without question the establishment of the PRC, which successfully 
placed the whole of mainland China under communist control. In addition to the 
enlargement of the communist sphere of influence, this development was interpreted by 
party leaders in Moscow as a sign that Washington was reluctant to actively intervene in 
East Asian affairs. Stalin therefore believed he could support a North Korean military 
push for unification without risking all-out war with the United States. Nonetheless, as a 
cautionary measure, Stalin insisted that Kim receive Mao’s approval for operations, and 
warned that “if he ran into difficulty with the United States, he would have to depend on 
China, not the Soviet Union, to bail him out” (Stueck 2002, 73). In May, Stalin also sent 
a telegram to China’s leadership declaring, “The present situation has changed from the 
situation in the past [so] that North Korea can move towards actions” (Vyshinsky 1950). 
At this point, Stalin was still the unchallenged chief of the international communist 
movement, and Mao could not openly dispute his authority on such matters. Furthermore, 
Mao had himself very recently reunified China by force and could thus not justifiably 
oppose Kim from pursuing a similar goal by identical means. For these reasons, when 
Kim Il-sung called on him for support, Mao promised that the DPRK had the PRC’s 
backing, should a need arise.  
Preparations for war began as soon as Stalin gave the go-ahead. Hundreds of 
Soviet military advisors had remained in North Korea after the establishment of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and more still arrived in May and June of 1950. 
Large amounts of mobile artillery and tanks were also sent from the U.S.S.R., with 
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technical staff to prepare and maintain the weapons. Though Stalin made it clear that this 
would be a “Korean” war, which would be limited to the Korean peninsula, as he did not 
want to risk the outbreak of a third world war, he promised that the Soviet Union would 
assist the North as best it could within those parameters. Kim Il-sung pledged “the attack 
will be swift and the war will be won in three days: the guerrilla movement in the South 
has grown stronger and a major uprising is expected” (Lankov 2015, 10) once the 
Northern army crossed the border. Fully in agreement on these matters, the three 
communist leaders set the time for attack for late June.  
 
3.2. The Outbreak and Progression of the Korean War 
On June 25, 1950, the North Korean military crossed the 38th Parallel and began 
its attack on the Republic of Korea. Their plan was to rapidly advance southward, capture 
the capital city of Seoul and encircle the Republic of Korea Army in the central region of 
the country. Seoul fell on the third day of the attack and Rhee and his administration, as 
well as hundreds of thousands of refugees, fled to the southeast coast. In late July, Kim 
Il-sung reported to Moscow that he was confident the war would last less than a month.  
Although North Korea held the upper hand militarily, the international 
community’s reaction to the war made the fulfillment of Kim’s prediction unlikely. In 
Washington, Truman immediately decided that the war was a case of outright Communist 
aggression, claiming in a statement made on June 27, 1950, that “The attack on Korea 
made it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion 
to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war” (Truman 
1956, 339). In Truman’s eyes, this attack, which was orchestrated by the Soviet Union, 
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was carried out to reduce American influence in the Asian continent and to test the mettle 
of the United States and its allies on a global scale. It was widely held at the time that the 
Soviet Union had masterminded the North Korean attack and that Kim Il-sung was 
Stalin’s puppet (Kennan 1968, 395). According to Truman, this gave America a moral 
imperative to act. “If we don't put up a fight now,” Truman proclaimed to his staff, there 
is “no telling what they’ll do” (Neal 2002, 182). 
A number of events surrounding the attack on South Korea made Truman 
anxious. First, the Soviet Union had successfully tested an atomic bomb in 1949, ending 
the United States’ monopoly on the weapon. Second, in Europe, Soviet intervention in 
Greece and Turkey had given rise to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which 
funneled aid to war-torn Europe in the hopes of warding off communist political 
victories. Most importantly, in Asia, China proper had been unified under Mao Zedong’s 
communist party, whereas the U.S.-backed Chiang Kai-shek had been forced to retreat to 
the island of Formosa (or Taiwan). After defeating Chiang, Mao had quickly moved to 
ally himself with the Soviet Union, and the two sides signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. The Truman 
administration faced fierce criticism for the unexpected communist takeover of China, 
which was often referred to as the “loss of China” (Newman 1992, ix). This critique 
played a large role in the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy, which placed Truman and his 
advisors under pressure to not appear “soft” on communism. When North Korean troops 
invaded the South, the Truman administration was eager to seize the opportunity to 
defend a noncommunist government from invasion by communist troops in hopes of 
gaining approval for its anticommunist campaign.  
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In the days following the outbreak of the Korean War, a series of critical 
decisions were made within the United Nations Security Council, propelled by the United 
States, regarding its response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Word of the 
North Korean attack first reached Washington via a radio message from Seoul to the 
Department of State sent by United States Ambassador to Korea, John J. Muccio, who 
stated: “It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was 
launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea” (FRUS 
1950, 125-126).19 News of the North Korea attack was soon passed on to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, who reportedly immediately exclaimed, “This 
is war against the United Nations” (Chace and Carr 2006, 68).. Lie called a meeting of the 
Security Council for the next day at 2 p.m. (New York time) to debate, amend, and revise 
a resolution with respect to the situation in Korea. United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution 82 was adopted on June 25, 1950, by a vote of nine to zero. The 
Soviet delegation, which could have vetoed the decision, was not present at the Security 
Council when the resolution was passed, because it had boycotted meetings since January 
10, 1950 over the issue of Chinese representation at the United Nations (Pak 2000, 109).  
UNSC Resolution 82 stated that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by 
forces from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea “constitutes a breach of the 
peace.” It called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of North 
Korean armed forces to the 38th Parallel, and, finally, “all [United Nations] Members to 
 
19 Foreign Relations of the United States is hereafter cited as FRUS.  
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render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to 
refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”20  
While the UNSC was debating how to respond to the North Korean attack, 
MacArthur, who was stationed in Tokyo, was ordered to send ammunition and equipment 
to South Korean forces so as to prevent a North Korean occupation of the capital area 
through the usage of air and naval cover to assure their safe arrival, provide ships and 
planes to evacuate American families from Korea and to protect the evacuation, and 
dispatch a survey party to Korea to monitor the situation and determine how best the U.S. 
might assist the ROK. On the evening of June 26, 1950, MacArthur reported to 
Washington that South Korean forces could not hold Seoul and that the ROK military 
was on the brink of “a complete collapse” (Korean Institute of Military History 1997, 
252).  
 As the situation on the Korean peninsula further deteriorated, on June 27, 1950, 
the UN Security Council passed the momentous UNSC Resolution 83.21 This statement 
once again called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for the North Korean 
authorities to withdraw their armed forces to the 38th Parallel. It was also noted that 
North Korea had failed to comply with UNSC Resolution 82, and thus “urgent military 
measures are required to restore international peace and security.” The resolution 
recommended “that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the 
Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
 
20 The full text of UN Security Council Resolution 82 may be viewed through the search 
engine of the United Nations at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/82 
21 The full text of UN Security Council Resolution 83 may be viewed through the search 
engine of the United Nations at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/83 
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international peace and security in the area.” The passing of this second resolution was an 
exceptional event in the history of the United Nations as it was the first time the UN 
requested military action from its member states to defend a country under military 
attack. Also noteworthy is the fact that, at the time, the ROK was not a UN member state. 
Despite calls for peace, the war waged on, and North Korean forces were able to 
continue their rush southward. On July 7, 1950, the UNSC passed Resolution 84.22 
Having previously recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such 
assistance to the South Korean state as may be necessary to repel the attack and restore 
peace and security to the area, the Security Council further recommended that all 
members providing military forces and other assistance to the Republic of Korea make 
these forces and assistance available to a unified command under the United States of 
America. In addition, they requested that the U.S. appoint the Commander of this 
organization, the United Nations Command, and task the Commander with reporting to 
the UNSC on circumstantial developments. In other words, the U.S. was hereby granted 
nearly unlimited authority over all UN-backed military operations on the peninsula. 
National militaries participating in the war as part of the United Nations Command 
(UNC) would be required to march under the UN flag. After the resolution was passed, 
Truman appointed MacArthur as Commander of the UN forces on July 8, 1950. The 
Republic of Korea, though not a member of the UN, likewise placed its military under 
MacArthur’s command on July 15, 1950, and on July 25, 1950, the UNC was officially 
established under the leadership of MacArthur. 
 
22 The full text of UN Security Council Resolution 84 may be viewed through the search 
engine of the United Nations at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/84 
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In total, sixteen countries sent troops and forty-one sent some form of equipment 
or aid to support the United Nations’ efforts against the forces of North Korea, which 
would later be aided by China. The success of this first “United Nations War” was of 
vital importance to the international organization if it hoped to maintain legitimacy. 
Failure to counter the North Korean attack would have caused the young institution to 
lose credibility just five years after its creation. Truman went so far as to state that the 
goal of the war effort was “to bring the United Nations through its first great effort in 
collective security and to produce a free world coalition of incalculable value” (Rovere 
and Schlesinger 2009, 104). 
While these critical decisions were being made at the UN Security Council, the 
South Korean government, military, and people were continuously forced into retreat by 
the Northern onslaught. The UN forces sent to aid the South Koreans were likewise 
repeatedly defeated by the advancing North Korean Army until they were forced back to 
the Pusan Perimeter, a 140-mile defensive line around the southeastern tip of the Korean 
peninsula that includes the port of Pusan. The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and 
UNC mounted a last stand around the perimeter, warding off North Korean attacks for six 
weeks, between August to mid-September. While the ROKA and UNC successfully 
defended this border, the United States, which had firm footing in Japan, continuously 
dispatched reinforcements and supplies to Pusan harbor. By early September, 
MacArthur’s troops outnumbered the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) 180,000 to 
100,000 soldiers, giving it the manpower needed to successfully mount a counterattack 
against the North (Appleman 1961, 61). 
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On September 15, 1950, MacArthur masterminded an amphibious landing at 
Incheon, a harbor city west of Seoul, which was well over 100 miles north of the Pusan 
Perimeter (Stokesbury 1988, 67). His objective was to liberate Seoul and threaten to cut 
off North Korean troops in the south of the peninsula. This risky tactic was a tremendous 
success. The UN forces that landed in Incheon defeated the North Korean units 
surrounding Seoul after only a week’s fighting. The UNC in Pusan pushed northward as 
the KPA retreated and Seoul was recaptured by ROK forces on September 25, 1950. By 
October 1, 1950, the communist troops that had marched on South Korea were all fleeing 
north of the 38th Parallel. 
With the North Korean forces in full retreat, the vital issue under consideration in 
the United Nations was the matter of whether the organization’s forces should cross the 
38th Parallel into North Korean territory and attempt to reunify the country by force. This 
topic had not been discussed at length earlier but there was a general understanding that 
the aim of the UN’s military venture was to restore the status quo by driving the North 
Korean Army north of the 38th Parallel. As UN forces rapidly approached the former 
border, arguments erupted within the UN for and against advancing past the parallel. 
Those in favor of a northward push argued that it was evident that there could be no 
lasting peace in the region if Korea remained divided into two ideologically polar states. 
During the U.S.S.R./U.S. occupation of northern and southern Korea, the policy of the 
UN had been to accomplish a unified Korea through the arrangement of free elections 
under UN auspice. The United Nations was still committed to this past decision and in 
dispute with North Korea, which had refused to permit UN supervision of elections north 
of the 38th Parallel. On the other hand, an attempt to unify Korea by force entailed 
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potential danger as there was no sure way to know how China or the Soviet Union would 
respond to the potential downfall of their ally. The Soviets could justify its entry into war 
with claims to some residual interests in the country while China might intervene since 
the disappearance of a communist state on the Korean peninsula would threaten its 
national security as it would place a U.S. ally next to its borders. The consequences of 
intervention by the Soviet Union or China could go so far as possibly sparking a third 
world war. In the United States, the success of the Incheon Landing had led to the rise of 
sufficient support for crossing the border. On September 30, 1950, U.S. Defense 
Secretary George Marshall sent a secret message to MacArthur stating, “We want you to 
feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th Parallel” 
(Weintraub 2000, 157-158).. With his government’s support, MacArthur ordered UN 
troops to cross the 38th Parallel into North Korean territory on October 7, 1950 
(Stokesbury 1988, 79). The North Korean capital, Pyongyang, was captured on October 
19, 1950 and UN troops continued to press northward, drawing closer to the North 
Korean-Chinese border (ibid.: 90).  
Stalin, who had been repeatedly promised a swift victory, was furious with the 
North Korean defeat and accused the North Koreans and his own military advisors of 
incompetence and negligence. On October 1, 1950, Stalin sent a message to Mao stating, 
“the situation of our Korean friends is getting desperate […] I think that if in the current 
situation you consider it possible to send troops to assist the Koreans, then you should 
move at least five-six divisions towards the 38th parallel at once” (Roberts 2019, 323). 
Upon receiving this message, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership met in 
emergency sessions from October 2-5, 1950 in order to decide on whether or not China 
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would intervene. Mao was very clear from the start that he wanted Chinese forces to 
move into North Korea, as per Stalin’s request. Furthermore, the Chinese communists 
owed the Koreans a debt of gratitude from the Chinese Civil War, in which many Korean 
communists had participated, and Mao himself had promised Kim he would provide him 
with assistance if needed. However, there was considerable opposition within the Chinese 
Politburo, and Mao was forced to decline the request for an immediate intervention with 
the statement that “such action may entail extremely serious consequences.” After 
receiving yet another more urgent request from Stalin to intervene, on October 5, 1950, 
Mao was able to convince members of the Politburo to overturn their previous decision 
and agree to send up to nine divisions to fight in Korea. After additional negotiations, on 
October 13, 1950, Mao finally made the decision that the PRK “should go ahead and 
cross the Yalu” into North Korea (Yufan and Zhihai 1990, 111). 
While Stalin and Mao prevaricated, the UN military advance northward 
continued. The Chinese forces, constituted as the People’s Volunteer Army (PVA), 
entered Korea the same day as the North Korean capital fell, with approximately two 
hundred thousand men. China justified its entry into the war as a response to “American 
aggression in the guise of the UN” (Fuchs, et al. 2018, 291). At the time, U.S. 
intelligence knew of China’s intention to intervene in the war, but they did not know 
where their troops would attack from nor how many troops they were willing to dedicate 
to the cause. Thus, the UNC was taken by surprise on November 1, 1950 when the 
Chinese forces attacked the U.S. First Cavalry Division near the city of Unsan. The 
Americans were caught wholly unprepared and suffered terrible losses. Mao then ordered 
the Chinese troops to wait for reinforcements before proceeding. This led MacArthur to 
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his biggest miscalculation of the war, ordering an offensive against the Chinese troops 
who he still believed were few in number. The result was a complete disaster for the UN 
forces. The PVA counterattack not only destroyed the offensive, with heavy losses on 
both sides, but forced the UNC into retreat. By December, the UNC was entirely pushed 
out of North Korea and on January 4, 1951, Seoul fell to the Communist forces for the 
second time. On April 11, 1951, Truman delivered his “Preventing a New World War” 
speech and dismissed MacArthur, a move that was brought about after the general 
publicly argued that the United States “take the war to China” (Ryan 1981, 576). 
By intervening in the Korean War, the newly established People’s Republic of 
China demonstrated to its domestic population the freshly instituted communist regime’s 
dedication to defending the country’s national sovereignty and communist ideology while 
flaunting to both its allies and rivals the country’s ability to hold its own against the 
United States. The intervention of China created a pseudo “balance of power” on the 
Korean peninsula. In mid-March 1951, UN forces retook Seoul for the second time, and 
their forces were able to establish and hold a fragile front line very close to the 38th 
parallel. The Chinese tried to dislodge them in April but failed due to the UN’s superior 
air support. The communist forces attempted an offensive in the spring of 1951, but the 
war had already taken the form of trench warfare. By the summer of 1951, Seoul had 
changed hands four times, the conflict became a war of attrition, with the front line set up 
close to the original border, the 38th parallel.  
By June, Mao was ready for a cease-fire, but Stalin argued that the war “gives the 
possibility to the Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and 
[…] shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of the 
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Anglo-American troops” (Combs 2012, 149). In the south, Syngman Rhee likewise urged 
the UNC not to settle before the country was reunified. Meanwhile, international support 
for the war continued to wain: in Europe, the war had never had much resonance and 
most people simply wanted the conflict to end before it spread there, the developing 
world expressed little support for the war, and two thirds of Americans believed that the 
U.S. should pull out of Korea altogether.  
For the remainder of the Korean War the ROKA/UNC and the KPA/PVA 
continued to wage battle but exchanged little territory. As such, the two sides were 
eventually forced to devise an alternative strategy to end the war because neither the 
UNC nor the Chinese and North Korean commanders were willing to gamble on a large-
scale offensive. Although the Korean Armistice Talks finally started in the summer of 
1951, the war continued on the battlefield and amassed thousands of casualties without 
meaningful military gains from either side.  
 
3.3. Interpreting during the Korean War  
Interpreters played a particularly consequential role within the UNC because this 
organization was comprised of troops dispatched from sixteen UN members states.23 The 
ROK and the U.S. militaries made up the overwhelming majority of this military 
coalition, and thus, ensuring smooth interlingual communication between these two 
groups was of maximum importance for the success of the UNC’s military operations.  
 
23 During the war, the demarcation between interpreter and translator was not clear, as a 
single individual was often assigned to do both. Individuals tasked with both functions 
were more often referred to as “interpreter” rather than “translator.” The current study 
will adhere to this approach.   
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The U.S.’s lack of capable Korean interpreters was both evident and problematic 
even before the official outbreak of violent conflict. In early 1950, the United States 
Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), which controlled and operated all 
communications intelligence and communications security activities within the 
Department of Defense, had no technical expertise on the Korean peninsula. The single 
self-trained Korean linguist possessed no Korean dictionaries, typewriters, or books 
pertaining to Korea. The agency, like most other national and operational level 
communications intelligence organizations at the time, focused on Soviet military 
communications targets and, thus, “North Korean codes had of necessity been grossly 
neglected” (Blair 1987, 171). The agency thus failed to conduct communications 
intelligence collection or analysis against North Korean targets until April 1950, and, as a 
result, the U.S. military misjudged the danger posed by North Korea and the imminence 
of the attack on South Korea, as analysts had believed “there will be no civil war in 
Korea this spring or summer” (Finley 1995, 382).24 The lack of Korean interpreters 
continued to hinder the U.S. military’s wartime operations in Korea; military historians 
Wesley R. Fishel and Alfred H. Hausrath acknowledge that during the war the inability of 
United States military to access the Korean language and clearly communicate with its 
 
24 Naturally, the challenges of communicating with allied forces presented difficulties 
not only for the UNC but the communist alliance as well, as the lack of a common 
language between the Chinese-North Korean Joint Air Command and the Russian Air 
Force was a tremendous hindrance to cooperation between the communist militaries. The 
resulting lack of coordination between the Sino-Korean ground forces and the Russian air 
units led to North Korean AAAs targeting Soviet fighters and a Russian pilot shooting 




partners was “responsible for many operational situations and errors that proved costly in 
lives, money, and time” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 1). 
When the United States decided to deploy troops to the Korean peninsula, the 
country’s military brass and policymakers believed U.S. military intervention would 
bring about a swift end to the conflict. Although initially taken aback by the rapid 
advance of the North Korean military, the atmosphere in Washington soon turned to one 
of euphoria following the success of the Incheon Landing on September 15, 1950, and a 
definitive victory against the communist enemy seemed only a matter of time. In early 
November, the Associated Press reported that an emboldened MacArthur told his staff, 
“You tell your boys that when they get to the Yalu (River) they are going home. I want to 
make good on my statement that they are going to eat Christmas dinner at home.” Soon 
after, the UNC commander launched the so-called “Home-by-Christmas” offensive on 
November 24, 1950, with “unwarranted confidence...believing that they comfortably 
outnumbered enemy forces” (Mossman 1990, 23-24). The northern push, carried out with 
the objective of conquering all of North Korea and ending the war, was quickly 
abandoned in light of the massive assault by the PVA, which had come to North Korea’s 
aid in late October. MacArthur was relieved from his post in April 1951, and the war 
stretched on until the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953.  
 
3.3.1. UN Liaison Group Officers 
It was largely due to the U.S. military’s overconfidence and belief that the Korean 
War would be a short-term commitment that “the Army Language School (ALS) did not 
gear up for a major expansion, as had occurred to meet the needs for language skills in 
 
84 
World War II” (Müller 1986: 104). As a result, throughout the period of “active combat 
in Korea from 1950 to 1953—the period of prime need for the Army—US military 
interpreters were not available” (Hausrath 1957, 121). In their stead, “the [U.S] Army 
was forced to rely on non-Americans for linguist services in Korea” (Fishel and Hausrath 
1958, 1).  
It was the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) that assumed the duty of selecting, 
training, and managing Korean-English interpreters by establishing the UN Liaison 
Group on July 7, 1950. Though initially a relatively small group of first lieutenants, the 
organization grew expeditiously following the UN Security Council’s pledge to come to 
the aid of the ROK. According to KMAG and ROKA headquarters, “more than 1,800 
Korean-English interpreter-officers were on duty in the ROKA at the close of the Korean 
hostilities” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 32).  
The position of UN Liaison Group officer was considered an attractive one 
because these interpreters were not expected to actively participate in armed combat. 
Unlike other commissioned officers who led enlisted soldiers on the battlefield, the 
official duty of the UN Liaison Group officer was limited to mediating communication 
between U.S. and ROK counterparts:  
Interpreters are assigned or attached to units by Headquarters ROK Army as may 
be required and they are to be used for interpretation and translation duties only. 
They will not be assigned to other duties. 
(Office of the Chief KMAG, 1953) 
 
Furthermore, there was the added advantage that officers were paid a higher salary than 
enlisted soldiers, and UN Liaison Group officers could improve their English language 
skills during their military service. During the war, English was a vital tool for survival, 
as even children learned a few English words in order to beg for food from the U.S. 
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military, as well a ladder for success, as ROK President Rhee Syngman was noted for 
giving preferential treatment to people proficient in English. The ROK Defense Minister, 
Shin Sung-mo, was one individual who benefited greatly from his ability to speak 
fluently in English, a fact that is highlighted and vilified in the poem “Shin Sung-mo” by 
the Korean poet Ko Un.  
he used to sail on an English boat 
 and was thought competent 
 because he knew the language 
he was loved by the president who was also well versed in English 
in no time he was named the Defense Minister 
he was living the dream 
before the war he said 
we will lunch at Pyongyang 
and supper at Sinuiju 
this is our chance 
our national army shall chase them to the Yalu River 
so that our dream of national unification may come to pass 
such utter nonsense 
(Ko 2004, 180-181; my translation) 
 
Due to the various privileges these military interpreters enjoyed, many hoped to 
serve as UN Liaison Group officers and candidates were selected through a fiercely 
competitive selection process. Anyone wishing to join the UN Liaison Group was first 
required to submit documentation verifying that they were, “a man of the Republic of 
Korea, civilian or army personnel [EM] who have completed the entire course of high 
school or higher” (Hausrath 1957, 120). If their paperwork was accepted, the applicants 
then appeared for a written examination administered by ROKA. A special 
KMAG Selection Board (under the KMAG AG) then gave those who passed the 
written test an oral examination. This board recommended to ROKA AG and G1 
those candidates it found competent to enter the school.  
(ibid., 122) 
 
According to former UN Liaison Group officer Kim Il-pyong, during the examination, 
candidates were  
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tested on their ability not only to speak in English but also their knowledge of 
Korean history and ability to translate. They were not only tested to see if they 
could speak English but also to see if they could read various English books, 
understand Anglophone culture, and translate into Korean. It was therefore a 
comprehensive exam of the candidate’s linguistic skills. 
 (Kim 2012; my translation) 
 
Due to the position’s appeal and the examination’s high-level of difficulty, most 
candidates who were selected were “either university graduates, university students, or 
career men […] who could be considered ‘intellectuals’” (Lee 1988, 213-14). 
Those who passed the entrance exam were sent to the English Interpreter (UN 
Liaison) Officer Training School, where they received military and language training for 
three to four weeks. The mission of the school was, 
to train the selected Republic of Korea personnel in the Republic of Korea Army 
military in English; techniques of interpretation and translation, and the technical 
military working knowledges and the basic military training as they require to the 
service of the excellent interpreter [English] officer in every field of any 
organization so that they can contribute to the sufficient operations of the 
Republic of Korea Army which has been held by the most close cooperation and 
coordination with the United Nations Army, and also to the development of the 
Republic of Korea Army. 
(Hausrath 1957, 120) 
 
While the Training School’s goals were lofty enough, when compared to the 46 weeks of 
language training provided at the U.S. Army Language School (ALS), the training UN 
Liaison Group officers received was exceedingly short. UN Liaison Group officer 
themselves considered the course they had taken at the interpreter school “to have been 
too short and sketchy to meet their actual needs and recommended that it be increased in 
length from 3 to at least 6 weeks; in three instances the suggestion was that it be at least 2 
months long” (Hausrath 1957, 122). The following excerpts show that it was also not 
uncommon for cadets to be posted after having spent only one or two weeks at the school 




The head of the newly established “UN Liaison Officer Group” was Lieutenant 
Colonel Kang Young-jun. The name and branch of service “UN Liaison Officer” 
had not previously existed within the ROK Army. Due to the rapid expansion of 
the Army during the early phases of the Korean War, the extension of the war, 
and the increase in the demand for KMAG Advisors, it was rare for these cadets 
to finish the required four-week training period before being dispatched. When I 
joined, the third batch had been sent out, but considering that it had only been 
forty days since the war broke out, it was obvious they had only received a 
maximum of ten days of training before being sent out.  
(Lee 1988: 211-12, my translation) 
 
In June 1951, I received just two weeks of training and was commissioned as an 
Army first lieutenant and sent to the 3rd Division.  
(Ji 2006: 84, my translation) 
 
The English Interpreter (UN Liaison) Officer Training School was only able to increase 
its period of training from three to six weeks in June 1953, a month before the signing of 
the armistice agreement. Thus, throughout the majority of the Korean War, UN Liaison 
Group officers had to manage their duties despite being undertrained for the tasks set 
before them. 
The UN Liaison Group, despite rushing to churn out military interpreters, was 
never able to fully meet the demand for these military linguists. As a result, there was a 
tendency for combat units to recruit interpreters whenever the opportunity presented 
itself: 
Because the number of Liaison officers who received regular training could not 
meet the exploding demand of the Army, a fair number were commissioned on 
the spot. Due to the needs on the battlefield, anyone who could say a few words 
on the frontlines was immediately ‘recruited’ and given a new insignia.  
(Lee 1988, 213) 
 
When we reached the northern outskirts of the city just after sunset, we ran into a 
roadblock manned by a squad of American GIs. I was overjoyed. 
   “Hey, you guys, what’s your outfit?” I asked. 
   “2nd Infantry Division,” one of the GIs manning a 75-mm recoilless gun 
replied, asking, “Would you like to work for us as interpreter?” 
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   “Hell, yes,” I accepted the offer on the spot. 
(Kim 2008, 26) 
 
In this case, interpreters were put to work without having received even the most basic 
level of language training. However, as will be revealed later in this chapter, in some 
cases, U.S. military personnel preferred working with untrained civilian interpreters over 
UN Liaison Group officers due to issues related to loyalty.  
 
3.3.2. U.S. Korean Military Assistance Group Officers 
Once their training was completed, UN Liaison Group officers reported to ROKA 
units to mediate communications between U.S. and ROK officers. Typically, these U.S. 
officers were members of the United States Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG), a 
military unit originally deployed to South Korea to help train and provide logistic support 
to the ROKA, following its establishment on August 15, 1948 under the title Provisional 
Military Advisory Group (PMAG). PMAG was renamed KMAG on July 1, 1949 and 
tasked with advising and assisting the ROK to develop its army, coast guard, and national 
police. After the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, KMAG advisors faced the 
demanding task of providing their ROKA advisees with counsel during major combat 
operations against North Korean and Chinese forces while also performing the secondary 
mission of maintaining a liaison between the ROKA and the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA), 
the U.S. field army with command over all U.S. armed forces in Korea. 
The main challenge KMAGers faced in their interactions with ROK unit 
commanders and officers during the war was the language barrier. When first deployed to 
the peninsula, KMAG had no Americans who knew or understood the Korean language. 
Prewar attempts to induce KMAG advisors to learn Korean failed from a general lack of 
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interest. Even in 1953, after the war had waged on for almost three years, it was found 
that only one KMAG advisor could speak, read, and write Korean with any degree of 
fluency. The inability of KMAG personnel to understand the local language negatively 
affected their mission, as a study of KMAG advisors concluded:  
From the circumstances there can be no question but that the utter dependence of 
KMAG advisors on Koreans for vital military information, and as a corollary the 
inability of KMAG advisors to obtain information directly through the use of the 
Korean language, hampered them in the accomplishment of their mission and 
resulted on numerous occasions in the unnecessary loss of territory and lives or 
wastage of ammunition. 
(Hausrath 1957, 117) 
 
Consequentially, the KMAGers were unreservedly dependent on the linguistic services of 
UN Liaison Group officers throughout the war, as is indicated by the following chart. 
Table1: Methods of Communication with Counterparts 
 
Method Percent of 255 respondents 
English (no interpreter) 59 
Korean (no interpreter) - 
ROKA interpreter 79 
Korean civilian interpreter 3 
US Army interpreter - 
Pictures, writing, or gestures 26 
Other  2 
No answer  
*Adds up to well over 100 percent because most advisors checked more than one method 
 
(Hausrath 1957: 67) 
 
One of the main complaints brought up by KMAG personnel about UN Liaison Group 
officers was their lack of knowledge regarding military terminology.  
Language is probably our biggest problem. The ROKs…make a genuine effort to 
learn English. It’s been suggested that we learn Korean, but that is difficult. 
Interpreters vary in quality. The one we use most of the time is excellent; he 
understands slang…The language barrier slows down the operation all the time. 
Interpreters are students who learned the English language. I recommend that they 
be given a course in military instruction and terminology. Now, they don’t know 
what you mean by MSR, and so forth.  
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(Hausrath 1957, 69) 
 
The interpreter should be given a basic course in the branch concerned. He 
doesn’t have the vocabulary to put technical things over to his counterpart.  
(ibid.) 
 
The language barrier is most serious. Interpreters are not familiar with technical 
terms…[They] are not trained in tactics, they need more training.  
(ibid.) 
 
Our ROKA interpreters simply don’t understand military terms until they’ve been 
out on the job for a minimum of two months, and that is the minimum.” [ROKA 
GGSC Advisor]  
 (Hausrath 1957, 120) 
 
The interpreters we have secured from ROKA are not very good quality. Maybe 
mediocre is a better word. They aren’t familiar with military terms either in 
Korean or English. [Div Senior Advisor]  
(ibid.) 
 
The UN Liaison Group officer’ unfamiliarity with military and technical terminology was 
in large part due to the inadequate training interpreters were provided with during their 
short stay at the English Interpreter (UN Liaison) Officer Training School. Less than four 
weeks of training was simply not long enough to properly arm interpreters with the 
linguistic and technical tools necessary to perform their duties immediately after being 
sent into the field. According to Lee (1998), however, the problem was not simply a 
symptom of the short duration of training, as he explains that training was insufficient in 
not only temporal terms but also sorely lacking in qualitative terms. While at the school, 
UN Liaison Group officers-in-training were “handed out the Glossary of U.S. Military 
Operation Terminology to memorize” but “it was impossible that we would be able to 
converse in English after only a week or two when we had previously only been trained 
to read” (Lee 1988, 212). It is important to note that the glossary, which was the main 
reference tool provided during training, was written in English and did not include the 
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Korean language equivalents for the military terms it listed. A major effort to translate 
the Dictionary of United States Army Terms into Korean was made before the outbreak of 
the war but the project was abandoned following the North Korean attack. The lack of a 
bilingual dictionary or glossary was the cause of much confusion regarding what military 
terms meant and how they should be rendered into Korean. In many cases, equivalents 
for military terms and equipment did not exist in the Korean language and the interpreter 
was forced to describe the item or concept as best they could. For example, “a machine 
gun, for which no word existed in Korean, became a gun that shoots very fast or a gun of 
many loud noises” (Hausrath 1957, 69) or any other way the interpreter chose to describe 
it. Another strategy used by officer-interpreters was to transliterate rather than translate 
military terms.  
American terms, such as M1, OP, tank, etc., were adopted into the Korean 
language and were used with complete understanding in oral communication. 
(Hausrath 1957, 119) 
 
Alternatively,  
this shortcoming could frequently be overcome by the addition of Chinese 
characters (which are understood by most literate Koreans, chiefly officers) to 
express the desired thought.  
(Hausrath 1957, 117-18) 
 
While the employment of Chinese characters allowed interpreters to assign concise 
signifiers to military terms, this did not guarantee that anyone else but the interpreter who 
coined the neologism would understand or employ the same terminology. It is hardly 
surprising, given the absence of officially prescribed equivalents for military 
terminology, that complications arose. For instance, “it was found in the course of 
manual preparation that different translators differed as to which terms were proper and 
accurate translations of the original language” (Hausrath 1957, 118). It is on these 
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grounds that both KMAGer and Korean interpreters pointed to the lack of translation 
equivalents for military terminology as the primary challenge when rendering English 
into Korean and vice versa.  
I felt at the time that it was easier to translate Japanese into English than it was to 
translated Korean into English. This was because the Japanese language has been 
quite Westernized since the late 19th century, starting in the 1860s, and thus 
changed, making it easy to express certain things in a Western way.  
(Kim 2012, 1) 
 
The Korea language is a nonmodern tongue in the sense that it often lacks terms 
for technical and modern colloquial words and phrases found in other languages. 
It was often impossible to find equivalents for American military terms. 
(Hausrath 1957, 117) 
 
The cumulative result of the cursory manner with which training was provided at the 
Interpreting School and the lack of reference materials and established interpreting norms 
meant that the UN Liaison Group officers were not provided with the tools to succeed as 
linguistic mediators within a highly contentious military field. The following excerpts 
show that KMAGers expressed mixed reactions when asked about their level of 
satisfaction with the interpreting services of UN Liaison Group officers (Hausrath 1957, 
69): 
They go from excellent to poor. It varies by the individual…I had an excellent 
interpreter who knew the job and helped me to do my job.  
The battalion CO didn’t speak English, but he had two interpreters who had 
been with the battalion for two years and knew their stuff. They could have been 
artillery officers, and they knew English well. I had the interpreters run missions 
like the S-3. They know all the artillery terms. 
I had no trouble whatsoever…I had a good interpreter; he made polite but 
accurate translations. I could check on this through an American sergeant who 
spoke Korean. 
I had three interpreters of whom two could not speak English. One of these 
would “translate” written English to Korean. One could speak a little. He would 




The mixed responses regarding interpreter quality suggests that even among official UN 
Liaison Group officers, the ability to render what was said in either English or Korean 
into the opposing language varied significantly. In their study of Korean War interpreters, 
Fishel and Hausrath (1958, 13-14) divide military linguists active during the Korean War 
into four general levels of competence: 
Class A: international political (or negotiating) level25  
Class B: advanced intelligence level26  
Class C: routine language operations level27  
Class D: minimum requirements level28  
 
25 Personnel operating at this highest level must be completely fluent in an Asiatic 
language and in English as well. They should be capable of simultaneous translations 
(interpretation) to and from English. In addition to linguist fluency they must have a deep 
understanding of the appropriate Asiatic culture, area, and psychology. This is a “super” 
category, the personnel in which would be competent to handle interpretation, advising, 
and even negotiating at high-level meetings such as those in which US military 
representatives have been engaged in Kaesong and Panmunjom since 1951. At the time 
of this writing the Army has no career personnel in this category in either Korean or any 
Chinese dialect. 
26 Personnel in this category must be fluent in an Asiatic language and competent in 
English as well. They should have some understanding of the appropriate Asiatic culture, 
area, and psychology. Primary areas of employment for men of such qualifications are 
military intelligence (including counterintelligence), Army Security Agency, psywar, 
CA/MG, military advisory groups, attaché system, MP (including CID), POW handling, 
and CIE. Unlike the altogether fluent top-level linguists, men within this category might 
be capable of fluent performance in only one of the primary fields of military linguist 
endeavor: interpretation, interrogation, or translation. This is a small group from the 
standpoint of available linguist manpower.  
27 Its members possess a lower degree of fluency than either higher classification, and 
might be “fairly competent” in only one of the three types of linguist work. This, it has 
been found, is the largest group from the standpoint of available linguist manpower. 
Because of the scarcity of the more highly qualified Class B linguists in Korea, many in 
this category were working in military jobs that, in the opinion of their responsible 
language supervisors, called for language specialists of Class B qualifications. Normally 
these persons of Class C language competence would be expected to be used in those 
activities of intelligence, CA/MG, advisory groups, MP, etc., where less time pressure or 
less critical preciseness are required. 
28 Its members constitute a substantial group of personnel with some language 
knowledge, but whose competence in any linguist activity field is not sufficient to enable 
them to preform high-or even medium-level linguist functions. There is, however, a 
demonstrated need for these less-qualified language men, particularly in the technical 
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The study concludes that “as of July 1953 the numbers of men in all four of the above 
categories present in the ranks of the Army in Korea were grossly insufficient to meet the 
operation needs of the Army” (ibid.). They found that there was a total lack of Class A 
interpreters and an extremely limited number of class B interpreters in Korea during the 
war. The majority of military interpreters working for the ROKA-U.S. alliance fell under 
Class C or D. As a result of the shortage of high-level interpreters, “linguists were 
frequently assigned to duties beyond their levels of training and consequently were 
deficient in their performance of those higher levels” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 3).  
 The shortage of available linguistic assets meant that the more competent 
interpreters were assigned in higher echelons of the military institute while the less adept 
were sent to lower units (Hausrath 1957, 69):  
We’re hindered by an insufficient number of good interpreters. Interpreters 
are assigned from ROK headquarters as first lieutenants. The pay is very low and 
they draw low caliber people. There are good interpreters at high echelons. We 
could not operate without them. 
There are four [interpreters] at the division. They tend not to be the best. The 
best seem to be at headquarters; they get worse as you go down the line. 
 
There were four principal spheres of KMAG operations: (a) headquarters (i.e., 
administrative and housekeeping), (b) combat and security units, (c) replacement training 
centers and ROKA schools, and (d) technical service and support units. The language 
problem existed to some degree in each one of these areas, but it was more serious in 
 
services and in the enlisted ranks such as in signal work, some MP tasks, medical corps 
(combat medics and for assistance in hospitals), and for routine operations in ordnance, 
transportation, some advisory group assignments, QM activities, POW-handling 
operations, labor supervision, TIE work in joint operations with non-American units, etc. 
The characteristic of the Class D linguist is that they can translate ideas back and forth 
between the two languages with the aid of a bilingual dictionary if needed but at a 
relatively low level of skill. 
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lower levels. Within KMAG Headquarters, Taegu, “the language problem here was not 
ordinarily a serious barrier” (Hausrath 1957, 117). 
Sure, there’s a language problem, but not so much at this level. My contacts 
are principally with KMAG people, and I’d say I don’t need an interpreter more 
than a few times a week, at most. [Lt Col. G3] 
For the few occasions on which I come up against a Korean who doesn’t 
understand English or doesn’t have a competent interpreter with him I can always 
find one of our ROK interpreters handy. It might help if I could speak some 
Korean, but if I did there’d be many other spots in this operation where I’d be 
badly needed. The real language problem exists outside this headquarters. [Major, 
G1]  
With a good interpreter, an honest desire to be of assistance, and a patient 
attitude, there is no particular problem caused by a language barrier. [Finance 
Advisor]  
 
Opinions of interpreters were much more negative in lower units, such as Service Schools 
and Support Units (Hausrath 1957, 120): 
I have 23 interpreters here who theoretically can be used. One I would rate 
“fairly satisfactory” and a second one is “barely satisfactory.” The rest of the lot 
are mediocre—you just have to draw pictures for them. [ROKA Inf School 
Advisor]  
The regiment has two interpreters: one is raw—he doesn’t speak much 
English and he’s virtually useless. The other one is only slightly better. As you 
can imagine I have some real problems getting information and thoughts across 
and back. [ROKA Inf Regt Advisor]  
 
While KMAGers expressed discontent about the linguistic abilities (or lack thereof) of 
some UN Liaison Group officers, particularly in the lower echelons of the military, the 
following table indicates that neither the interpreter’s lack of language skills nor deficient 
knowledge of military terminology was the main complaint or concern of KMAG officers 
during the war. 
Table 2: KMAGers Response to Questions about Interpreters 
Questions and responses Percent of 204 
respondents 






   Yes 
   No 
   No response 
   Total 
b. Do you trust his accuracy in interpretation? 
   Yes 
   No 
   No response 
   Total 
c. Do you trust his honesty? 
   Yes 
   No 
   No response 
   Total 
d. What are your interpreter’s weak points? 
   English generally poor 
   Doesn’t understand military terms or situations 
   Afraid of ROKA officers 
   Other 
   No response 
   Total 
e. Rate your interpreter’s ability 
   Excellent 
   Good 
   Fair 
   Poor 
   No response 




























(Hausrath 1957: 121) 
The table seems to indicate that despite the many challenges UN Liaison Group officers 
faced, only 6 percent of KMAGers responded that they believed their interpreter’s 
abilities to be poor. Furthermore, most responded positively with regard to the matter of 
trust. Elsewhere, based on comments made in reference to the same questionnaire, 
Hausrath makes the following comment: 
[t]he most frequent complaint received from advisors was that their interpreters 
were not trustworthy (i.e., on security grounds). The second most frequent 
complaint was that they were poorly trained and consequently not competent to 
perform their duties satisfactorily.  




Similar concerns regarding the trustworthiness of Korean civilian interpreters was voiced 
by member of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) 
during the U.S. occupation. However, the later might have been caused by the fact that, 
during the occupation, many Koreans viewed the U.S. as a pseudo-colonial force that had 
unlawfully invaded their country, the situation during the Korean War was quite different 
as the ROK and U.S. were allied against a mutual enemy. Considering the context under 
which interpreting took place, what reason might the U.S. military have had to question 
the loyalty of the UN Liaison Group officer? When asked “What are your interpreter’s 
weak points?” why did KMAGers answer that officer-interpreters being “afraid of ROKA 
officers” was more problematic than the linguistic difficulties of interlingual 
communication such as “English generally poor” or “Doesn’t understand military terms 
or situations”? This question will be answered in the following section.  
 
3.4. Zones of Uncertainty within the UNC/ROK Alliance 
Morris Janowitz and Roger Little (1965, 27) define the military establishment as 
“a comprehensive and all-embracing hierarchy” and claim that “the career soldier is 
assumed to be an ideal example of the professional operating under bureaucratic 
authority.” Within the military bureaucracy, personnel are categorized and positioned 
based on their rank, and, “uniforms and insignia, by ‘telegraphing’ the wearer’s status in 
the hierarchy of authority and his job in the division of labor, facilitate communication, 
coordination and impersonality” (Davis 1948, 145). Persons of higher rank are entitled to 
command nearly absolute obedience from those of lower rank. While it is largely thanks 
to the organization’s bureaucratic structure that militaries can coordinate the activities of 
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large groups of people, the institution’s dependency on a rank-based chain of command 
limits the organization’s ability to adapt to change as the top-down system of 
communication leaves few channels for feedback. It was for this reason that Robert 
Merton (1965, 53-62) criticized the ideal bureaucracy for its tendency to be rigid and 
over time resistant to change.  
The creation of the U.S.-ROK military alliance saw the convergence of two 
hierarchical structures, the U.S. and South Korean militaries, each with their own systems 
of operation and regulations. This multilingual army might therefore be defined as a 
“zone of uncertainty” within social space in which social agents from disparate 
backgrounds, in this case the U.S. and Korean militaries, who possessed different views 
about what constituted legitimate activity were suddenly required to occupy a single 
social space together. Because a defining characteristic of the military field is its 
bureaucratic structure, military personnel are accustomed to inhabiting clearly designated 
positions within the organization. Within the U.S.-ROK multilingual army confusion 
emerged for the members of both groups because neither was sure as to how they should 
occupy and operate in this newly formed social space. While trying to bring order to the 
confusion, U.S. and ROK military personnel competed for the authority to reproduce and 
distribute what each felt were legitimate values and regulative principles. Interpreted 
events, in particular, were a crucial site for the convergence of the two military fields and 
their respective habitus. During the Korean War, the three groups of interlocutors—U.S. 
KMAGers, ROK commanding officers, and UN Liaison Group officer—given their 
uncertainty about how to position themselves and operate in this space, sought to assert 
their dominance over the form interlingual communication should take. While “zones of 
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uncertainty” are often short-lived because some form of traditional hierarchy is ultimately 
reestablished amongst the agents, the unique structure of the U.S.-ROK military alliance 
prevented any one group from asserting their dominance over the interpreting habitus. 
Thus, a sustained uncertainty was the defining characteristic of the interpreting habitus 
during the Korean War. Hierarchy could not be established because uncertainty lingered 
in regards to whether the ROK commanding officer or the U.S. KMAGer held authority 
over the other, and thus the two military organizations competed to secure the loyalty of the 
UN Liaison Group officer and establish dominance during interpreted events. 
 
3.4.1. Conflict between ROK Officers and U.S. KMAGers  
During the Korean War, the mission of the KMAG was to advise and assist the 
commanders of South Korea military units. KMAG advisors did not hold the authority to 
issue direct orders to the ROK military unit to which they were assigned. Rather, 
KMAGers were expected to control training or operations by influence, suggestion, and 
guidance. What they accomplished depended largely upon their powers of persuasion and 
on the esteem in which they were held by their Korean counterparts. Had the U.S. 
military desired the KMAGers to possess operational authority over the Korean military 
unit, it could have sent American officers who were ranked higher the South Korean unit 
commanders, thus positioning a U.S. officer atop the chain of command. The U.S. 
military, however, chose not to pursue this approach and strictly limited the KMAGer to 
an advisory role and required that they be “one or two ranks lower than their counterpart” 
(Hausrath 1957, 51). The U.S. did not seek to place the ROK military under the 
KMAGer’s direct control because the U.S. government hoped to avoid being overly 
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invested in peninsular affairs. The U.S., at least ostensibly, had intervened in the war at 
the urging of the United Nations Security Council, and thus assigning American officers 
to command Korean field units ran the risk of aligning U.S. interests too closely with 
South Korea’s, which would limit the U.S.’s ability to maneuver the diplomatic field in 
Northeast Asia. The country’s direct involvement in the Korean War ran the risk of the 
limited conflict developing into a direct conflict with China and/or the Soviet Union, 
potentially sparking a third world war and the first international conflict involving two 
states that possessed nuclear weapons. The deployment of KMAGers in an advisory role 
was an alternative to such a move. The Soviet Union and China, likewise, took measures 
to avoid a face-to-face confrontation with the United States. The Soviet Union did not 
officially participate in the war, opting rather to provide diplomatic support, strategic and 
tactical planning, and logistic support to North Korea and China. The Chinese, rather than 
deploying the country’s official military, the People’s Liberation Army, created and 
dispatched the People’s Volunteer Army, to avoid officially declaring war against the 
United States and the United Nations.  
The U.S. military hoped that the deployment of KMAGer as advisors to South 
Korean units would allow it to exercise sufficient control over the ROK military to 
maintain operational control over South Korean forces while maintaining that it had not 
infringed upon the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea. When asked the question “How 
much difference in rank can there be between a KMAG advisor and his counterpart 
without creating difficulties?” (Hausrath 1957, 52) it is noteworthy that over 70 percent 
of KMAGers, after having engaged with Korean counterparts, claimed that being one or 
two ranks lower than their advisees would not seriously impede working relations. In 
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other words, they believed they could work on more-or-less equal terms even if they were 
of slightly lower rank. On the other hand, only 11 percent believed advisors needed to be 
of equal rank in order to perform their duties. This would imply that factors outside of 
military rank offset the difference.  
While the ROK Army unit commander may have held a higher rank than their 
U.S. KMAG counterpart, the playing field was leveled out by the inverted hierarchical 
relationship which existed between the U.S. and ROK militaries. It was due to the 
lopsided power relation between the U.S. and ROK militaries that “at the time it was 
widely believed that colonel-level officers had to be close to their KMAG advisor if they 
were to be promoted to general” (Ji 2006, 168). In other words, a higher-ranking ROK 
Army advisee could not blatantly disregard a lower-ranking U.S. KMAG adviser, 
regardless of military rank. It was against this backdrop that one Chief of KMAG argued,  
Advisors have ample authority. While they had no command over their ROK 
counterpart or ROK Army units, they were directed to report to next higher 
commanders, US or ROK, any dereliction or serious departure from advised 
procedures. Eighth Army commanders were prepared to back up the advisory 
function when needed, by issuing orders through command channels to insure 
appropriate military performance. Advisors were cautioned, however, against 
referring trivial matters, and were urged to work out satisfactory procedures 
directly with their counterpart.  
(Hausrath 1957, 20-21) 
 
This statement suggests that although KMAGers did not have direct control over the 
ROK units they were assigned to, their association with the U.S. military ensured they 
possessed a level of authority that approximated the position of power accorded to the 
ROK Army unit commander.  
But while the U.S. military decision-makers argued KMAGers had the necessary 
tools to successfully cooperate with their Korean counterparts on equal footing, 
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uncertainty regarding their positioning within the organization meant that ROK 
commanders and KMAG officers were constantly engaged in competition over authority 
within the military unit. The animosity felt between the two sides was made most 
palpable when one side unilaterally asserted authority over the chain of command, such 
as during combat situations. For example, the following quote by a South Korean general 
reveals that when tensions did arise, relations between the ROK unit commander and the 
KMAGer could swiftly break down when either the ROK Army commander would 
bypass the KMAGer in issuing orders or the KMAGer would place the ROK unit under 
his command.  
General Chung observed that during the retreat in the winter of 1950-51 a 
number of KMAG officers were left behind and either were killed, fell into 
the hands of the Communists, or made their way out without assistance from 
their counterparts or the units to which they were attached. He said that this 
had not been an accidental occurrence; whereas to some ROKA officers and 
units their KMAG advisor was “their most prized possession” and was 
therefore shepherded back to safety when the Communist attack came, others 
were so poorly regarded by their ROK associates that no effort was made to 
save them. General Chung continued with the comment that he was sure an 
investigation would confirm his conviction that those officers who were in 
rapport with their counterparts, interpreters, and subordinates were those who 
had been brought out. The reverse was also verifiable, according to General 
Chung.  
(Hausrath 1957, 116) 
 
Such attempts by the two sides to dominate the military field were made most evident 
during interpreted events; both the ROK Army officer and the U.S. KMAGer sought to 
dictate the norms of interlingual communication by subjecting the interpreter to the 
particular command structures of their respective fields. The UN Liaison Group officer, 
however, was able to resist pressure from both parties and assume a position of relative 
empowerment during interpreted events because the U.S.-ROK rivalry prevented either 
military institution from exerting unhindered pressure on the interpreter. The following 
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sections will examine the dynamics between these military interpreters and U.S./ROK 
officers.  
 
3.4.2. Conflict between ROK Officers and UN Liaison Group Officers 
Because UN Liaison Group officers were members of the ROK military, one 
might expect that they would display unconditional loyalty to their national military, and 
by extension their military superiors. The following statement by former military 
interpreter Lee Yeong-hui (1988), however, demonstrates that this was not necessarily 
the case and suggests that some UN Liaison Group officers and ROK Army officers 
maintained a highly confrontational relationship during the war.  
Although the name “UN Liaison Officer Group” was impressive enough, in 
reality, we had nothing to do with the United Nations Command. We were 
“interpreting officers” trainees, the most scorned upon group in the ROKA.  
(Lee 1988, 214; my translation) 
 
Throughout the Korean War, interpreter officers were put in an awkward position. 
Our official title was “UN Liaison Officer (Group),” but we belonged to neither 
the UN or the US. Because the US made up the majority of the so-called UN 
forces, a large number of interpreter officers were assigned to US units, but they 
were still under the authority of the ROKA.  The main role played by 
interpreters was interpreting between KMAGers sent to Korean units and ROKA 
Commanders. When I was sent to my first post during the early stages of the 
Korean War, it was still unclear if the Korean unit or the US KMAGer was 
supposed to provide the interpreter with supplies. As officers of the ROKA, 
interpreters were under the command of the ROKA senior officer, but because of 
the ambiguity of our positioning and duties, interpreters were always treated as 
the sons of concubines.  
(Lee 1988, 216-17; my translation) 
 
The cause for the discord between the two groups can be accredited to a number of 
factors, the most prominent being the fact that military interpreters were ambiguously 
positioned within the strictly hierarchical Korean military institution. As Huntington 
suggests, the officer corps can be categorized into two groups,  
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between officers who wish to become specialists and those who wish to prepare 
themselves for top command positions. The former sacrifices the opportunity for 
high command but develops a specialty which, in many cases, will be transferable 
to civilian life upon retirement. 
(Huntington 1963, 788) 
 
Huntington also points out that “commissioned officers,” such as the ROK unit 
commanders, are “generalists,” while “direct commission officers,” such as UN Liaison 
Group officers, are “specialists.” While the generalist is committed to “the management 
of violence as a career” (ibid., 785), specialization “takes place in areas not directly 
related to combat” (ibid., 786). The following list of duties, obligations, and benefits 
enjoyed by UN Liaison Group officer during the Korean War demonstrates that this 
classification can be applied to the situation in the South Korean military: 
Art. 11: Interpreter officers cannot assume any responsibility except interpreting 
and translating.  
Art. 14: Interpreter officers will have the same obligation as other branch officers 
to observe all army regulations. 
Art. 19: Interpreter officers will be excepted from draft call only during their 
service in the army. 
Art. 20: Officers of the interpreter branch will receive the same pay and allowance 
as other branch officers.  
(Hausrath 1957, 119) 
 
The fact that their duties were limited to interpreting and translating meant that UN 
Liaison Group officers were not engaged in the “management of violence,” which is 
accomplished by ordering enlisted soldiers to engage in battle; as a result, they were 
excluded entirely from the ROK military’s chain of command. A further consequence 
was that in the eyes of the ROK unit commanders, these linguistic specialists, despite 
their rank as first lieutenants, could not be perceived as their peers. And indeed, the 
interpreters themselves did not see themselves as fully affiliated with their own military 
institution. The following excerpt, taken from the memoir of former military interpreter 
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Ji Myeong-gwan reveals that, even during the height of the Korean War, UN Liaison 
Group officers saw themselves as non-professional military men.  
Interpreting officers wore officer uniforms but could not be called true soldiers. 
Unless under special circumstances, they were not provided neither gun nor 
sword, all they did was accompany the U.S. KMAG Advisor and take charge of 
interpreting. All they did in the battle tents was translate official documents 
written in English or type their contents. I hope to tell you about the war in the 
eyes of these amateur soldiers. 
(Ji 2006, 85; my translation) 
 
The reason interpreters were “the most scorned upon group in the ROKA” and “could not 
be called true soldiers” can be understood using sociologist Erving Goffman’s concept of 
“total institution,” as explained in his work Asylum. Goffman defines a total institution as 
“a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals cut off 
from the wider society for an appreciable period of time together lead an enclosed 
formally administered round of life” (Goffman 1961, 11). Military barracks, incarceration 
facilities, and asylums are often cited as examples of “total institution.” There are 
typically two sets of groups within a total institution: staff and inmates. In the military, 
commissioned officers might be seen as management staff while enlisted soldiers occupy 
a position in many ways akin to that which is occupied by inmates. These two groups 
inhabit two different social and cultural worlds, and there is considerable social distance 
between the two, a schism that cannot easily be breached. A clear indication of this 
divide is the fact that enlisted personnel cannot be promoted to the ranks of officer. In the 
military, commissioned officers enforce restrictions on enlisted soldiers’ self-
determination, autonomy, and freedom of action while excluding them from the decisions 
taken concerning them. UN Liaison Group officers existed outside this strict 
officer/soldier dichotomy. Though they were officers in the ROK Army and enjoyed 
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many of the benefits that accompanied the position, their authority and duties were 
limited to issues related to interlingual communication and did not extend to the 
command and control of the military unit and its personnel. In other words, while other 
officers in the South Korean military could be clearly categorized as members of the 
management staff, the officer-interpreter was ambiguously positioned within the total 
institution. 
The commanding officers in the South Korean military sought to exert control 
over the interpreting habitus by subordinating the interpreter to their command. This 
effort took the shape of employing measures to reposition the interpreter firmly within 
the hierarchical structure of the military institution. Rather than acknowledging UN 
Liaison Group officers as first lieutenants in the officer corps, unit commanders often 
treated them as enlisted soldiers. As a U.S. KMAG advisor pointed out, 
the relationship between the ROK officer and the interpreter is also important. 
The interpreters are often considered schoolboys and the officers expect the 
interpreters to protect them, not to tell the truth of their boss, the advisor. 
(Hausrath 1957, 77) 
 
One of the central features of total institutions are the measures taken to manipulate the 
personalities of residents so that their behavior fits the expectations of the larger group. 
Ceremonial degradation, for instance, is carried out in an attempt to remake the self by 
stripping away the individual's current identity and stamping a new one in its place. As 
can be seen in Lee’s following evaluation, commissioned officers sought to discredit the 
interpreter by refusing to acknowledge them as part of management, as well as 
diminishing the value of the linguistic services they provided. 
Although they assigned me the rank of “ROKA first lieutenant,” in reality, I was 
only half a first lieutenant. I wore the insignia of first lieutenant on one of my 
collars, but unlike the other branches of service, I did not have a badge to indicate 
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my area of service. Interpreter officers were half-civilian, half-military personnel. 
It was more than a year later that we were assigned badges, which were parrots 
sitting atop rifles. The “parrot sitting on a rifle” was truly symbolic. It seems that 
an ignorant group of combat officer in the Army HQ had out of spite come up 
with the idea. It was perhaps an attempt to cunningly insult the group of frail 
intellectuals in the military.  
(Lee 1988, 215-16; my translation) 
 
The strategy utilized by the ROK military can be interpreted as an overt attempt to 
mortify the interpreter by labelling their linguistic services as little more than parroting 
what was being said by commissioned officers. This is an extreme example of a dominant 
institution seeking to assert control over the interpreting habitus by denying the 
interpreter’s autonomy and agency. The ordering of interpreters to wear this military 
badge can likewise be examined and explained using Goffman’s theoretical lens: 
The individual finds that his protective response to an assault upon self is 
collapsed into the situation; he cannot defend himself in the usual way by 
establishing distance between the mortifying situation and himself. 
(Goffman 1961, 36) 
 
By forcing interpreters to adopt an official symbol which devalued their services, the 
ROK Army attempted to strip the interpreter of any authority they possessed during 
interpreted events. By stripping these specialized officers of their authority over their area 
of specialty, the officers were attempting to demote these military interpreters to sub-
officer status. 
UN Liaison Group officers, were, nevertheless, able to, at times, resist the 
institutionalized pressure applied on them by the ROKA; they did not always conform to 
the description of their job as limited to merely mimicking words. The following excerpts 
show interpreters themselves played a critical role in fostering amicable U.S.-ROK 
military relations. These citations also reveal the interpreters’ view of the job of 
interpreting as one that required creative problem-solving skills.  
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many Korean interpreters viewed their job as more than just work. The comment 
was made…time and time again by interpreters that the difficulties of their 
position were more than compensated for by the knowledge that they were 
contributing to the betterment of Korean-American relations by overcoming the 
language barrier.  
(Hausrath 1957, 131) 
 
As I have said earlier, translating from English to Korean and interpreting the 
words spoken by an American into Korean is no different from creative writing. I 
realized the difficulty of the task of translating and interpreting while carefully 
interpreting the lectures given at the U.S. 9th Corps into Korean. It was then that I 
realized how difficult interpreting is.  
(Kim 2012, 2; my translation) 
 
These statements show that, thus, despite attempts by the ROKA leadership to devalue 
their services, interpreters recognized the value of their work and were able to resist this 
institutionalized narrative.  
The presence of the U.S. KMAG advisor created an additional buffer between the 
interpreter and any pressure ROK commanders could apply on them. The fact that the 
interpreter was often the only member of a ROKA unit capable of communicating with 
the U.S. officer, with whom they worked in close quarters meant that there was always 
the possibility they could use their position to their advantage by discrediting their 
military superiors. Although interpreters were lower in rank than the unit commander, his 
advisors, and the KMAGer, they took part in all activities in the unit outside of combat. 
They participated in operation planning, the monitoring of unit supplies, and knew of 
private purchases made by the commanding officer using military funds. As Lee writes, 
regardless of how we felt about the war or the military, because we were Koreans, 
we had to do our best to prevent the KMAGer from seeing or hearing about the 
various delicate situations happening in the unit, which was always a source of 
agony for us. The interpreting officer was placed in a position where he had to 
“pretend not to have seen” what was going on. But we never received thanks from 
the commander of his staff. We were the odd man out.  




As this excerpt suggests, despite the lack of clear boundaries regarding their roles, 
interpreters were able to maintain a higher level of autonomy than either institution 
would have preferred.  
Perhaps most central to this issue was the fact that, often times, interpreters did 
not acknowledge the superiority of commissioned officers in the ROKA. In the eyes of 
UN Liaison Group interpreters, their military superiors lacked the symbolic or cultural 
capital one would expect of an individual assigned to their position. The ROK military 
had only been officially launched in 1948, after the USAMGIK handed over power to the 
Korean Government. Many of the senior staff in the ROKA had limited military 
experience when the war broke out and had since been rapidly promoted due to the lack 
of available leadership in the face of a rapidly growing military. In fact, in many cases, 
interpreters felt that they were superior to their commanders. The following passage has 
been taken from the memoir of former UN Liaison Group officer Kim Il-pyong. 
There were even ROKA officers and generals who hadn’t graduated from 
middle school before joining the Japanese military as soldiers during the 
“Greater East Asia War” (1941-45). Some of them had been drafted as soldiers 
and transferred to the National Defense Guard after the country’s liberation. 
These simple men were made officers and generals. Some were promoted 
rapidly during the Korean War. Generals were awarded a new star every 3 to 6 
months…some officers claimed that being a commissioned officer meant you 
had the same level as a college graduate. Some of these officers were insolent 
and incredibly ignorant. 
(Kim 2012, 1; my translation) 
 
During the Korean War there was a popular joke in Japan: if you were a private 
in the Army during World War II (which the Japanese call the Greater East Asia 
War), you would be made an officer if you went to Korea, and if you were a 
sailor in the Navy you would be made the Navy Chief of Staff.  
(Kim 2012, 3; my translation) 
 
Perhaps it was because they felt inferior to us who had done well in school and 
entered university after liberation and before the outbreak of the war, but when 
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interacting with us ROKA officers tended to act pompously and talk 
exaggeratedly, and always try to show off.  
(Kim 2012, 3; my translation) 
 
Former UN Liaison Group officer-interpreter Ji Myeong Gwan echoes Kim’s sentiment, 
as he criticizes the fact that 
The ROK military was hastily built up. Even people who had joined the 
Japanese military during the Japanese colonial era as enlisted men became 
generals. 
(Ji 2006, 86; my translation) 
 
Goffman mentions that within a total institution, management is able to assert their 
dominance not only because they possess the power to do so but also because members 
of the lower rungs of the organization feel a sense of moral inferiority to their superiors. 
This element of respect for one’s superiors was missing in the ROKA officer/UN 
Liaison Group officer relationship. Instead of accepting the pressure applied on them by 
ROKA officers, the following excerpt suggests that these military interpreters may often 
have been indignant that they did not receive the recognition they believed they were 
owed.   
We officer-interpreters generously lent our services to the establishment of the 2nd 
Corps and served with distinction during the Korean War. Many of us were killed 
in action during the war. However, in his memoire, General Paik Sun-yup does 
not even mention the role of the officer-interpreter. There is no question that he 
relied on the interpretations of the officer-interpreter and received plenty of aid 
through their services but in his memoire “The Military and I” he puts on 
“camouflage” to make it appear as if he could understand English and could 
converse with KMAG advisors well. Can this be called respectable behavior from 
a ROKA general? There is not a single mention of officer-interpreters in his 
memoire.  
(Kim 2012: 2; my translation) 
 
It is noteworthy that General Paik Sun-yup, who was the first South Korean officer to be 
promoted to the rank of four star general, was only 29 years old when the war broke out. 
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The dissonance between the views of the ROKA commissioned officer and UN 
Liaison Group officer over the positionality of the military interpreter was the cause of 
continued friction between the two groups; “interpreter officers’ treated ROKA officers 
with disdain, and ROKA officers treated interpreters with contempt” (Lee 1988: 217; my 
translation).  
  
3.4.3. Shifting Relations between KMAGers and UN Liaison Group Officers 
During the Korean War, U.S. KMAG personnel were thoroughly reliant on the 
services of UN Liaison Group officers when communicating with their South Korean 
counterparts. Although these U.S. officers raised issue with the linguistic abilities of 
these military interpreters, with particular frustration expressed over their lack of 
knowledge regarding military terminology, ultimately, it was the “trustworthiness” of UN 
Liaison Group officers that was the most significant concern of U.S. military personnel. 
Questions regarding the honesty of these military interpreters stemmed from the fact that 
UN Liaison Group officers were first lieutenants in the South Korean military. U.S. 
military advisors concluded that they could not fully trust these interpreters because “the 
primary loyalty of a Korean—civilian or military—is to the Republic of Korea rather 
than to the U.S. Government” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 62). The fact that a first 
lieutenant in the ROK military held a monopoly over the channels of interlingual 
communication presented a problem for the U.S. officer because, when a conflict of 
interests emerged between the two groups, the UN Liaison Group officer could easily 
manipulate what was said by either interlocutor to benefit the South Korean military.  
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When asked about the “seriousness of problems of distortion by interpreters,” 13 
percent of KMAG respondents answered that it was “very serious,” 21 percent responded 
that the issue was “serious,” and 50 percent stated it was “not too serious.” On the other 
hand, only 12 percent thought the issue was “not serious at all.” In other words, 
approximately 84 percent of KMAG staff believed UN Liaison Group officers used their 
position of power, to varying extents, to manipulate what was said between U.S. and 
ROK military personnel (Hausrath 1957, 71).  
In response to requests that they provide further comment on the topic of 
distortions made by UN Liaison Group officers, one KMAGer pointed out that the 
officer-interpreter was often “torn between the devil and the deep” (Hausrath 1957, 70). 
In other words, it was nearly impossible for interpreters to satisfy both U.S. and ROK 
personnel because KMAGers demanded that the interpreter produce a target text that 
closely mirrored the meaning and tone of the source text, while ROK officers expected 
the interpreter to actively moderate exchanges between the two parties. The following is a 
list of discontents expressed by KMAG staff with regards to the interpreting practices of 
UN Liaison Group officers.  
(1) Interpreters sometimes distorted or modified advice or colored or completely 
held back information the advisor should have had to interpret strongly 
worded advice or corrections accurately for fear of offending their superiors. 
(2) Interpreters pull the same old stunt, they misinterpret in order to keep from 
offending.  
(3) all ROKs [interpreters] have a tendency to lie—to save face” or “cover for 
their ROK superiors. 
(Hausrath 1957, 70) 
 
These excerpts show that KMAGers believed any discrepancies between the source text 
and the target text were an indication that the South Korean military interpreters had 
distorted the message to favor the interests of the ROK military. They assumed that 
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interpreters “distorted” or “modified” what was said by the KMAG advisor to avoid 
insulting their Korean superiors, because “the interpreters figure that when we [the 
Americans] go, they’ve ‘had it’ if they alienate their ROK commander” (ibid., 70). As 
one ROK Army interpreter stated, “The interpreter is always in the middle. If things don’t 
go the way my commander wants, he blames me for not getting the right advice from [the 
KMAG advisor]” (ibid., 126). The following chart shows that KMAGers believed the 
majority of UN Liaison Group officers did not pass on information because they feared 
recriminations by their commanding officer.  
Table 3: KMAGers Response to Question about Withholding of Information 
Questions and Responses Percent of 204 
respondents 
Does your ROKA interpreter tell you things your counterpart does 
not wish you to know? 
Yes, always 
Yes, frequently 












(Hausrath 1957, 126) 
Such practices were thought to be a threat, given that their implied message that advice 
issued by KMAG personnel was not being conveyed in its entirety, which could stymie 
the U.S. military’s ability to maintain control over their Korean counterparts.  
As an alternative to interpreter-mediated communication, “most advisors 
considered speaking directly to their counterparts in English,” and if the other party 
understood at least some English; this approach was considered “the most effective 
means of communication and advisors used this method extensively” (Hausrath 1957, 
67). In some extreme cases, KMAG advisors even demanded that their Korean 
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counterparts learn English, which would enable them to communicate, while 
circumventing the seemingly biased interpreter.  
The Korean commander with whom I worked was 28 years old, a general. I tried 
to teach him English and he proved an eager and apt pupil. Advisors look for 
cooperative attitude on the part of the ROK officers and their willingness to learn 
English is an indication of it. I had one ranking Korean officer removed from his 
job because he was uncooperative and would not try to learn English. 
(ibid., 68) 
 
The U.S. military, however, was unable to implement this approach on a wide scale 
because only a limited number of Korean officers were capable of communicating in 
English. Furthermore, while the U.S. officer might have felt better able to express 
themselves in English, there was no guarantee that the ROK officers with whom they 
worked could understand what was being said to them, although, as the following excerpt 
demonstrate, some KMAGers believed themselves capable of judging whether or not 
ROK officers understood English based solely on their facial expressions: 
I spoke directly to my counterpart and no serious situation resulted. If I tell them 
something and they don’t get it, I know it. When I see that smile come on their 
faces, I know they got it.  
(Hausrath 1957, 68) 
 
Counter to what this KMAG officer might have believed, in the absence of an interpreter, 
U.S. military officers had no way of verifying if their counterparts understood what they 
had said.   
 An alternative solution to surmounting the linguistic barrier between the U.S. and 
ROK officers without involving an interpreter was to require fluency in Korean as a 
qualification for KMAG advisory posts. It was believed this would allow KMAG 
advisors to “communicate directly and easily with his counterpart and enhance his (and 
the US Army’s) prestige and standing among Korean military men” (Hausrath 1957, 127-
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128). When asked “Should someone doing your present work be given instruction in the 
Korean language before starting the job?” (ibid., 128) over 90 percent of KMAG 
respondents conceded that knowledge of the Korean language would help or improve 
their relations with their Korean counterparts. However, it was also noted that training 
KMAGers to speak and understand Korean would be “expensive and time-consuming.” 
Thus, although they recognized the value of learning Korean, only 55 percent of 
KMAGers thought they should receive some form of language training. Furthermore, 
only 10 percent responded positively to the prospect of undergoing intensive language 
training. 
This approach, despite its obvious merits, however, was never included as part of 
KMAG training. Before the war, a new advisor received a short orientation, met the 
KMAG chief, visited with the staff, attended a weekly staff meeting, and received an 
advisor handbook and a procedure guide for his reading before being assigned to his post. 
During the war, a new advisor received, at most, a brief KMAG orientation and/or a short 
briefing by his immediate superior before going directly to his unit at the front. Chronic 
shortages and frequent turnover of personnel, combined with the chaotic tempo of back-
and-forth combat operations and the expanding KMAG operational duties meant that 
many unit advisors received little information on their missions or duties, much less the 
conditions under which they worked. One advisor commented, 
My mission was not clearly specified at the time of my assignment. I came as a 
replacement and was given a two-hour briefing about the position of the outfit to 
which I was assigned. I was given no instructions on how to work with the 
ROKA. I was left on my own. I definitely had the feeling that my missions were 
undefined and that I was on my own.  




Such a lack of clear instructions was largely due to the fact that there was a shortage of 
KMAG personnel throughout the war in the face of urgent demands for advisors. While 
the original plan was for all division, regimental, and battalion commanders in the 
Republic of Korea Army to have an American officer at his side, aiding in the execution 
of military duties, in practice, the U.S. Military Advisory Group “never attained such a 
comprehensive coverage of the Korean Army. Moreover, though the advisory group 
reached its full, authorized strength by the end of 1949, KMAG never was able to assign 
advisors to all Korean battalions—infantry and otherwise—at any one time” (Sawyer 
1988, 58). Much like UN Liaison Group officers, U.S. military advisors were often 
thrown into a make-it-happen situation with little guidance and limited support.29 The 
U.S. military did not have the time or resources to train members of the under staffed 
advisory group to speak and understand Korean. 
The last option available to the U.S. military in the fight to gain the loyalty of the 
interpreter was to align the UN Liaison Group officer more closely with the interests of 
the U.S. military than their position as South Korean officers would normally allow. The 
most common suggestion made was to assign interpreters to the staff of the U.S. KMAG 
advisor rather than to the ROK Army counterpart. Advisors who favored this shift in 
affiliation believe the change would have the effect of, 
protecting interpreters from possible reprisals or disciplinary action by their 
ROKA superiors, and would also structure the situation so that the interpreter’s 
 
29 A better organized system was erected in the summer of 1953 as KMAG conducted 
regular orientations, provided advisors with an Advisor’s Procedure Guide that 
emphasized the twin duties of advising their counterparts and of providing accurate and 
timely reports to US commanders, and ensured each advisor received the “Ten 
Commandments” for KMAG advisors. Given that the Korean Armistice Agreement was 
signed in July 1953, however, these measured could hardly have improved the situation 
during the war. 
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primary duty clearly would be to further the advisory mission by seeing that the 
advisor received complete and accurate information and by interpreting for him in 
the same spirit. 
(Hausrath 1957, 71)  
 
As one KMAGer put it, “If interpreters are given some sort of immunity from domination 
by their ROK superiors, they can do their job” (ibid.) The following chart demonstrates 
that this approach was supported by the majority of KMAG staff members. 
Table 4: Suggested Assignment of Interpreters 
Suggested assignment Percent of 255 
respondents 
Should be assigned to the KMAG advisor’s staff 
Should not be assigned to advisor’s staff 










(Hausrath 1957, 72) 
Advisors also favored the attachment of interpreters to the KMAG staff because such 
assignment would make the interpreter constantly available to the advisor. 
Such an attempt was made in June 1953 in the 8th ROK Division when General 
Song “ordered control of the ROKA interpreters in the division shifted from his own G1 
to the KMAG G1 advisor in the division” (Hausrath 1957, 130). KMAG advisors 
reported that UN Liaison Group officers reacted enthusiastically to the move and that this 
change resulted in a “100 percent improvement in morals and effectiveness of the 
interpreters.” One military interpreter informed the Senior KMAG advisor that he was 
happy the change had been made; he noted that “the majority of the interpreters in ROKA 
are better educated than most Koreans,” but they “are used like dogs” by South Korean 
officers (Hausrath 1957, 131). The same interpreter explained that in addition to, and at 
times instead of, the duties for which they had been trained, “ROKA interpreters were 
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assigned duties as orderlies, strikers, etc. Under KMAG control their work was confined 
to interpreting” (ibid.) After the UN Liaison Group officer had been transferred, one 
KMAG officer expressed his satisfaction with the change and remarked that “the 
interpreter should be assigned to the KMAG officer, and if satisfactory, always remain 
with him” (ibid.) Such measures, however, were rarely employed during the war and 
throughout the conflict the shortage of capable interpreters, the ambiguity of the 
interpreter’s affiliation, and the indefinite hierarchical relations between the ROKA 
advisee and the KMAG advisor created the conditions for a high level of uncertainty 
during interpreted events.  
 
3.4.4. Local Civilian Interpreters 
Given the near impossibility of adequately training Korean officers to speak 
English or American officers to speak Korean to a level of fluency that would allow for 
meaningful exchange, coupled with the unfavorable position they occupied during 
interpreted events, some KMAGers suggested that the U.S. hire “Korean civilian 
interpreters (CMS), clothe them in U.S. uniforms and U.S. insignia, house them and feed 
them with KMAG detachments” (Hausrath 1957, 130) as an alternative to employing UN 
Liaison Group officers. The prospect of employing civilian interpreters was thought to be 
the best solution to the language barrier because “the civilian is at least two steps 
removed from subservience to and possible hostile action by a ROK counterpart officer” 
(ibid., 131). It was believed that “although the man would certainly remain a Korean, the 
experience of U.S. units that used Korean civilian interpreters was that a certain degree of 
loyalty was accrued to the American employer” (ibid.). The employment of Korean 
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civilian interpreters provides some insight into how the transfer of UN Liaison Group 
officers from ROKA to KMAG staff might have transformed the interpreting habitus 
during the war.  
Records of a successful pairing between a U.S. military unit and a Korean 
civilian interpreter can be found in “Mister Pak Takes Over,” an article penned by the 
Korean War veteran, Captain Frederick Haight. Haight begins his story by highlighting 
the fact that many members of his military unit were initially suspicious about the Korean 
civilian interpreter Pak’s loyalty and doubtful about his abilities as an interpreter. 
Members of the unit considered Pak to be “servile and unintelligent” because his 
“English was not good” while disregarding the fact that he “spoke many Chinese 
dialects” (Haight 1953, 63). As a result, the American intelligence unit “refuse[d] to 
accept him as a full-fledged interpreter” (ibid., 64).  
The relationship between the interpreter and the U.S. military staff members 
underwent a wholesale transition after Pak successfully interrogated two Chinese 
Communist prisoners who had defiantly refused to answer questions asked by American 
interrogators. Through this event Pak gained the trust of the U.S. military staff in his 
linguistic skills and political loyalty. The interrogation marked the beginning of a 
camaraderie or “fictive kin” relationship between Pak and the members of the U.S. 
military, made evident by the fact that the U.S. unit members thereafter referred to the 
interpreter as Mister Pak.  
Once a “fictive kin” relationship was established between the two parties, the 
dynamics between the interpreter and the military agents during interpreting events 
underwent a substantial change. While the personnel of the U.S. intelligence unit had 
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previously forbade Pak for participating in meetings, they now not only relied on him to 
interpret during meetings but also entrusted him with liaison duties and intelligence 
analysis. The combination of interpreting and other roles was no doubt challenging for 
the individual interpreter, even if, at the same time, it provided him with more capital 
(e.g. status, authority, etc.), enhancing his position within the unit. The following event 
shows Pak performing such a task, one which lay beyond the normative linguistic 
obligations of an interpreter.  
At the battalion command post Mr. Pak sat listening to a radio. We had tried 
again and again to monitor the Communists’ network, but in issuing their orders 
they used a dialect and military slang which baffled our interpreters. Suddenly, 
Mr. Pak shouted for one of the regular interpreters. “Transmit what I say to the 
Captain,” he snapped in Korea. “I cannot translate fast enough.” 
From midnight until seven in the morning, he was virtually in command of the 
battle of Nan Two. He translated the Chinese command’s orders to its units so 
quickly that I could warn Able Company where and in what strength an attack 
was coming. Hunched over the radio, a map spread in front of him, Mr. Pak 
called every move. Our supporting artillery knew exactly where to place its fire; 
Able was prepared for every Chinese assault. 
Suddenly Mr. Pak had another idea: “Set a transmitter to the Chinese 
frequency. I will give them orders.” The effect was almost immediately apparent. 
Able Company called Battalion Observation Post. “What the hell’s come over 
the Commies?” demanded an agitated voice. “They’re all snafu’d!” I explained 
what Mr. Pak was doing. “Geeze,” said the voice from Able with deep sincerity. 
“Well – thank him for us, will you?” 
(Haight 1953, 65) 
 
During this situation, Pak simultaneously played the role of linguistic mediator, 
intelligence analyst, and military commander. Pak was entrusted with these 
extralinguistic functions because his fluency in the enemy’s language allowed him to 
understand, analyze, and respond to enemy tactics more quickly and accurately than 
channels of command would allow. The immediacy of Pak’s response to new information 
enabled him to shift the tides of this battle in favor of the UN troops.  
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While the active role played by Pak during this event undoubtedly overstepped 
the limits of what is often considered the normative role of the interpreter, U.S. military 
personnel were appreciative of the service he provided. This was the case due to the 
particularities of war. Before Pak demonstrated his loyalty he was viewed as a potential 
enemy, either a North Korea spy or a Japanese sympathizer, but once it was ascertained 
that Pak was not an enemy colluder, he was accepted as an ally of the United States and 
entrusted with functions that far exceeded the boundaries of what is considered normative 
practice in a professional interpretive setting. The abrupt shift in the level of trust allotted 
to Pak can be explained by the extreme conditions of war; as Baker notes “there is no 
place in war for fluid, shifting identities, for split or even strained identities, nor for 
negotiated narratives of any kind” (Baker 2010, 200).  
The U.S. military overwhelmingly favored the employment of civilian 
interpreters, based on the view that as “a Korean civilian his loyalty was fundamentally to 
his people rather than the ROKA, which meant that he probably would offer greater 
loyalty to his KMAG employer than a ROKA interpreter-officer could be expected to” 
(Hausrath 1957, 131). Utilization of such indigenous civilian linguists presented 
numerous problems to the Army, not the least of which was the fact that of the 228 
working for Eighth Army on June 30, 1953, 100 were eligible for induction into ROKA 
at any time ROK decided to call them into its service.  
The loss of these civilians would seriously cripple division, corps and Army POW 
interrogation, as well as counterintelligence and communication reconnaissance 
activities. The Department of the Army has been able to furnish only a small 
fraction of Korean-speaking intelligence personnel. It will be impossible for 
Eighth Army to fulfill AFFE post-hostilities intelligence requirements if CMS 
personnel are lost through induction. 




Furthermore, many of the men who were past the age of military service were already 
serving as interpreters for commercial houses, where the wage scale was higher than that 
of the U.S. military, and thus would not be easily lured into U.S. military employment 
(Hausrath 1957, 124).  
Nonetheless, the fact that U.S. military personnel preferred the employment of 
civilian interpreters over trained UN Liaison Group officers demonstrates the falsity of 
any illusions about the interpreter’s neutrality. While it has been revealed that interpreters 
are not neutral conduits of meaning, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that 
institutions of power, and by extension institutionalized norms of interpreting, do not 
guarantee the impartiality of the interpreter, either. Ironically, during the Korean War, it 
was precisely because the ROK and U.S. militaries were in competition against each 
other, each attempting to place the interpreter under their control and establish dominance 
over the interpreting habitus, the two cancelled out each other’s influence over the 
interpreter, creating a layer of insulation, and room for maneuver, for the interpreter. In 
other words, UN Liaison Group officer-interpreters were empowered because interpreting 
events constituted a “zone of uncertainty,” and they could use their position and expertise 
to contribute to their self-professed goal, which was for “the betterment of Korean-





THE KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS (1951-1953):  
A FAITHFUL ECHO 
The current chapter explains the conditions under which UNC military 
interpreters served during the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-1953) and analyzes 
the interpreting habitus that emerged within this diplomatic event, held during the 
conclusionary phase of the Korean conflict. It will first introduce the circumstances that 
implored both the UNC/ROK and the PRC/DPRK to seek to end the war at the 
negotiation table rather than on the battlefield, followed by an examination of the makeup 
of the negotiation teams and the topics that were discussed during the negotiations. After 
analyzing the sociopolitical conditions under which the talks were held, the study will 
discuss who was recruited to serve as an interpreter at Kaesong and Panmunjom, the sites 
of the negotiations, how their position as military personnel limited their ability to 
actively participate in the negotiation of meaning during interpreted events, and how the 
presence of the PRC/DPRK’s multilingual negotiators and interpreters further 
constrained interpreters as the communist delegation constantly monitored the 
performance of UNC interpreters.  
 
4.1. History of the Korean Armistice Negotiations 
By the summer of 1951, it was apparent that neither the UNC/ROK alliance nor 
the PRC /DPRK coalition would be able to readily achieve victory on the battlefield. The 
U.S. government and its military officials concluded that it would take substantial 
additional forces and resources to make a meaningful push northward but public opinion 
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in the United States as well as other states that had committed forces to the UN cause, 
however, “overwhelmingly called for their soldiers return home” (Rollinson 1997, 7). 
Since the failure of its last major offensive in the spring of 1951, a communist victory 
appeared increasingly unlikely, and both the Chinese and North Korean leadership were 
burdened by the mounting cost of war. Thus, both sides sought to bring an end to the 
fighting via truce talks at the negotiation table rather than prolonging military 
engagement. 
The ROK government, on the other hand, was adamantly opposed to the prospect 
of ending the war without having attained the goal of a unified Korean peninsula. 
President Syngman Rhee publicly rejected the idea of an armistice on multiple occasions 
and called upon the people of the ROK to “reassert our determination to […] fight on to a 
decisive end in case the UN accepts the truce and stops fighting” (Allen 1960, 160). He 
repeatedly disparaged the idea of an armistice as communist appeasement, and brashly 
claimed that “the Republic of Korea Army will fight on, if it means a suicide, and I will 
lead them” (Clark 1954, 275). Despite his opposition to the armistice negotiations, Rhee 
could not prevent such talks from happening as the ROK military had been placed under 
the operational control of the commander of the UNC. Thus, discussions regarding a 
ceasefire fell under the authority of the UNC. However, his threats to continue the war 
even after a ceasefire was completed were made possible by the fact that although the 
ROK military had been placed under the UNC’s command for the extent of the war, no 
agreement on control in the post-truce period existed. As such, Rhee could pull ROK 
troops out of the UNC after the armistice was signed and potentially carry on with the 
fight after the ceasefire. The prospect of the ROKA making such a move as soon as the 
 
125 
armistice was signed was highly problematic as it would likely force the UNC back into 
the fighting. This difference in opinion caused severe friction to arise between the ROK 
and the U.S. throughout the period of armistice negotiations which Rhee used to 
negotiate a U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty, long-term economic assistance, and a 
pledge by the U.S. that it would provide cooperation during the post-armistice political 
conference.30 Only after these terms were met did Rhee give his assurances that he 
would “not obstruct in any way the implementation of the terms of the armistice” despite 
“his misgivings over the long-term results” (Clark 1954, 287-88).  
On June 23, 1951, after holding preliminary discussions with U.S. State 
Department representative George Kennan, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations 
Jacob Malik publicly suggested in a UN radio broadcast that “as a first step discussions 
should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for 
the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel” (Acheson 1969, 532-533).31 A 
few days later, on June 30, 1951, General Matthew B. Ridgeway, Commander-in-Chief 
of the United Nations Command, made the following announcement: 
I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing 
for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate 
guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.  
Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be 
prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at 
which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could 
take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan Harbor.  
(Vatcher 1958, 24) 
 
30 The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea was 
signed on October 1, 1953, two months after the signing of the Korean Armistice 
Agreement. For full text see https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp 
31 UN radio was established at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 




In response to Ridgway’s comments, on July 1, 1951, the Chinese Communist Party’s 
official newspaper, Remin Ribao, declared that the Chinese people had always wanted a 
peaceful settlement in Korea, but “it was not until recently…[that]…severe blows to the 
American army…[and]…the general demands for peace of the people of the world” 
compelled the U.S. government to consider accepting the Soviet Union’s proposal for 
peace (Stueck 1995, 216). The following day, Kim Il-sung, Supreme Commander of the 
North Korean military, likewise made known that North Korea would participate in 
discussions regarding an armistice deal. The communist side suggested that the meetings 
convene at the city of Kaesong, which was located just below the 38th parallel, as an 
alternative to the Danish hospital ship as Denmark was associated with the United 
Nations. The Truman administration found Kaesong an acceptable location, as it was 
located midway between the front lines of the two forces but was unoccupied by either 
army. The U.S. leadership, anticipating that the talks would bring a speedy end to the war 
and seeing no disadvantage in the proposed location accepted the proposal.  
 Talks between the negotiation teams of the UNC/ROK and DPRK/PRC began on 
July 10, 1951. Both delegations were comprised of five principal delegates. On the UN 
side, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy served as the UNC’s main negotiator from 
the start of the negotiations until May 1952, after which he was replaced by Lieutenant 
General William K. Harrison. Assisting him were Major General Lawrence C. Craigie, 
Major General Henry I. Hodes, Rear Admiral Arliegh A. Burke, and ROK Army Major 
General Paik Sun Yup, the single ROK representative at the negotiation table (Vatcher 
1958, 30). At the head of the communist delegation was Lieutenant General Nam Il, 
Chief of Staff of the North Korean Army, and the Vice Premier of North Korea. Assisting 
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General Nam at the conference table were two representatives from North Korea: Major 
General Lee Sang-cho and Major General Chang Pyeong-san. There were also two 
delegates at the table from China: General Teng Hua and Major General Hsieh Fang 
(Zhang 1995, 218-219).  
The first issue that needed to be settled before talks could begin in earnest was the 
matter of what topics were “on the table” for discussion during the negotiations. A major 
point of disagreement between the two groups was the issue of where to establish a 
military demarcation line. The communists believed that the UNC would accept the 38th 
parallel as the line based on statements made by U.S. Secretary of State Acheson in early 
March in which he stated that a settlement at or near the parallel “would accomplish the 
military purposes in Korea” (Acheson 1969, 531) as well as comments by Ridgeway who 
declared that “it would be a tremendous victory for the United Nations if the war ended 
with our forces in control up to the 38th parallel” (Pearlman 2008, 163). UN Secretary 
General Trygve Lie likewise announced on June 1, 1951 that a ceasefire along the 
parallel “would fulfil the main purpose of the United Nations” (Foot 1990, 45). However, 
for a combination of political and military motivations, which will be discussed further 
on in this chapter, the Truman administration chose to reject the communist proposal 
regarding the placement of the line of ceasefire. The U.S. was also unwilling to commit 
to the withdrawal of its troops, partially due to the violent reaction of the ROK 
government to such a move, and the difficulty that reengaging recently withdrawn U.S. 
forces would entail should peninsular hostilities break out once more.  
On July 16, 1950 the communist delegation agreed to eliminate the reference to 
the 38th parallel as the demarcation line and on July 25, 1950 the two sides agreed to 
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remove direct reference to the withdrawal of foreign troops, choosing to discuss it at a 
later date. Sixteen days following the start of the talks, on July 26, 1951, the following 
agenda was agreed to by both parties:  
1. adoption of agenda; 
2. fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a 
demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea; 
3. concrete arrangements for the realization of a ceasefire and an armistice in 
Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising 
organization for carrying out the terms of a ceasefire and armistice; 
4. arrangements relating to prisoners of war; 
5. recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both 
sides. 
(Bailey 1992, 76) 
 
Once the agenda was set, the two sides were able to proceed with negotiations on the four 
remaining agenda points.  
The first item the delegations moved to discuss was the fixing of the location and 
deciding on the nature of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone 
(DMZ). In the following statement made at the opening of discussions, the KPA/PVA 
reiterated their dedication to the idea of the 38th parallel being reinstated as the border 
between the two sides: 
We hold firmly that the 38th Parallel should be made the military demarcation 
line between both sides and that both sides withdraw ten kilometers from the 
38th Parallel in order to establish a demilitarized zone. 
(Vatcher 1958, 46) 
 
The UNC countered with a line running through Pyongyang and Wonsan, well north of 
the current line of contact, which had formed more or less along the 38th parallel. To 
support its argument for a line that was so favorable for the UNC, Joy presented the 
notion of three zones of military significance: air, sea, and ground. He argued that since 
the UNC maintained air superiority over the entirety of the Korean peninsula and held 
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control over the seas that surrounded it, it should be awarded additional territory on the 
ground. This argument for more territory was unconvincing, and Nam countered this 
rather weak line of reasoning with the statement, “your battle lines on the ground are the 
concentrated expression of the military effectiveness of your land, air and seas forces” 
(Foot 1990, 47).  
The UNC could not condone acceptance of the 38th parallel as the military 
demarcation line due to an assortment of political and strategic reasons. While the 
armistice talks were underway, the two sides were fighting along a line of contact 
positioned slightly north of the 38th parallel except for a small section in the west. As 
Paul Nitze, the head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff wrote, a settlement 
at the 38th parallel “would give the impression that the Chinese and the North Korean 
communists had been able to achieve somewhat more than an even military result against 
sixteen [United Nations member] nations” (Foot 1990, 45-46). This would strike a blow 
against the legitimacy of the United Nations, as it would indicate that during the 
organization’s first collective military effort it was only able to fight two newly 
established states, the DPRK and the PRC, to a draw.  
Furthermore, there was the issue of the indefensibility of the 38th parallel. This 
line, which was drawn across the Korean peninsula in 1945 for the purpose of 
demilitarizing Japanese forces, was not meant to function as a permanent border between 
two belligerent countries. Most problematic was the fact that the 38th parallel was 
entirely lacking in natural geographical barriers, such as oceans, rivers, or mountain 
ranges, which usually run along national borders. A good indicator of the border’s 
impracticality as a wall dividing the two armies was the fact that the UNC/ROK and the 
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KPA/PVA were able to breach the line for a total of four times during the short span of 
one year at war. The UNC regarded the new battle line north of the 38th parallel as far 
more defensible than the former border created during the U.S./U.S.S.R. occupation.  
With neither side willing to relent on this issue, and with the talks deadlocked, on 
August 22, 1951, the Chinese-North Korean delegation declared a recess claiming that air 
bombing conducted by the UNC had made the negotiation site unsafe. The UNC used the 
break as an opportunity to move the talks to a more neutral location, as it was dissatisfied 
by the fact that Kaesong was now located within territory controlled by the communist 
forces. On October 22, 1951, the two sides agreed to relocate the venue of the talks to the 
village of Panmunjom, located several miles to the east of Kaesong, which would 
thereinafter serve as the site of negotiations.  
Negotiations were reinitiated at the new site on October 25, 1951 and the two 
sides continued to debate the location of the military demarcation line. The UNC argued 
that the border should be drawn based on the line of ground contact at the time that the 
armistice was signed. It favored this approach because, at the time, UN forces were on 
the offensive, and Ridgway believed this fact, coupled with the UNC’s air and naval 
superiority, would continue to provide the negotiation team with leverage during the 
remainder of the talks. The KPA/PVA, on the other hand, insisted on an immediate 
agreement regarding the location of the military demarcation line. Discussions dragged 
on until November 27, 1951, when the two sides agreed that the line of contact at the 
time of the signing of the armistice would form the demarcation line, which would 
surrounded by a four-kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone (Hermes 1966, 114). 
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Discussions between the two delegations regarding item 3—arrangements for a 
ceasefire—began on November 27, 1951 with the two sides quickly agreeing to a 
Military Armistice Commission with equal representation for both camps. On December 
3, 1951, the KPA/PVA suggested that the armistice be supervised by nations “neutral to 
the Korean War” and by March 1952, the two sides had more-or-less completed 
discussion on this issue by agreeing to include Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and 
Switzerland as the members of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) 
(Hermes 1966, 173). 
Formal talks regarding item number 5—recommendations to the governments of 
the countries—began on February 7, 1952 and progressed quickly largely due to the fact 
that both sides hoped to avoid precise phrasing on the matter. The negotiators were only 
making recommendations to their governments about post-armistice political action, and 
thus the contents of item 5 were not regarded as binding. Joy proposed that after the 
signing of the armistice, the relevant country’s governments consider convening a 
conference between the political representatives of both sides “to discuss appropriate 
matters arising from but not resolved by the armistice agreement” (Posen 1986, 75). The 
communist delegation advocated that a conference to discuss the signing of a peace treaty 
be held ninety days after the conclusion of the armistice between a group of five 
delegates from each side. It was their intention that the conference discuss the withdrawal 
of foreign troops from the peninsula and other questions related to the peace in Korea. 
The UNC negotiation team quickly agreed to these recommendations regarding the 
holding a post-truce conference, on the condition that the Republic of Korea was one of 
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the participants. This agenda point was agreed on February 18, 1952, only eleven days 
after it was formally introduced into the negotiations. 
The most problematic item discussed during the armistice talks was number 4, 
prisoner of war (POW) repatriation. Heated discussions, and the substantial elongation of 
the talks, were caused because the UNC delegation proposed the idea of non-enforceable 
repatriation for Korean War POWs, which the KPA/PVA team immediately rejected. It 
had, up to this point, been assumed by both sides that all POWs would be exchanged at 
the conclusion of the armistice, as was customary. The UNC noted, however, that among 
the prisoners held by the UN forces were many former residents of the ROK who had 
been inducted into the KPA following the North Korean attack. The UNC argued that 
these people should be allowed to return to their homes in the south. Furthermore, it was 
also discovered that many of the Chinese soldiers were former members of the 
Nationalist Chinese Army who did not support the communist government. The UN 
delegation argued that these troops might prefer and should be allowed to go to Taiwan 
rather than be forced to return to mainland China.  
While the U.S. negotiators emphasized the value of individual human rights and 
insisted on the principle of voluntary repatriation, the communist delegation argued that 
“the United Nations Command had no right to withhold repatriation of certain prisoners 
merely because those prisoners expressed opposition to being repatriated” (Joy 1952, 
146-147). The UNC responded that “it had the right and the duty to refuse to repatriate 
those prisoners who could not be returned to the side of their origin without the use of 
force” (ibid.).  
 
133 
Both sides were adamant that they would not concede on this matter, and from 
May to December 1952, no progress was made on the POW issue. Once committed 
publicly to non-enforceable repatriation, the officials in Washington stubbornly insisted 
upon “a clear-cut victory” (Foot 1990, 217). Truman thoroughly embraced the principle 
of nonforcible repatriation because he wanted “a decisive victory…that embodied the 
essence of the difference between the two sides in the Cold War” (ibid., 158). He insisted 
that this was the best way for the United States “to maintain its hegemonic position in the 
international system” (ibid., 151). The North Korea/Chinese side, on the other hand, 
could not afford to allow many of their soldiers to refuse repatriation as both were still in 
the early stages of constructing new regimes and the refusal by large numbers of 
communist troops to return home would undermine the legitimacy of these newly instated 
governments. 
In March 1952, the communist delegation indicated that they were willing to 
show some flexibility on the matter, but only if the majority of Chinese and North Korean 
prisoners intended to return. In response, on April 19, 1952 the UNC conducted an initial 
screening process to determine the repatriation desires of prisoners and reported that 
among the over 170,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners, only 70,000 desired 
repatriation. The KPA/PVA negotiators flatly stated that such low figures could not be 
true and would not serve as the basis for further discussion on the matter (Hermes 1966, 
144-149). Neither side was prepared to compromise on this issue and on October 8, 1952, 
with no progress in sight, the UNC unilaterally declared a recess.   
 During the adjournment of talks, both sides believed that they could apply 
pressure on their opponents by increasing military activity. In May 1952, General Mark 
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W. Clark replaced Ridgway as Commander-in-Chief UN Command, and ordered the 
largest air attacks of the war against the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and the 
bombing of the hydroelectric dams on the Yalu River (Berstein 1983, 288-296). The 
Chinese leadership, convinced that war would continue for some time, started to build up 
its forces and by early 1953, Chinese troops in Korea reached 1.53 million, the highest in 
the war (Zhang 1995, 225-227). Despite these efforts, neither the UNC’s aerial attacks, 
nor the Chinese ground attacks were threatening enough to cause either side to 
compromise on the issue. Thus, although the level of violence on the peninsula increased 
substantially in 1952, these actions had no discernible effect on the negotiations and 
served only to push up the number of casualties.   
In early 1953, the political situation of both sides also began to shift. In the U.S., 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had strongly criticized Truman’s handling of the war and 
armistice negotiations, came into office in January. Keenly aware that neither the 
American people nor its UN allies would support a major offensive to reunify Korea, 
Eisenhower made it known that, as long as there were no major compromises made on 
the issue of voluntary repatriation, he would authorize the Armistice as it had been 
negotiated at that point. By this time, the communist forces were also eager for the war to 
end as both China and North Korea were eager to begin reconstructing their economies. 
The biggest turning point, nonetheless, was the death of Joseph Stalin on March 5, 1953. 
The Soviet leader’s successors, facing unrest in the European satellites, encouraged the 
Chinese and North Koreans to conclude the armistice (Weathersby 2012, 108-109). In 
light of this situation, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a speech in which he 
proposed that those prisoners not desiring repatriation be transferred to a neutral state and 
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Nam Il agreed to this proposition “out of need to consolidate the Communist bloc after 
Stalin’s death” (ibid., 183).  
By July 27, 1953 all of the details had been worked out and preparations were 
complete for the signing of the document. The final armistice was signed at 10 o’clock on 
July 27, 1953 by U.S. Army Lieutenant General William Harrison, Jr. representing the 
United Nations Command (UNC) and North Korean General Nam Il representing the 
Korean People's Army (KPA) and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA). Within 
a few hours, General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, 
Marshall Kim Il-sung, Supreme Commander Korean People’s Army, and Peng Dehuai, 
Chinese People’s Volunteer, also signed the document for their military forces. The 
representatives affixed their signatures to eighteen copies of the armistice, six in English, 
six in Chinese, and six in Korean, thus ending the longest truce talks in history.32 
 
4.2. UNC Military Interpreters at the Armistice Negotiations 
The Korean Armistice Negotiations was the longest and one of the most complex 
negotiated armistices in history, involving “159 plenary sessions and some 500 hundred 
meetings at a subsidiary level” (Bailey 1992, 70), all of which required the mediatory 
presence of interpreters who worked between the three official working languages: 
Korean, English, and Chinese (Ekvall 1960, 20). As the working language of the UNC, 
 
32 Both sides accumulated tremendous casualties during the war. Approximately two to 
three million civilians were killed in North and South Korea. There were 33,629 U.S. 
soldiers killed on the battlefield, plus 20,617 from other causes, and an estimated 400,000 
South Korean military fatalities. One to two million communist troops are believed to have 
perished. U.S. statistics show that 45 percent of its casualties occurred while the 
negotiations were underway (Foot 1990, 208). 
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which was represented by four U.S. military officers and one ROK officer, was English, 
it officially only required the services of English-Korean interpreters and English-
Chinese interpreters (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 57). The UNC’s English-Korean and 
English-Chinese interpreters rendered what was said by any of the representatives at the 
negotiation table in English into Korean and Chinese. They did not interpret what was 
said by the representatives of the PRC or DPRK in Chinese or Korean. That was the 
responsibility of the communist interpreters.  
The number of interpreters needed at Kaesong and later Panmunjom was, 
naturally, much smaller when compared to the needs of the USAGMIK during the 
occupation of southern Korean following the Japanese surrender or the UNC forces in the 
battlefields during the Korean War. The U.S. military estimated that, in total, it would 
require the assistance of approximately 140 military interpreters and translators at 
Kaesong and Panmunjom (Ekvall 1960, 46). While the quantity of interpreters needed at 
the armistice was far lower than the numbers needed during the occupation or the war, 
the fact that these interpreters had to participate in a diplomatic conference setting meant 
that they had to be highly proficient in the language pairs they were working with.  
During both the U.S. occupation of southern Korea and the Korean War, the 
United States military had steadfastly refused to recruit and train its own Korean 
linguists, despite the negative effects it had on the institution’s ability to communicate 
with the local populace, its allies, and enemies, choosing rather to rely on Korean civilian 
interpreters during the occupation and the ROKA’s UN Liaison Group officers during the 
war, as was discussed in the previous two chapters. The interpreters working at the 
Korean Armistice Negotiation table, however, had to be U.S. military personnel, as the 
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UNC’s negotiation team was being led by an American officer, and the entire operation 
was under the management and control of the UNC in the face of opposition by the ROK 
government. Thus, the U.S. military could not employ the services of UN Liaison Group 
officers at the negotiation table because, as was discussed in chapter three, the loyalty of 
these interpreters did not belong to the UNC but to the Republic of Korea Army. 
Before the negotiations began, the U.S. military issued a call for “Grade A 
linguists” to serve as interpreters at the armistice talks. These interpreters were required 
to be on,  
the “international political” (or negotiating) level. Personnel operating at this 
highest level must be completely fluent in an Asiatic language and in English as 
well. They should be capable of simultaneous translations (interpretation) to and 
from English. In addition to linguistic fluency they must have a deep 
understanding of the appropriate Asiatic culture, area, and psychology. This is a 
“super” category, the personnel in which would be competent to handle 
interpretation, advising, and even negotiating at high-level meetings such as those 
which US military representatives have been engaged at Kaesong and Panmunjom 
since 1951.  
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 13) 
 
Unfortunately, it was soon revealed that despite the fact that it had actively intervened in 
Korean affairs since 1945, “the U.S. Army had no competent career-service language 
personnel available to handle the 2-yr truce negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom” 
(ibid., 8).33 Thus, the U.S. was forced to recall a number of its reserve officers to active 
duty to serve as interpreters at the negotiation table.  
 
33 During the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in post-war Japan 
(1946-1948), which is examined by Kayoko Takeda (2010) in Interpreting the Tokyo War 
Crimes Tribunal: A Sociopolitical Analysis, the U.S. military had likewise faced an urgent 
need for high-level interpreters. The U.S. military was unable to supply interpreters from 
within its ranks to serve as the primary interpreters, opting instead to employ Japanese 
nationals with bilingual backgrounds with no formal training to serve as the interpreters at 
the Tokyo trials. Nonetheless, because the U.S. military had recruited and trained Nisei 
(second generation Japanese-Americans) interpreters and translators during World War II, 
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The primary English-Korean interpreter to serve at the negotiation site was 
Horace G. Underwood, a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Reserve. Horace’s brother, Richard 
F. Underwood, was a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army Reserve, who had been assigned as 
an English-Korean interpreter for the initial liaison team of UN command officers who 
flew into Kaesong to do the groundwork prior to the truce talks. Horace Underwood, 
Richard’s older brother by ten years, had served in the military during World War II as a 
U.S. Navy officer, and had since been teaching English at the Chosen Christian College 
in South Korea when the Korean War broke out. Horace joined the armistice delegation 
“at Richard’s urging” (Li, Millet and Yu 2001, 260) and became the Chief Official 
Interpreter for the UNC at Panmunjom.  
The top English-Chinese interpreter for the first two years of the negotiations was 
First Lieutenant Kenneth Wu, who was later replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Richard 
Ekvall. Like the Underwoods, neither of the English-Chinese interpreters was still active 
in the military during the Korean War. Kenneth Wu was an ethnic Chinese born in Burma 
who joined the U.S. Army in Kunming, China, in 1943 and was naturalized as an 
American citizen in 1947. Before joining the negotiation team at Kaesong, he was the 
chief of the Chinese POW interrogation team in Pusan. When the armistice talks began, 
he was subsequently commissioned as second lieutenant, U.S. Army Reserve, to serve at 
Kaesong and, in 1953, Wu was promoted to first lieutenant. As was the case with the 
 
these Nisei linguists, who had worked for the U.S. Army as military intelligence staff 
during World War II, were able to monitor the linguistic production of these interpreters. 
The Nisei were charged with correcting interpreting errors and tasked with reading all the 
prepared translations simultaneously as they were delivered by the different participants in 
the courtroom. When linguistic disputes broke out between the Japanese interpreters and 
the Nisei monitors they were resolved by two bilingual U.S. military officers. 
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Underwood brothers, “he [was] not a career service-language officer” (Fishel and 
Hausrath 1958, 14). Wu served as the senior Chinese language officer until he was 
replaced in the spring of 1953 by Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Ekvall, “a Reserve officer 
who was recalled to active duty for the express purpose of handling interpretation chores 
at the negotiations” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 16). Ekvall had served as staff officer and 
translator with the military mission of General George Marshall in Beijing from 1946 to 
1947. 
Fernández Sánchez notes that, aside from Ekvall, all of the senior interpreters at 
Kaesong and Panmunjom were “untrained interpreters” (Fernández Sánchez 2012, 118-
122). The task of interpreting during the armistice talks proved to be tremendously 
strenuous, and the interpreters felt themselves linguistically ill equipped to meet the 
challenges of serving as interlingual mediators in such a high-level diplomatic conference 
setting. For instance, Richard Underwood recalled that he “did have very great problems 
at the formal meetings because all of a sudden, we came up with all sorts of technical 
language that I had no competence to interpreter, and it was a really, really, miserable 
time” (Underwood 2010). Horace Underwood likewise experienced “initial difficulty in 
meeting the requirements of his job satisfactorily” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 16), and 
even Ekvall, who was already a seasoned military interpreter at the time, “found his 
Chinese, fluent though it normally was, inadequate for the needs of the demanding task at 
Panmunjom for several weeks after he arrived” (ibid.). The military’s employment of 
untrained interpreters during military operations, however, has proven to be more the 
norm than the exception in many cases. While there are instances in which a military 
engages in warfare with a group of trained interpreters and translators, such as the Nisei 
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interpreters and translators who played an active role during World War II, “wars have 
been and—unfortunately—continue to be schools of interpreters” (Baigorri-Jalon 2010, 
173).  
Interpreters at the Korean Armistice Negotiations were required to participate in 
both the plenary sessions and the staff meetings. During the negotiations the 
representatives of both sides met in a tent set up on the 38th parallel where “a narrow 
green baize table was placed in the center of the tent and down the center of that table ran 
the 38th parallel” (Dean 1960, 9). The center line of the table had to be set up in 
accordance with the actual boundary line of the two sides, so the placement of the 
negotiation table was constantly adjusted in accordance with the changes of the actual 
boundary line (Wang and Xu 2016, 191). Mirroring the circumstances on the battlefield, 
the communist representatives sat on the northern side of the negotiation table while the 
UNC delegation sat on the southern side. Such care was taken regarding the positioning 
of the table because both sides regarded the negotiation sites as part and parcel of the real 
theater of war.  
Though Richard Underwood hints at the fact that the plenary sessions were more 
challenging than the staff meetings, both proved to be challenging for the interpreters, for 
different reasons. During the plenary sessions, the delegates of the two sides debated the 
five items of the armistice agreement, with the interpreters seated at a small table just 
behind the spokesman and the main conference table. This positioning allowed them to 
reference word lists and dictionaries, which were required because the language 
employed during the talks included a wide range of terminology, as pointed out by the 
English-Chinese interpreter, Kenneth Wu. 
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In the present armistice negotiations, the vocabulary involved is legion. Though 
strictly a military conference the words used cover every province of semantics—
military science, political hocus-pocus, geographical jaw-breakers, political 
jargon, philosophical abracadabra, and torrential tirades of penetrating oral 
defamation couched in diplomatic sugarcoats. Here it is purposeful to point out 
that the interpreter, wagging his tongue rather than the pen as does the translator, 
has no time to seek refuge in a dictionary when he is ambushed by the lethal 
assault of an unexpected and unknown word. In short, the ideal interpreter is the 
one who can drive well on the thoroughfares of a two-lane lingual traffic, except 
that he is to be able to jump tracks and switch directions on split-second impulses 
far from being his own. He is to be able to juggle with words and put across the 
most fantastic show of verbal magic.  
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 15)  
 
The interpreter was aided by an assistant who sat next to the interpreter to look up words, 
check texts, and hand over documents with pertinent paragraphs marked for reading, in 
cases where the principal suddenly quotes a passage. While having their own space 
provided some advantages, sitting behind the main conference table also presented 
interpreters with some challenges: 
the interpreter loses something of the close rapport with his principal; there is a 
diminution of the sense of immediacy; it is harder for the principal to consult with 
his interpreter; there is greater chance of the interpreter’s not hearing correctly or 
not hearing all of what his principal says; and, if he needs to cross-check on what 
has been said or heard, he has to tip his hand and temporarily stop the meeting by 
getting up and going to the conference table.  
(Ekvall 1960, 62-63) 
 
In addition to the plenary sessions, the interpreter’s presence was also required at 
the staff meetings, during which the specifics of items which had been agreed to during 
the plenary session was clarified and put into writing. During these talks, the interpreter 
sat at the conference table, just to the left of the spokesman, and thus did not have 
immediate access to an assistant, reference books, or any of the other props. All the 
interpreters were allowed to have on the table were prepared texts that were given to 
them and a pad of paper on which to make notes. During these meetings, interpreters no 
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longer had reference material to lean on, but, according to Ekvall, this setting could be 
preferable because “the stimulation of the front line permeates him and helps him dig 
deep for the things he knows below the level of conscious awareness” (Ekvall 1960, 63).  
Certain measures were taken by interpreters to ensure that they would be able to 
best convey what was being said by the negotiators. The most commonly used tactic was 
for interpreters to prepare a written translation of a statement before the meeting rather 
than to interpret it on the spot.  
Every statement had to be carefully and precisely formulated the evening before 
and then translated into Chinese and Korean. Since the Chinese and English 
languages are in no sense similar in structure, many hours had to be spent in 
making sure that what we wanted to be said could be said correctly and precisely 
in both the Chinese and Korean languages.  
(Ekvall 1960, 9) 
 
The downside of essentially reading prepared texts was that though they had a prim 
finished preciseness about them, such interpretations tended to be “pompous, and often 
oddly bombastic” (ibid., 67). Furthermore, excessive dependence on reading translations 
of a statement made before the meeting was held could become an impediment to smooth 
interlingual communication as “the interpreter tends to flounder somewhat wildly when 
ad lib exchanges follow use of, or are inserted into, the prepared text” (ibid.). 
When a statement could not be translated in advance, measures were taken to 
provide the UNC interpreter some supplementary material which would help them 
accurately interpret what was said by the negotiation team. For instance, often the 
speaker at the conference table would write down what they were about to say on a piece 
of paper, read from the paper, and then pass it to the interpreter. The notes scribbled by 
the speaker provided the interpreter with a record of what has just been said. Though this 
strategy was developed in Panmunjom to aid the interpreters, it was soon discovered that 
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in addition to providing reference material for the linguistic mediators, it helped the 
negotiators better organize their thoughts and get their points across in a more succinct 
manner. Thus, interpreters urged that all members of the negotiation team employ this 
tactic, and even asked that the senior negotiator consider, “making it mandatory in 
preference to unlimited and uncontrolled adlibbing” (ibid., 68). 
In addition to the Underwood brothers, Wu, and Ekvall, a team of linguists was 
organized to provide interpreting and translation services during the negotiations. The 
following chart indicates that there was a total of seventy-six UNC military linguists 
working for the language division at Panmunjom in July 1953. 

















(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 57) 
However, the following comments made by Ekvall suggests that Fishel and Hausrath’s 
numbers were inflated and that the shortage of linguistic personnel at Panmunjom was 
much more severe than official records indicate. 
I found myself chief of a would-be language division whose table of organization 
called for 140 linguists. Instead, we numbered twelve, including translators and 
Chinese and Korean typists.  
(Ekvall 1960, 46) 
 
Given the importance of interlingual communication at the negotiation table, it is hardly 
surprising that UNC linguist supervisors and intelligence division chiefs found their 
number to be “assertedly insufficient” (Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 57).  
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 The disparity in the numbers presented in Fishel and Hausrath’s study and the 
recollections of Ekvall in his memoire appear to have been caused by the fact that the 
criteria for calculating the number of linguists differed. According to Ekvall, 
The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, all suddenly pressured to produce 
linguists, poured personnel into the language division. They were men who on 
their records were rated as qualified linguists. We found most such ratings 
fictitious. Using practical rule-of-thumb tests, we sent them back—at least four 
out of every five—as fast as they came. The ones we did keep couldn’t interpret 
as yet, but they showed promise. We set up training courses, rotated them as 
monitors in the meetings and let them get their feet wet in various interpreting 
assignments of an incidental nature.  
(Ekvall 1960, 46) 
 
In other words, the fourteen members of the language division appear to be the number of 
permanent personnel Ekvall deemed as competent interpreters and translators. So while 
Fishel and Hausrath’s records include all of the personnel assigned to the language 
division, they fail to take into account whether all of its members could actually take on 
the roles they were called on to perform. Whether it be seventy-six or fourteen, both 
Fishel and Hausrath’s report and Ekvall’s autobiographical account indicate that there 
was a vast shortage of linguistic mediators at the Korean Armistice Negotiations.  
The lack of personnel translated to an increased burden for the interpreters 
capable of performing their linguistic duties with any proficiency. Thus, the more 
competent interpreters “often interpreted for eight or more hours a day” (ibid., 46), 
despite the fact that it is widely recognized that the quality of interpreting decreases when 
interpreters continuously interpret for long stretches of time (Moser-Mercer 2000). These 
long working hours proved to be taxing for the interpreters, who often began to 
“blackout” after about two hours without rest (Ekvall 1960, 48). Furthermore, because of 
the limited number of interpreters available at the negotiations, it became necessary to 
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stagger the schedule of those meetings so that “the interpreters, could go from one 
meeting to the next” (ibid., 46).  
While the lack of personnel added to the already heavy burden of the UNC 
interpreters, as discussed in chapter two, interpreters can sometimes accrue significant 
power and authority within interpreted events when they hold a monopoly over the 
linguistic capital necessary for interlingual communication to take place. During the 
occupation, this led to interpreting norms which allowed the interpreter to actively 
intervene in interpreted events, during which they were not only allowed but often 
encouraged to take on roles that extended beyond those of a simple linguistic mediator, 
roles which included advisor, informer, and negotiator. The following section will 
examine the interpreting norms that emerged during the armistice talks and determine 
why, despite the shortage of capable interpreters, the military interpreters at Kaesong and 
Panmunjom were unable to command more authority during the negotiation talks.  
 
4.3. The Interpreter as a Faithful Echo 
In his memoir “Faithful Echo,” Robert Ekvall (1960) provides the following 
detailed account about a particular interpreting assignment that he found particularly 
challenging and frustrating while serving as the UNC’s senior English-Chinese 
interpreter at Panmunjom.  
The temptation to add, if not a sentence, just a phrase or even a word, can be very 
strong. The interpreter often feels as though he were the only one with hearing 
ears, listening to a dialogue of the deaf where just one more word—the right one, 
of course—would clear up all misunderstanding; he may even deceive himself 
into believing that such addition is the best and highest form of interpretation. In 
his inmost being he knows what his principal means: it is simply a matter of 
clarification. Yet clarification may, in fact, be something not desired.  
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   And here I remember a staff meeting in Panmunjom in which I was most 
unhappy from beginning to end. What I was given to interpret seemed to be, as I 
worked through it stubborn sentence by sentence and refractory phrase by phrase, 
the most amazing jumble of contradictions ever muttered. I thought I knew what 
was intended. Again and again I was tempted to insert one or two explanatory 
phrases which would make everything clear. But against all reason I held true to 
the words of my principal and at the end wiped my sweating palms. The other 
side responded with the request that the interpretation be repeated. This implied 
that I was at fault, and I had to swallow the humiliation while at the same time 
feeling, with a mounting, helpless sort of fury, that it wasn’t altogether my fault. 
But no matter whose fault, I was the one pilloried and shamed. Then they asked 
that the statement be repeated. It was no clearer than before, and I once more 
sweated through its interpretation, after which those on the other side of the table 
shook their heads in bewilderment. A long question-and-answer session followed 
until everyone seemed tired out. At last, in a state of mutual bafflement, we 
adjourned and I could take my shame outside. 
   Yet as we rode back to camp at Munsani, my principal remarked, “Ekvall, you 
did a good job today.” 
   “But sir, they didn’t understand. Nobody understood and we ended more 
confused that when we started.” I was smarting with the hurt of a job bungled and 
yet still sensed bitterly, but silently, that it wasn’t altogether my fault.  
   “That’s it exactly. If they had understood I would have known you were 
misinterpreting. They weren’t supposed to understand. I was purposely fuzzing it 
up. Good work.”  
(Ekvall 1960, 102-103) 
 
The aggravation the interpreter felt during this meeting was due to a clash between his 
professional desire as a linguistic mediator to enable accurate interlingual communication 
and the established interpreting norms which prevented him from adding, omitting, 
simplifying or embellishing what was said by the original speaker. Unlike the civilian 
interpreters working for the USAMGIK, who were expected to serve as informants and 
negotiators during interpreted events, and UN Liaison Group officers, who were expected 
to manipulate an exchange between KMAGers and ROKA commanders to favor their 
Korean military superiors, “absolute faithfulness, or fidelity, was the norm that was 
strictly observed” (Wang and Xu 2016, 200) at the negotiation table. In Ekvall’s own 
words “the interpreter must never add, even in the interest of clarification, anything of his 
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own to what is being said; and conversely, he must never subtract, for neither subtraction 
nor […] omission is permissible” (ibid., 102).  
Inghilleri notes that interpreters in conflict situations “continually consider 
disparate sets of rights and obligations and weigh one ethical obligation against another” 
(Inghilleri 2012, 100). The event outlined above and comments made by Ekvall reveal 
that when forced to choose between the ethical obligation to facilitate and mediate 
language communication or to function as a neutral conduit, the UNC interpreters were 
compelled to choose the later as their primary obligation, even when such practice came 
at the expense of the comprehensibility. 
Furthermore, this episode demonstrates that the UNC negotiators could not 
monitor what was being said by the interpreter when their words were rendered into 
Chinese, as they based their assessment of the interpretation’s faithfulness to the original 
on the reaction of the Chinese negotiators. It also raises the question of why, given that 
no one on the UNC side of the negotiation table could monitor whether or not the 
interpreter was adhering to norms of interpreting that limited the interpreter to the 
somewhat mechanical role of faithfully rendering of what was said in the source language 
to its closest equivalent in the target language, the interpreter felt compelled to abide by 
these norms.  
A key characteristic that distinguishes the UNC interpreters who participated in 
the truce talks from civilian interpreters working for the U.S. Military Government, who 
viewed the U.S. as a foreign occupational force, or UN Liaison Group officers, whose 
loyalties belonged to the ROK Army, was the fact that the interpreters at Kaesong and 
Panmunjom, though not active, still saw themselves as U.S. military personnel. The fact 
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that the UNC interpreters were members of the U.S. military had a clear influence on the 
positionality of the interpreters within the military field as they were firmly embedded 
within the military’s hierarchical chain of command. At Kaesong and Panmunjom, the 
interpreters were unquestionably military men subordinate to the officers to whom they 
were providing their linguistic services. As a result, these interpreters conducted 
themselves in accordance with the norms of the military, and the power they exercised 
during interpreted events was in large part defined by their rank rather than their 
linguistic abilities. 
As a result, interpreters at Kaesong and Panmunjom who were of low military 
rank experienced considerable difficulties while serving at the negotiation table:  
On [Horace Underwood]’s retirement from active duty in July 1953 he was 
replaced as senior interpreter by an Army sergeant. The lack of senior status 
proved a handicap for this sergeant, even as it had for other interpreters working 
at Panmunjom. Because of the ticklish problems involved in phrasing documents 
intended to be translated, the interpreters at these negotiations had been consulted 
on all draft documents and had sat in on all staff meetings. Several of these 
linguists commented that their lack of rank frequently was embarrassing to 
them—not so much in dealing with the enemy across the table, but in dealing with 
US negotiators!  
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 16-17) 
 
The difficulties the sergeant who replaced Horace Underwood faced would have been 
particularly prominent as he was an enlisted soldier working with high-ranking officers. 
This sentiment appears to have been widespread as one linguist suggested, 
Perhaps we ought to be given field-officer rank for these negotiations so that we 
could deal with our own negotiators on relatively equal terms. As it is, generals 
and admirals often won’t ask or take advice from a sergeant or a lieutenant 
regardless of his ability or his degree of experience. 
(ibid., 17) 
 
And another interpreter at Panmunjom observed that it was because of his military rank 
that his superiors undervalued the worth of the cultural and linguistic expertise. 
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The Army’s got to make up its mind what it wants from its language personnel. If 
it wants top-grade people for meetings such as this it ought to be prepared to 
“pay” for them. I mean simply that in my lowly rank I am constantly being 
embarrassed by having to offer advice to some general or colonel who resents 
hearing me talk because I’m just a ______. And frankly, if my future promotions 
are as slow in coming as this last one was I’ll be damned if I’ll stay in the Army 
much longer. I trained a long time to get to this point, and I don’t much like being 
ordered around or scorned by some guy with a lot of rank who doesn’t know 




The laments of these interpreters stand in stark contrast with the situations seen during 
the occupation and the war, during which the interpreters’ position was elevated due to 
the access they maintained over the channels of interlingual communication.  
In addition to the difficulties low-ranking military interpreters faced, interpreters 
possessing high-rank were questioned on whether their job required such power within 
the military establishment: “one disgruntled officer, irked at my rank which he felt was 
too high for a mere interpreter, suggested that I be declared superfluous and sent away 
from Panmunjom” (Ekvall 1960, 45). The presence of a high-ranking interpreter was seen 
as a threat to the military institution because it implied that interpreters, whose functions 
were viewed as supplementary, could in fact take on leadership roles and potentially 
assume positions of power.  
Ekvall provides details of several attempts made by members of the U.S. military 
to remind interpreters that they occupied a subservient position within the military. This 
was typically done by alleging that interpreters were not true soldiers as they lacked the 
characteristic of a military man. For instance, U.S. personnel at the negotiation talks 
claimed interpreters were “prima donnas” who were “too temperamental for any good 
use” (ibid., 70). Here, interpreters are denigrated for possessing characteristics that ran 
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counter to what was viewed as the central values of the military, namely, masculinity and 
strategical thinking. Another denunciation directed at interpreters was the clichéd 
assertion that the interpreter’s job was to parrot what is said by their “principal,” as 
exemplified in the following comments made by one of Ekvall’s acquaintances at 
Panmunjom: “He [the speaker] says ‘Squeak, squeak, squeak’, and you say ‘squawk, 
squawk, squawk’. A hell of a job!” (ibid.). The treatment of interpreters at the armistice 
talks mirrors the relationship seen between ROKA unit commanders and UN Liaison 
Group officers during the Korean War. In both cases, the mistreatment of the military 
interpreter by military staff might be interpreted as a conscious refusal to acknowledge 
the value of the linguistic capital that the interpreter possesses, and thus rejecting any 
authority the interpreter might hold in an interpreted event, while presenting military rank 
as the sole source of symbolic capital within the military organization.  
While the treatment of UN Liaison Group officers and U.S. military interpreters 
paralleled each other, the interpreter’s reaction to this treatment differed substantially. In 
the case of the UN Liaison Group officers, interpreters such as Kim Il Pyong (2012) and 
Ji Myeong-gwan (2006) expressed their disdain for their military superiors and criticized 
them for failing to recognize the value of the linguistic services they were providing. This 
group of interpreters were able to challenge the authority of ROK officers and refuse to 
be relegated to a position of subservience because they occupied an ambiguous position 
within the military’s rank system. The UNC interpreters in Kaesong and Panmunjom, on 
the other hand, were squarely positioned within the U.S. military’s chain of command 
and any attempt to devalue the authority of their superiors would come at the cost of 
diminishing their own worth and thus could not be attempted. 
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Further adding to the constraints placed on interpreters to “parrot” what was said 
by their military superiors was the fact that interpreters were constantly being monitored 
to ensure they did not diverge from statements made by their principals. Ironically, while 
the U.S. military staff serving as representatives of the UNC at the negotiation table could 
not monitor the linguistic output of their interpreters, the majority of communist 
negotiators knew not only their mother language but also one or two of the other 
languages spoken at the talks. For instance, the head of the communist delegation, Nam 
Il, “spoke fluent Russian—he had been a school teacher in the Soviet Union—and was 
reputed to be equally fluent in Chinese” (ibid., 58). One of the Chinese staff officers and 
Communist negotiators, Pu Shan, had received a doctoral degree at Harvard University 
and worked as a professor at a U.S. college in the mid-west. He spoke much better 
English than his interpreter. Nonetheless, he was barred from engaging with the UN’s 
negotiation team directly in English, as it had been agreed that the negotiators would be 
limited to speaking their own language, which would then be communicated to the other 
side via an interpreter. Another member of the communist negotiation who could speak 
perfect English was Huang Hua, the chief Chinese negotiator. Huang had previously 
served as a Chinese-English interpreter for the Chinese Communist commissioner in 
Beijing at the time of the Marshall mission. Nonetheless,  
during six weeks of negotiating against Ambassador Dean he never uttered a 
word—in greeting, argument or even incidental half pleasantry—in English, nor 
did he correct his interpreter when the usual awkward mistakes were made.  
(ibid., 56-57) 
 
Although Huang did not flaunt his knowledge of English, his proficiency in the language 
was a great asset to him, as he understood what was being said as it was being said, and 
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could “think out his answer and counterattack” (ibid., 57) while the interpreter was 
rendering the English message into Chinese.  
Ekvall recalls that UNC interpreters were constantly reminded that the 
representatives of the communist forces as well as the PVA/KPA’s Korean and Chinese 
interpreters were constantly monitoring what they said. For instance, Pu Shan, who was a 
forceful and polished orator in Chinese, was often aggravated that all of his eloquence 
was lost on the American officers because the message had been rendered into English. 
He thus developed a habit of staring at Ekvall, the only member of the UNC negotiation 
team who could appreciate the merit of his words and elegant aphorisms, after making a 
speech. At times, this became too much to bear and  
He would twist and fidget until he could stand it no longer—he had long ceased 
looking at me—and then would stop his interpreter with a fierce whisper: “No—
no, not that. Here read this.” He himself would write out the English interpretation 
of what he had said and pass it to his interpreter to read.  
(ibid., 54-55) 
 
The other representative of the Chinese military, Huang Hua, likewise indirectly applied  
pressure on the interpreter by making it evident that he was monitoring what the 
interpreter said: “He listened to me, I knew, with amusement and a touch of malicious 
curiosity to learn how I would put into his mother tongue what he had already understood 
so well when it had been said in English” (Ekvall 1960, 48).  
 The fact that interpreters were constantly under surveillance was a source of 
emotional distress because the norms of word-for-word interpreting were so fiercely 
upheld at the negotiation table that divergence from the original could be interpreted as 
an indication of disobedience towards the senior officer who had made the statement, 
which, within a the context of a military at war, was a serious offense. This is best 
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represented in the example of Sul Jeong Shik, the Korean-English interpreter of the 
communist negotiation team. Underwood recalls that 
He continually tried to “gild the lily” of [Chinese] Liaison Officer (Col. Chang)’s 
remarks. For example: Col. Chang said quite calmly on one inspection trip “Here 
are three of the Chinese People’s Volunteers [i.e. Chinese soldiers] killed by your 
soldiers,” but Sul [the interpreter] said words to the effect, “Here you see, in pools 
of their own blood these brave volunteers who left home and family to come to 
this foreign land in sacrifice for the noble cause of our side in this war.” 
   After he did this several times I turned to Col. Chang (against all protocol, for 
interpreters exist only to speak for their masters) and asked him if he indeed 
meant what Sul said, or what he himself said. Chang glared at a third officer (who 
had shown no evidence of speaking English) who gave him a quick nod, meaning 
I was telling the truth. At that Col. Chang blew up at Sul and ordered him to go – 
get out of my sight. My analysis of the situation is that Sul, who had been a 
“mole” HS [high school] teacher in Seoul before the war, was simply trying to be 
super patriotic to “prove” his loyalty to the North. 
(Harris, 2010b) 
 
The Korean War historian Allan Millet (2002, 260) writes that events such as those 
discussed above were the cause of Sul’s demise:  
“a turncoat Seoul highschool teacher” who worked as an interpreter for the 
Communist delegation…He was executed at the end of the meeting because of his 
poor performance. In other words, it seems that interpreters without any proper 
training were only valuable according to their linguistic abilities, and, thus, they 
were highly vulnerable. 
 
Both Underwood and Millet ’s comments about Sul, however, paint a distorted picture of 
this interpreter. First, while Millet claims that Sul was an unexperienced, untrained 
interpreter who performed poorly at the negotiation table, this could hardly have been the 
case. Sul had not only studied English Literature at Mount Union University, Ohio, and 
Columbia University, New York, he was also an accomplished interpreter and translator 
by the time the negotiations began. In fact, for several years during the U.S. military 
occupation of Korea, he had worked as an interpreter for the Public Information Bureau 
of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). Sul’s name was 
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even listed as an interpreter in the meeting minutes of the Joint U.S.-Korea Conference 
(1946-47), which were discussed in detail in chapter two. The fact that he was chosen to 
work as a mediator at this high-level meeting attests to the fact that Sul was recognized as 
being a highly proficient interpreter whose skills were recognized by the USAMGIK. 
When the Korean War broke out, Sul, whose writings show he was at heart a socialist, 
joined the North Korean military but suffered a heart attack while in North Korea and 
was operated on at a Hungarian field hospital. After his recovery, he was chosen to serve 
as the KPA’s Korean-English interpreter at the armistice negotiations held at Kaesong 
and Panmunjom.  
Second, Millet claims that Sul was executed because of his poor performance as an 
interpreter. Having established that Sul was already an accomplished interpreter by the 
time the Korean Armistice Negotiation began, it is difficult to understand why he would 
have been executed during the armistice talks, when his linguistic skills were more 
valuable than ever. The truth of the matter was that Sul was not put on trial for being a 
bad interpreter but on charges that he was an American spy (Cho 2012, 8). This was most 
certainly not true, but these claims were made against him because the North Korean 
communist party had begun a purge of cadre members who had defected from South 
Korea. Sul’s career at the USAMGIK provided convenient grounds to justify his 
elimination.  
More important than the actual circumstances under which Sul was executed, 
however, is the reasoning that led to Underwood and Millet’s assumption that he was 
killed for being an incompetent interpreter. Their interpretation of these events provides 
insight into the UNC interpreter’s self-perception and their perception of the norms of 
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interpreting during the Korean Armistice Negotiations. In autobiographical material, an 
informants’ over-emphasis of certain themes or their defensive stance on certain topic 
tend to reveal their values and indicate their awareness of potential conflicts (Watson 
1976, 107). Thus, the connection made by Underwood and Millet between Sul’s 
interventionist interpreting tendencies or refusal to subserviently act as a linguistic 
conduit, and his execution by the North Korean communist party suggests that UNC 
interpreters themselves viewed fidelity to the source text to be an indicator of the 
interpreter’s loyalty to the military establishment. Interpreting strategies such as addition, 
clarification, subtraction, compression, omission, on the other hand, even when employed 
to facilitate communication, were viewed as signs of open defiance. Because both the 
negotiators and the interpreters saw the negotiation table as a battlefield, such 
insubordination was legitimately thought to be punishable by death, which is why Millet 
and Underwood arrived at the conclusion that Sul was executed for misinterpreting.  
In sum, UNC’s military interpreters were officers and soldiers in the U.S. army, 
working with their military superiors at the negotiation table. As members of the military, 
the authority they commanded during interpreted events was decided not by the level of 
linguistic and cultural expertise they possessed but by their military rank. As such, they 
were obligated to abide by the military’s expectations regarding what constitutes 
legitimate interpreting practice. The word-for-word interpreting norms of the military, 
however, at times hampered interlingual/intercultural communication as it limited the 
tools at the interpreter’s disposal which might be used to better convey the original 
message to the PVA/KPA’s representatives. Despite the fact that the UNC lacked the 
means to monitor the activities of its interpreters to confirm that they were acting as 
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neutral conduits, the interpreters and representatives of the communist alliance provided 
this function, since they kept close track of what the interpreter said and were more than 
eager to point our discrepancies. Given that attempts to diverge from the original message 
would be quickly discovered and the consequences of such an act were believed to be 
severe, it is hardly surprising that UNC interpreters did not seek to challenge their 
superior’s expectations regarding proper interpreting practices and abided by demands 






Despite the historical significance of the Korean War as the first major 
international clash to follow World War II, the first war in which member of the United 
Nations participated in military action under the UN flag, and the first “hot war” of the 
Cold War era, there have been very few studies conducted on the role interlingual 
communication and interlingual mediators played in this violent conflict. The limited 
number of studies that exist focus solely on the Korean Armistice Negotiations (1951-
1953) but have thus far ignored the contributions made by interpreters during the U.S. 
military occupation of southern Korea (1945-48) as well as the Korean War (1950-1953), 
mostly likely due to the difficulty in locating historical records related to linguistic 
mediation during those periods.  
The data for this study draws from a wide variety of historical documents 
collected from the Republic of Korea government’s online database, the Korean History 
Database, and the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States of 
America. A large body of newspaper and magazine articles published in both South 
Korea and the United States were consulted as well. Special attention was also paid to 
autobiographical material written by former interpreters as well as transfiction written 
during the period under analysis. This study is likewise indebted to the families of former 
interpreters, who shared insightful interviews, anecdotes, photographs, and military 
records relevant to the topic at hand.  
 The archival material was analyzed and interpreted using Pierre Bourdieu’s 
sociological notions of “field,” “capital,” “habitus,” and Moira Inghilleri’s 
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conceptualization of interpreting activity as a “zone of uncertainty.” This theoretical 
framework was used to analyze subtle shifts in the interpreting habitus that occurred as 
the Korean conflict proceeded from preparation to engagement to conclusion. The 
historical records, military documents and reports were used primarily to explore the 
networks of power within which interpreting took place, while the information gathered 
from interviews, autobiographical material, newspaper articles, and fictional works were 
used to portray and analyze how interlocutors, including but not limited to the interpreter, 
navigated and manipulated the structures of power that emerged during interpreted 
events, thus lending further nuance to the study. 
  
5.1. Summary of Key Findings 
The current study views the U.S./U.S.S.R. occupation of the Korean peninsula, 
the Korean War, and the Korean Armistice Negotiations as the preparatory, engagement, 
and conclusionary phases of the Korean Conflict. Chapter two discussed the preparatory 
phase, or the U.S. occupation of southern Korea. Chapter three delved into the 
engagement phase, or the Korean War, and chapter four investigated the conclusionary 
phase, or the Korean Armistice Negotiations. All three chapters followed a similar 
structural format, as each introduced the socio-political circumstances of the military 
field in which interpreted events were situated, the relationship between social agents 
who engaged in interpreted events, and the distinct interpreting habitus that emerged 
during each phase of the conflict. This structural configuration is in line with Bourdieu’s 
recommendations for analyzing a field of power and its habitus (Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1992a, 104-105).  
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 Each of the three chapters began with a summary of the socio-political conditions 
surrounding the Korean peninsula. Chapter two provided a review of the socio-historical 
conditions and the decisions made by major players that led to the division of Korea 
along the 38th parallel and its occupation by the militaries of Soviet Union in the north 
and the United States in the south. Chapter three began with a brief account of the 
outbreak of the Korean War and provides a detailed explanation of how and why the 
United Nations and the People’s Republic of China became involved in the conflict, 
despite the fact that the Republic of Korea was not a members of the United Nations 
when war broke out on the peninsula. Lastly, chapter four clarified why the two sides 
decided to bring the fighting to an end at the negotiation table rather than on the 
battlefield, the process of negotiations, and the contents of the final agreement.  
 Next, each chapter moved on to examine the interagential structures of power 
and relations within the military field during each period of the conflict. Chapter two 
focused on three primary players: U.S. military personnel, the Korean public, and Korean 
civilian interpreters working for the United States Army Military Government in Korea 
(USAMGIK). During the period of military occupation, the southern half of Korea was 
dominated by the USAMGIK, which maintained administrative control over the country 
from 1945 to 1948. Despite arriving in Korea with the intention of establishing an 
occupational government, the United States military did not possess any trained Korean 
linguists within their ranks, as the country’s military brass had unfoundedly assumed that 
Japanese Nisei interpreters could manage the task of mediating communications between 
the Korean people and U.S. military personnel. This proved to be an erroneous 
supposition, as fewer Koreans than initially thought could communicate through a 
 
160 
Japanese mediator, and many of those who could refused to do so due to the country’s 
recent experience of colonial oppression under Japanese rule. Consequently, the 
USAMGIK was forced to employ Korean locals as Korean-English language brokers for 
the Military Government. Because the study of the English language was strongly 
discouraged during the last decade of Japanese rule, as Japan had engaged in open 
warfare with the United States, there was a short supply of Koreans capable of 
functioning as Korean-English linguistic go-betweens at the time. Despite the high 
demand and low supply of English speakers, the USAMGIK chose to grossly underpay 
interpreters, which might have led to some instances of corruption. The Korean public, 
with whom the USAMGIK had to establish channels of communication, viewed the 
foreign occupational force with great negativity because while the U.S. military claimed 
to have arrived in Korea to aid in its establishment a functioning indigenous government, 
it disbanded and oppressed the People’s Republic of Korea, which had been recognized 
by the Japanese Governor-General and was widely popular and operational when the U.S. 
troops arrived. The Korean public regarded interpreters working for the USAMGIK as 
the second generation of foreign colluders, criticized the Military Government as an 
“interpreter’s government” and claimed that USAMGIK interpreters were “malicious” 
individual who were to blame for many of the problems Korean society faced at the time.  
 Chapter three reviewed the situation seen during the Korean War. Here, the study 
focused on three agents: UN Liaison Group officers, U.S. Korean Military Assistance 
Group officers and Republic of Korea Army officers. During the Korean War, the U.S. 
military once again opted against recruiting or training its own linguistic staff, deciding 
rather to rely on the services interpreters and translators provided by the Republic of 
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Korea Army (ROKA). These military linguists were lieutenants in the South Korean 
Army but worked under the misleading title—United Nations Liaison Group officers. 
This was a highly coveted position because serving as an officer/interpreter guaranteed 
better pay than enlisted soldiers, increased the person’s chances of survival, and gifted 
the individual with the opportunity to study and practice English. Most UN Liaison 
Group officers were individuals who had received higher education and considered 
themselves members of the South Korea’s social elite. Once selected, interpreters were 
required to receive three weeks of language and military training, but in reality, due to the 
urgent need for interpreters in the fields and headquarters, training was often cut short. 
Complaints regarding the linguistic capabilities of these interpreters can, in part, be 
accredited to this lack of training, and the absence of agreed upon translation equivalents 
for military terminology. A large number of UN Liaison Group officers were sent to 
ROKA units to serve as linguistic mediators between U.S. KMAG officers and ROKA 
unit commanders. KMAGers were U.S. officers sent to serve as advisors to the 
commanders of ROKA units. KMAG advisors were lower in rank than their Korean 
counterparts and did not hold official commanding power over the Korean units to which 
they were assigned. Nonetheless, the ROKA advisees could not disregard their presence 
because the UNC, which was headed by a U.S. general, maintained operational control 
over the ROKA. Thus, the KMAG advisor and the ROKA advisee were constantly 
contending for authority over the other. As the main channel through which the two could 
cooperate and compete, interpreting was made the site of this struggle. Because UN 
Liaison Group officers were members of the ROKA, and ROKA unit commanders were 
their superiors, these interpreters were compelled to abide by their military superior’s 
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orders. However, many members of the UN Liaison Group questioned the authority of 
their unit commanders, as they viewed themselves to be socially and intellectually 
superior to their senior officers, causing tensions to arise between the two groups. Near 
the end of the war, the 8th ROKA Division reassigned their UN Liaison Group officers to 
the KMAG staff. Because this move came only one month before the signing of the 
armistice agreement, it is impossible to definitely confirm how such a move would have 
affected the social dynamics between agents during interpreted events, though records 
complied by U.S. military personnel indicate that both UN Liaison Group officers and 
KMAGer responded positively to this move. The study infers how the relationship might 
have developed over time based on the relationship seen between a U.S. military unit and 
a Korean civilian interpreter. In this case, it was found that once a “fictive kin” 
relationship was established between the two parties, members of the U.S. military relied 
on the interpreter not only for linguistic mediation but additional services and functions 
that lay outside of what is typically thought of as being the domain of the interpreter, 
including intelligence gathering, analysis, and, when needed, operational control.  
 The subjects studied in chapter four, which focused on the Korean Armistice 
Negotiations, were the UNC delegates to the armistice talks, the North Korean/Chinese 
delegates, the communist interpreting staff, and the UNC interpreters. The Korean 
Armistice Negotiations were held between the delegations of the UNC and the 
representatives of the armies of North Korea and China. Consequentially, the languages 
of all three participants—Korean, English, and Chinese—were recognized as the official 
languages of the armistice talks. It was agreed that any comments made in one language 
were to be interpreted into the remaining two languages. Both delegations were 
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accompanied by interpreters who were tasked with rendering statements made by their 
representatives into the other official languages. Because the United States military had 
failed to train Korean linguists, despite its three year occupation of Korea and its 
participation in an international war fought on Korean soil, it was discovered that there 
were no linguists among active duty personnel who could reliably work as conference 
interpreters at the armistice talks. As a result, the UNC had to rely on U.S. military 
reserves, who had been raised as bilingual but had no formal training as interpreters, to 
play this vital role. The number of interpreters and translators at the negotiation site was 
constantly lower than the numbers recommended, forcing interpreters to work long hours 
under highly challenging conditions. The delegation of the UNC was made up of four 
officers from the U.S. military and one member of the ROKA while the KPA/PVA 
delegation was headed by North Korean general who was supported by two North 
Korean and two Chinese representatives. Both sides saw the negotiation table as an 
extension of the battleground and treated the other as an enemy.  
 The following chart provides an overview of the findings of this study.  
Table 6: Military Interpreters During the Three Stages of the Korean Conflict 
 U.S. Occupation Korean War Korean Armistice 
Negotiations 
Year 1945-48 1950-53 1951-53 
Military 
Organization 
















Republic of Korea 
Army 
United State Military 
Interpreter’s 
Rank 
Civil Servant, Grade 
7 to 10 
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A common factor found throughout the Korean conflict was the high demand and low 
supply of capable interpreters. These findings align with the following assessment made 
by Fishel and Hausrath (1958) with regards to the linguistic challenges the U.S. military 
faced in Korea during the Korean conflict: 
The US Army has faced a serious language deficiency in Korea, not only since 
the start of the Korean War in June 1950, but since the initial US occupation of 
the peninsula in September 1945. Even as in 1945 when US forces landed in 
Korea without trained Korean language personnel in their ranks, 5 years later in 
the invasion of South Korea in 1950 found the US Military Advisory Group to the 
Republic of Korea (KMAG), the Eighth US Army, and other US units in Korea 
still without adequate supply of competent language specialists. The gravity of the 
language situation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the US Army had no 
competent career-service language personnel available to handle the 2-yr truce 
negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom.  
(Fishel and Hausrath 1958, 8) 
 
Although the military field was characterized by a high demand and low supply of 
interpreters throughout the three phases of the Korean conflict, the reasons for the 
asymmetry between the two differed by period. During the U.S. occupation, the U.S. 
military misjudged the efficacy of using its readily available Nisei interpreters in Korea. 
This miscalculation was brought on by racist views of Asian countries and people, and an 
insensitivity towards Korea’s colonial past and its identity as a sovereign nation. 
Consequently, the USAMGIK was forced to rely on local civilian interpreters, whose 
numbers were limited because the study of English in Korea had been restricted under the 
Japanese colonial authorities.  
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During the Korean War, the shortage of interpreters was in part caused by 
America’s hubris following World War II. U.S. policymakers and military leaders 
believed that the U.S.’s intervention would bring the war to a swift termination, and thus 
the military decided against training its own Korean interpreters. Instead, the organization 
relied on interpreters supplied by the ROKA. This belief demonstrates the fact that the 
U.S. not only drastically underestimated its enemies but also undervalued the importance 
of interlingual communication within the field of military combat.  
The demand for interpreters at the Korean Armistice Negotiations distinguished 
itself from the needs of the occupational government or the U.S. military during the war. 
During the negotiations the U.S. military required the services of Grade A military 
linguists, or “conference level” interpreters. Because the military had ignored the need to 
train its own interpreters during both the occupation and the war, it had no active duty 
personnel with the abilities to perform such a role. Due to the fact that the UNC 
negotiation team was led by the U.S. amid opposition from the ROK government, 
however, the U.S. could not rely on Korean interpreters. Because there were no active 
duty language specialists capable of fulfilling this role, the U.S. was forced to recruit a 
handful of bilingual personnel that were members of its Reserve Corps. Aside from 
Colonel Ekvall, these individuals had not been trained and lacked experience as 
interpreters, yet they were forced to learn on the job during this important event. While 
the negotiations were ongoing, the U.S. military continued to recruit and send candidates 
to the negotiation site to work as interpreters, translators, or typists, but most were sent 
back because they lacked the linguistic skills to carry out theses roles.  
 
166 
 Also worthy of note are changes to the interpreters’ status, rank, and affiliation 
over the three phases of warfare under examination as changes to their positioning within 
the military field influenced their ability to dictate the terms under which interpreting 
took place. During the occupation, the USAMGIK recruited local Koreans to serve as 
interpreters at the Military Government. Their positions ranged from grade 7 to grade 10 
government servants. As lower grade civil servants for an occupational government, who 
were being paid artificially low wages for their linguistic services, it would seem natural 
that these interpreters occupy a position of subservience within the institution of power. 
The findings of this study, however, reveal that contrary to expectations, the civilian 
status of these interpreters, which allowed them to exist outside the military hierarchy, 
provided them with a high level of freedom when compared to military interpreters. As a 
result, these interpreters functioned under less pressure to abide by the expectations of the 
institution. Furthermore, because the U.S. military had arrived in Korea without having 
made any preparations for the linguistic challenges it would face, the Military 
Government lacked the capabilities to recruit and test, train, and monitor the activities of 
its interpreters. In other words, this foreign institution was thoroughly reliant on the 
services of interpreters over whom it could exercise no oversight. Rather, the officials in 
the Military Government came to rely on interpreters to compensate for their lack of 
cultural, political, and linguistic knowledge, and as a result the USAMGIK was often 
referred to as the “interpreter’s government.” Under such conditions, the Military 
Government was unable to present both the material and linguistic capital needed to 
assume a position of power dominance during interpreted events, which prevented it from 
asserting with confidence the validity of its views on how interpreters such function 
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during interpreted events. Because of the lack of institutional control, there was a high 
level of uncertainty regarding how interpreting should be conducted, which offered 
interpreters the opportunity to actively intervene and in some cases dominate interpreted 
events.  
During the Korean War, UN Liaison Group officers, who served as mediators 
between U.S. KMAG advisors and ROKA unit commanders. Despite the group’s name, 
UN Liaison Group officers were first lieutenants in the ROK military, and as such, these 
interpreters appeared to be firmly situated within the hierarchical structure of the ROK 
military. However, because these officers were limited to performing tasks related to 
translation and interpreting and were not involved in “the management of violence,” they 
were excluded for the ROK military’s chain of command. Thus, these interpreters saw 
themselves as “amateur soldiers” and commissioned officers saw them as “frail 
intellectuals.” Furthermore, UN Liaison Group officers worked primarily with KMAG 
officers, which added to the ambiguity of their positioning within the military field. They 
were thus viewed as outsiders and a potential threat to the Korean military institution by 
ROKA officers. While the Korean and U.S. militaries were allies, there was an ongoing 
rivalry between KMAGers and ROKA commanders over who possessed more authority 
because while the ROKA advisor held rank, the KMAGer was a member of the stronger 
military force. The UN Liaison Group officer was pressured to function as a gatekeeper, 
limiting the information the KMAGer had access to regarding the workings of the Korean 
military unit to which they were assigned. However, just as officers in the Korean 
military did not view these interpreters as regular members of the ROKA, the interpreters 
themselves saw themselves as positioned outside the military structure. Their position as 
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inbetweeners meant they could at time reject the premise that military rank equals 
superiority, as memoires have revealed that they displayed disdain towards their military 
leaders. Due to these complications, some U.S. military units preferred to hire civilian 
interpreters, who were relatively free from pressures that Korean military personnel 
exerted upon UN Liaison Group officers. In this case, if the interpreter demonstrated their 
loyalty to the U.S. military, they were, in some cases, accepted as fictive kin and 
entrusted with a wide range of duties.   
 The situation seen during the Korean Armistice Talks differs from circumstances 
seen during the two previous phases of conflict significantly. The interpreters at the 
negotiation table were U.S. military personnel, the majority of whom were officers, 
conveying what the members of the UNC delegation, who were likewise U.S. military 
officers but of higher rank, said to the communist delegation. While in the case of the 
occupation and the war, the interpreters saw themselves as fully not situated within the 
hierarchical structure of the military organization for which they worked, there was little 
room left for such ambiguity at Kaesong and Panmunjom. As Wang and Xu (2016) 
observed, these interpreters were first and foremost loyal to the militaries that they 
served. The “role morality” of these interpreters was primarily defined by their status as 
military personnel rather than their function, which was to serve as linguistic mediators. 
Furthermore, while the U.S. military had outsourced responsibility over the recruitment, 
training, and monitoring of interpreters during the occupation and the war because it 
lacked the capabilities to carry out such functions, during the armistice talks, the U.S. 
military was forced to locate, recruit, test, train, manage and monitor its interpreting staff. 
An additional layer added to the constraints placed on interpreters to ensure that they 
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were accurately communicating what was said by their principals was the presence of 
“enemy” interpreters seated across the table, watching their every move and surveilling 
their every word. The example of Sul Jeong Shik stands as a reminder that stepping 
outside the bounds of verbatim interpreting could be equated to insubordination, which, 
within the context of war, might very likely lead to server punishment. Thus, the level of 
uncertainty regarding the identity of the interpreter, the positionality of the linguistic 
mediator within interpreted events, and dominant views with regards to what constitutes 
proper practice was low during the armistice talks, which limited the tools available to 
the interpreter during interpreted events.   
 The findings of this study show that the interpreter’s status or rank within a 
military organization is not the primary source of the authority they might possess during 
interpreted events. It seems unlikely that military rank does not figure into the 
empowerment of the interpreter during interpreted events at all, based on the fact that 
lower ranking interpreters at the Korean Armistice Negotiations believed that their 
superiors disregarded their linguistic and cultural expertise because of their lower status. 
Nonetheless, it is readily evident that the civilian interpreters working for the USAMGIK 
occupied a position of greater authority than UN Liaison Group officers during the war, 
who, in turn, exercised greater freedom than the interpreters at the Korean Armistice 
Negotiations.  
Th results of this study also demonstrate that an institution’s ability to dictate the 
terms of interpreting are decided by how actively it is involved in, 
1) the selection of the interpreter, from a pool of competent candidates who 
possess the requisite linguistic skills and are willing to align themselves with 
the goals of the institution,  
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2) the training of the interpreter, which helps students acquire relevant linguistic 
skills and impresses on them normative practices,  
3) the monitoring of interpreters, to verify that they adhere to prescribed 
practices. The institution must be able to create incentives for interpreters to 
comply with the requirements of the institution.  
 
During the U.S. occupation, the USAMGIK was unable to effectively fulfill any of these 
functions, which resulted in an interpreting habitus that allowed and, more importantly, 
required that the interpreter take on an active role during interpreted events. During the 
Korean War, the U.S. military was once again only marginally involved in the selection 
and training of interpreters and entirely lacked the ability to monitor interpreting 
practices. Furthermore, UN Liaison Group officers were members of the ROKA, and 
under no obligation to defer to the wishes of KMAG officers. Instead, these interpreters 
were liable, if grudgingly so, to manipulate an interlingual exchange to favor the ROKA. 
The circumstances seen during the armistice negotiations were different, as interpreters 
were selected from the military, received training at Kaesong and Panmunjom, and were 
constantly being monitored by other interpreters, both friendly and enemy, to ensure that 
they complied with interpreting norms which called for the interpreter to function as a 
conduit of meaning.  
 
5.2. Implications and Future Research 
The findings of the present study, summarized above, have reinforced the view 
that interpreting is a social practice. The data analyzed in this study suggests that the 
interpreter’s position within the network of power that emerged during interpreted events 
held during the Korean conflict affected their behavior as well as those of other social 
agents situated in the military field. The interpreting habitus that took form in each period 
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of the Korean conflict emerged based on the power dynamics between social agents, the 
interpreter’s position within the institution of power, and the ability of the U.S. military 
to select, train, and monitor interpreters. At different times and locations during the 
conflict, radically different norms of interpreting, ranging from active intervention to 
nonintervention took form. All of these findings point back to the notion that interpreting 
does not occur in a vacuum, and that it is conditioned by the social, political and cultural 
context of the setting in which the interpreted event takes place.  
 The author hopes that this study represents a contribution to the field of 
Translation and Interpreting Studies (TIS), mainly in the following two area. One is the 
addition of new knowledge and information to the collective knowledge of this rapidly 
growing discipline. This study drew from a wide variety of materials, including 
previously classified military and governmental documents, provides a wealth of 
information on various aspects of interpreting during both the U.S. military occupation of 
southern Korea, the Korean War, and the Korean Armistice Negotiations, which had 
previously been largely ignored.  
 The other contribution of the present study may be the broadening of 
perspectives in TIS. Studies conducted within the discipline since the so-called “cultural 
turn” have focused much attention on the social factors in which interpreting takes places 
as well as the power dynamics seen between social agents. This study used Bourdieu’s 
theoretical framework to examine the sociological nature of interpreting during the 
Korean conflict. It directly addressed social and political issues to describe the field in 
which interpreting took place, examined the social dynamics that arose within the 
military field between social agents engaged in interpreting events, and analyzed the 
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interpreting habitus that arose is zones of uncertainty. It is the author’s hope that this 
research is seen contributing to the deepening and widening of sociological approaches to 
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